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Despite a grovdng interest in Censervatiea in recent years,
rfilsxtlrelj littls has been done (apart

Meyer and Russell Kirk) to deal

frt-s?

the work ©f Frank

viith ConservatiEia

afs

a

philos&phy

with clearly-defined principles Kcparate frea an adherence to
the staitufc'-qua.

Thle disjsertatisn endeavsrs; to

at correcting this lack, and

existence and aaj«r

ter.'ifcs

®r

ir.

laake a

start

addition f.eoks t® point 0ut the

tv.'^.

tm

doaiaant straujas ef Coa-

sarvatirs thought

These tw©
jifi

currf-r-te

of Cfifnservatisa received their genesis

organised philosop!iie« (Canservatlsm

k.ad

prerigusly existed

the political
in as unerganised, often teBtperaatirtal , fashion.) in

philessphie.- »f Edaiund Burke and Jcsaph d© Kaistre*

Though these

da on such
thinkeris are both Coaservatires, a^reein^; as they
ejiistence ©f
key principles ©f Conservative pailosfrphy as the
a chjingelftss and knowable acral

ls7/,.

the fallibility cf

aian

and

ef huican reason, the need ©f Kan t© be treated as a social beins,
thc>
ill

danger of abstract rationalism, and the need to be very cautious

carrying out reforms, they also disagree in many important

ways?,

Ajaong these

a.lity cf
tiit

disagreements are differing viewc of the eor-

man (Maistre here being the more pessimistic of ths

thinlcers.-)

,

differences of ©pinion on the origins and contea't

«f euetom and positire

lavr,

conflicts as t© the steaning of "freedoia"

(Msi-stre adheres to a positive theory of freedom, v/hereas Burke's

positica is a siixed one.)

,

contention as t® the degree of authority

and individual autonomy that should exist in the state, and finally
the degree t© which Utopian ©r laillenarian elements are present
iE the thefjries of the two thinkers.
It is the contention Qf this dissertation that the divorce

between Libertarian and Authoritari.<n Conservatism, begun by
Burke and Maistre^ has continued to the present day, and that
it is not possible to understand the nature of Conservatism and

its current jstatus

vsatliout

examining this disunity^

Table Of Contents

Chapter
!•

p^^ge

The Orii^ns and Nature ®f Conservatism

1

Tke Lives of Burke and Maietre

Th© Origins of Conservatism

19

What Is Censervatism?

22

One Conservatism Or Tw«?

60

Views On Man

II.

1

66

Man As Creation ef God

66

Original Sin

68

Degree of Good and Evil In Man

71

Free Will In Burke and Maistre

5l

IUhfs

Rale of Passion and Its Relationship

To Reason

91

Tke Extf^nt •f Human Reason

III,

If&tiori,

9?

Natural Law, and State of Nature,

and Their Relation T© Reason

t06

Tk© Nation
The Sources of Knowledge In Burke

1

1

Kai£tre«s Theory of the Source of
Knowledge
The Meaning ef Reason In Burke

123

Ckapter

Page

'

III (Cositiaued)
MaiEtre'ff Concept ©f E«asott

126

Burke *B Ccrtcepte af Gausatioa.

t52

Maiatre

IV,

On.

Causation

Thft

Natural Law

1it2

Tike

State of Katuro

I6l

Sources and Nature ©f ScTereignty

Origin of Positive

V»

157

176

La»r

Moral Justifiability of Soyereignty

l85

The Variability of Political Forms

l87

The Separation, of Powers

T93

'iiajs

of Checking Authority In Burke and Maistrc

Burke

202

Theory of Revolution

Maistre'e Views On Liaiting Authority

203

Mai6tre»s Treatment of Revolution

212

222

Relationship ©f Church and State
Church and State In Burke

«

Philosophy

Church and State In Maistre's Philosophy

VII.

199

199

Burke »s Theory of the Party

VI.

176

The The®ry of War and Empire

Burke's Beliefs Abdut War
Climate
Burke »s View af the Prcsper Dsraestic

In War

222
254

241
2ifl

GkApter

Page

VII (ContiBued)

VIII.

The iMperialisH cf Edaund Burke

2kS

MalBtre*B Beliefs About War

250

Inperialicm In Maictre's Theory

252

Thearies ©f Class Structure and Attitudes Tov/ard

Social Mobility

IX.

255

Burke's Perceptions of Class Structure

255

Social Mobility In Burke's Theory

259

Maistre»g View of Social Structure

26?.

S^cial Mobility In Maistre's Theory

26k

The ITature of a Constitution and Its Significance

For Liberty

269

Burke's Ideas About the Nature ®f
Constitutions

Haistre On the Nature of Constitutions

269

272

Tke Relationship of Burke's Views of

Censtitutions To Liberty

275

The Effect of Maistre'5 Constitutional Ideas
On Liberty
X.

The Meaning, Value, and Goal of Plistory

Burke's Definition of History

277
280
280

The Relationship Between the Individual and

History In Burke's Theory

28l

chapter

Page

X (Continued)

Kaistre's Definition of Kistary

28l

Kaifitrc's View 9f the Rele of the Individual

la Regard To History

282

A C'&ntroversy Over Interpretation of Burke

283

The Meaning of "Progress" In Burke' c Theory

286

Burke's Ideas of the Goal of History la

Relation To Liberty

289

Maistre's Ideas About History

290

The Meaning of "Progress" In Maistre's Theory

292

The Goal of History and Its Relationship To

XI,

XII.

Liberty In Maistre's Theory

292

Attitudes Toward Utilitarianism

295

Burke On Utilitarianism

296

Maistre On Utilitarianisa

30k

AU Analysis

310

The Legacy of Burke and Maistre

312

The Significance of Burke

512

Tke Significance ©f Maistre

317

CcnclusioR

321

Selected Bibliography

322

Chapter I: The Origins and Nature of Conservatism
A. The Lives of Burke and Maistre. Since the philosophical

theircs & thinker stresses are often intimately associated with his

life experiences, it is a useful approach to begin a study of this
tort with brief biographical sketches oT the principals.

We shall

first take a look at Burke*

Burke's date of birth is not known.

It may be that the people

of that time considered personal record-keeping to be a less important
art than is the present opinion.

John Morley, though uncertain

as to whether Burke was born in 172S or 1729»- finally settles upon

the date January 12^ 1729 (nev; style)

January

1,

,

\?hereas Philip Magnus choc yes

Most of Burke's biographers

1729 (also new style).

have chosen prudence over valor and put the year of his birth as
All these biographers are,

1729, folloTred by a question mark.

iiov/-

ever, agreed that Burke was the offspring of an Irish Protestant
father, Richard Burke of County Limerick, and an Irish Catholic

Bother, Mary (Wagle) Burke of County Cork, and was born in Dublin.
As was the custom in such religious mixed-marriages at the time,

Edmund and his brothers Garret and Richard were brought up in their
father's religion, and their sister Juliana adhered to her mother's
faith.

Despite his Protestantism, Burke's political adversaries
^John Morley > Edmund Burke (New York: Harper and Brothers,

Publishers, 1879), ?p. 3-^.
^Philip Magnus, Edmund Burke

:

A Life (Londonr John Murray,

1939)

never ceased to delight in calling bim a Catholic, and even a Jesuit,

charges he never bothered to deny.

Richard Burke, Edmund's father,

was a rather successful law^yer, whose legal practice, however, was

later to be seriously damaged by his outbursts of bad temper, a
trait his eminent son was to inherit.

At the age of six, Burke

was sent to Ballyduff, Ireland to begin his education at a Catholic

After five years at this school and one at home,

village school.

Burke was enrolled in Ballitore School in Ireland, an institution
run by a Yorkshire Quaker, Abraham Shackleton.

Shackleton

a fine

man and a fine teacher, and

Burke considered
isas

thereafter to

ascribe all he knew to Shackleton and to maintain a close personal

relationship m.ta Shackleton and his son Richard,
the events of Burke's fainily

posing

hini to

lif^:;

It is clear that

and early education were predis-

that large degree of religious tolerance he was later

to manifest.

In

17if3,

there until

Burke enrolled at Trinity College in Dublin, remaining

1?ifo,

and receiving

riis

Bachelor's Degree.

He was not

in
a brilliant student^ though he won a classical scholarship

that permitted

hira

to live at the college.

l7i+6

Burke »s style of study

study, for
was to throw himself whole-heartedly into one area of
a limited period of time.

He himself spoke, in a letter to Richard

Shackleton (quoted by Morley)
the "Furor Mathematicus"

,

and the "Furor Poeticus".

,

of being possessed successively by

the "Furor Logicus", the "Furor Historicus",
It ^dll be seen that Burke's later pol-

went from one allitical style was very much like this, in that he

consuming political interest (be it America, India, or France) to
Around this time Burke "began taking an interest in pol-

another.

In

itics.

l7i+7,

he was a founding member cf the Trinity College

debating club, in which his acidic and vociferous style of debating
earned

hira

the reputation of being "damned absolute", a verdict

that was later to be seconded by many of the greats of Britain and

Europe,

For a few months after he received his degree, Burke almost

single-handedly began writing and publishing a short-lived literary
weekly. The Reformer

,

and also wrote a series of anonymous political

pamphlets in defense of the rights of Ireland against British opprecsion.

In 1750, quite possibly under some pressure from his father,
who sought to see his only son who attended a university make a

success of himself. Burke ceased his dabbling in politics and literature at Dublin and went to London in order to study for the bar*
It did not talte very long for Burke to develop a deep and abiding

respect for the institution of law, and a great contempt for the
the
way it was to be learned, which was chiefly by hanging around
up.
Londoti l&w courts and picking up what could be picked

thia

tinre,

Around

Burke was leading a somewhat Bohemian existence, fre-

with
quenting the coffee houses and debating societies of London

relative of his, and
William Burke, a rather disreputable distant
the law.
not concentrating overly much on his studies of

Burke

choice for a young
had decided on a literary career, a not unusual

Burke's slow
man with Bohemian tendencies, and this, plus the young

progress tov^ard entering the bar (a step he never did achieve),
caused his angry father to cut off his allowance in 1755, after

cpending a thousand pounds to support

hira

in London,

Now faced by the need to support himself, Burke began doing
secretarial work for politicians and started seeking a literary
career in earnest.

In the latter regard, he published anonyniously

his first major work, A Vindication Of Natural Society , a tal-

ented satire of both Bolingbroke
theories of natural religion.

'

s

writing style and of his

Though the authorship of the

Vindication, was soon revealed and the work caused some stir,

it

d3.d

little to remove financial problems from Burke *s life,

as is shoun by the fact that a short time later he was offering

his last few shillings to an Armenian wayfarer, Josef Eniin*
The year 1757 was a wonderful year in Burke's life.
12,

he married Jane Nugent;

On March

Will Burke had been courting this

Catholic physician's daughter, but magnanimously stepped aside
far Sdreuiid.

Then, ok April 21,

Ediiiund»^s

book on The Sublime and

the Beautlfal was published, this being the work that established

hie reputation as a writer.

For the next two years. Burke continued his literary work,

becoming editor of the Annual Register and publishing a history
of England, though his still precarious financial situation
(He was largely dependent on his father-in-law's generosity.)

caused him during this period to consider emigration with his
family to Aiaerica,

la T759, however, his rising acquaintance

rith literary and society people (among whom were Garrick, Dr»

Johnson, and Mrs^ Montagu, the "Queen of the Blue-Stockings")

gained hin the opportunity to enter politics through the back
door.

He became the private secretary of V/illiam Gerard Hamilton,

a Commissioner of the Board of Trade and Plantations, an

M..

P.

rather unkindly known as "Single Speech", in recognition of hio
first and only brilliant speech in Parliament,

For the next

six yoare Burke was associated with Hamilton, until a dispute

centering on the degree of independence Burke was to have utterly
shattered the relationship.

Burke complained with some justice

that Hamilton had come to look upon, him as a piece of household
furniture.

Since Burke clearly needed a job to support himself

and hie family, he sought and found a new position as private

secretary to Lord Rockingham, the leader of probably the least
corrupt Whig faction, to whom he was introduced by Will Eurke.
Fnen, shortly thereafter, Rockingham became Prime Minister, Burke

became, in effect, chief whip of the Wliig Party, a position that

necessitated a seat in Parliament.

This problem was solved by

Will Burke's patron Lord Verney, who controlled a pocket borough
at ?/endover he had intended to give to Will; he was, hov/ever,

asked by Will to give it to Edmund instead, and complied.

Another

packet borough was found for Will.
Burke took his seat in Parliament on January

1766,

and immediatly plunged into the British dispute with America,

taking the American side in the dispute, usually with little

success.

severcl

Anierica was to be Burke
yej^.rs,

s

chief interest over the next

though India was also of interest to

hira,

due

to his desire to help along as much as possible his and Will's

iJivoBtments In India.

It is not to be thought that this position

©n India entailed excessive dishonesty, for when Burke saw injustice being done in India, he allowed no thought of personal

or family profit to affect his decisions,

Will Burke's financial

manipulations in India, which were as incompetent as they were
grandiose and dishonest, ultimately did the entire Burke family
serious financial harm, since the whole family lived together on

Edmund's he avily-raort gaged estate, "Qregories", and chared a common
Edmund, however, turned a blind eye to Will's dishonesty,

purse.

©ut of affection for him.

Siaultaneously with this struggle over America, and not

unrelated to it, was Burke's attempt to free the House of Comraons
from

th-^j

influence of th© Crown, so that it might act as a vork-

able counterweight to the Crown.

This was to be done in two

ways, as outlined by Burke in two important works.

In Thoughts

On the Causes Of the Present Discontents , Burke declared the
root cf Brit?iin's current problems, both at home and abroad,
to be the growth cf executive power over the House of Commons,

which ought to be the people's representative.

Rather disingen-

uously, Burke sought to excuse George III for this, preferring

instead to blame evil ministers.

One solution for this was to

organize philosophically-united parties, willing and able to

pass on proposed legislation ac bodies committed to carrying
out reasonably clear prograras of government.

This

ively destroy the King's divide and rule tactics.

v.'ould

effect-

The second

prong of this two-pronged attack on nascent monarchical absolutism
was outlined in Burke's speech on the reform of the King's civil
list.

The various feudal principalities, dukedoms, earldoms,

etcetera, in v;hich the King reigned under titles other than "king"
(a potent means of expanding the posts he could fill) were to
be abolished, and those offices which had been rendered entirely

obsolete, such as Master of the King's Stable, were also to be

eliminated.

It had been the habit of George III and his cohorts

to buy the loyalty of Members of Parliament by appointing them

to these posts

v/ith

nice salaries and little or no work attached.

Though Burke's attempt to reform the civil list, and hence curb
the pov;er of royal patronage, was not as successful as he had

hoped, it was successful enough to earn him the bitter enmity

of George III, an enmity that did not moderate (and then far
from completely) until the writing of Reflections On

"nvo

Revol-

ution In France .
affAn extremely important event in Burke's life, as it

ected bis political theory, was his visit to France from January
to March of 1773.

Here, for the first time, no one regarded

encouraged,
him as an Irish upstart, and he was permitted, even

basis of full
to mix with the highest levels of society on a

equality.

Burke's
Though we may assume this was very pleasing to

ego, A£ he becaa* the idol of French salon society (Walpole re-

marked, in a very pregnant phrase, that he almost made Christ-

ianity fashionable,), he nevertheless came back to England a
very deeply troubled man.

It cannot be said that this journey

radically altered Burke's philosophy, but it did clarify and
deepen portions of it.

From the time Burke began to think co-

herently about philosophy, he had a definite distrust of abstract

reason and of its potentially baneful effects (This was the theme
of his first important work, A Vindication Of Natural Society .

)

but after this fateful trip, the earlier half-playful tone of
the Vindication was gone,.

Seeing abstract rationalism at work

in all its glory in its capital city of Paris, Burke came away

convinced that it was necessarily subversive of all order, civ-

ilization and morality*

Consequently, Burke^s references to

abstract rationalism and atheism (he considered the two necessarily connected) were from that point marked by the utmost passion
and even violence*

He undoubtedly looked upon aia^elf as a man

vho, like Dante, had journeyed through the lowest circles of

hell and had brought back with him the

This aessage was:

-^Hold to the

ra-i^sage

©f redemption.

British constitution and Christianity

In 177/f, Burke undertook his first and only attempt at

truly elective politics.

The tide against the Tories that year

on the
was running especially high^ due to the damaging effects

British economy of the American boycott of British goods.

The

Whigs saw an opportunity to carry off both of the Parliamentary

seats of Bristol, then England's eecond-largest city, and therefore
ran Burks, who had the reputation ef a friend of British merc-

antile interests and a would-be compromiser on the disputes be-

tween England and America, for one of then, even though he had
just been chosen for the pocket borough of Malton.

This commer-

cial city, Bristol, elected Burke with 270? votes, and he preferred
the larger constituency to the smaller.

It cannot be said

that the six-year relationship between Burke and Bristol was
a happy one for either side*

perception of

h5.s

This difficulty stemmed from Burke »s

role as an M, F» and his relationship with the

people, as shall be seen in Chapter Eleven,

He ^as, first, firmly

set against accepting instructions from his constituents; he

in Parliament

vras

to exercise his .iudgement on the great affairs of

the state, and not to take orders like some clerk.

It must be

cenXeoised that people hail the truly independent man, but they do

not vote for him.

Second, Burke was vdlling to promote the in-

terests of Bristol when they did not run counter to those of England,
but when they did, he never forgot that he was a member of the

British Parliament from Bris tol, and not a representative (or
ambassador) of Bristol t£ the British Parliament .

Finally, Burke

did a very poor job of cultivating his constituents.

He made

little attempt to visit Bristol frequently and perform the local

equivalent of kissing babies.

Burke felt it was his responsibility

to stay in London and do his job there.

When it came time for Burke

dropped
to run for reelection, he realized the race was hopeless, and

out before the polling began.

Henceforth, he stayed in pocket borough

When it became clear America was lost to England, Burke »e

thoughts turned to India.

It has already been seen that

liis

first interest in the subject had been profoundJ.y fajnilial and

financial.

Upon studying the situation in India, hov/ever, Burke

became convinced that V/arren Eastings, first Grovernor General
of British India, was cruelly oppressing the Indian people, and

what had hitherto been a rather peripheral interest to Burke

became an© of the chief interests, and perhaps the compelling
interest, of his life*

Froa T782 to 1795» Burke attempted to

have Hastings impeached on a variety of charges, all of which
could fall under the heading of violating the Natural Law.

however, the verdict wae taken, the man

v/hora

'.Vhen,

Burke had called

"a spider of Hell'^ was, whether because of political reasons

or because his innocence was actually believed, acquitted on
all counts.

Burke declared many cimes that he had never suffered

a more personally crush^.ng political defeat*

The one lasting cause of Burke, that which had been his
first interest in politics, was the rights of Ireland^ and of

her Catholics in particular.

H3.s

close personal connection

ijriLth

Catholics, among them his mother, his sister, his first school-

Easter, his wife (until her conversion), and his father-in-law,

undoubtedly left him open to the charge that

he-

a terrible charge in eighteenth-century England.

did he suffer more, or for a longer time.
©ttly

too was a Catholic,

From

no'

attacks

It was, in fact, the

issue on which Burke was ever in actual danger of physical

violeace.

In 1730, Lord George Gordon, an H. P. and general

ruffian, prcvxjked massive anti-Catholic riots in which, before

they were quelled, hundreds of people were killed.

One of the

chief targets of the rioters' wrath was Burke, who had a much-

deserved reputation as an advocate of religious toleration in
general and of Catholic emancipation in particular.

A mob be-

sieged his home threatening to burn it, as they had already burned

Bany homes and shops, and when a contingent of sixteen soldiers
was sent to protect him^ Burke dismissed

had Kore important things to do.

thera,

telling them they

Burke continued to

¥/alk.

the

streets during the height of the riots, making no attempt to
hide his identity, and when on one oT these excursions he was

surrounded by a crowd of rioters and ordered to change
on.

an issue of toleration, he adamantly refused

began drawing his sv/ord to defend himself»

tci

do

liis

vote

so and

Fortunately, the

riots were crushed after ten harrowing days, and did act succeed

in extinguishing the life of one of the brightest lights of British

Parliamentary history, Edmund Burke
The last conflict in Burke »s life, that he pursued up to
the time of his death, was, of course, the one v/ith Jacobinism,

It cannot be said this was a happy time for Burke, for in this

struggle hs had to split his beloved

V-liig

Party for betraying

British principles, losing several persoual friends in the process, saw himself reviled as a fool, an enemy of liberty, and

even a lunatic, and finally suffered the untimely death of his

dear eon Richard, whom he had seen as the ornament of the Burke
family.

Finally, still firmly in the midst of the crusade for

Western civilization, Edmund Burke died on July

9,

1797.

Count Joseph de Maistre was born at Chambcry in Savoy in
175<4,

a member of the Savoyard branch

oT a great French

fairdly,

Maiatre, though geographically an Italian, always identified
strongly with France and probably considered himself to be French,
Maistre'

s

father was a nobleman and a high official of the Kingdom

of Savoy, and his mother was a very devout and tender woman who

had a great hold over her eldest son*

So great

v/as

Maistre

willing submission to the authority of his parents that while
he was pursuing an education in law he would never read any book

without seeking and winning their approval of its contents first.

Maistre *s pre-university education was in the exclusive
care of the Jesuit Society.

In all likelihood,

liis

life-long

devotion to the Catholic Church and to the Society of Jesus

stemmed from this period*

After his Jesuit-run education was

completed, Maistre went to the dniversity of Turin to study law,

unlike Burke not finding that course of study to be uncongenial.

After the completion cf his legal stuflLes, Maistre effortlessly

entered the public administration of Savoy, ultimately graduating
frcm there to the Savoyard Senate presided over by his father.

Until the storm of the French Revolution came to Savoy,

Maistre •£ life was probably fairly typical of the life of an

Intelligent young French (by culture) nobleman of the Enlighten-

ffient

period*

Unaided he taught himself English, Spanish, Latin»

Greek, and German (the first three with high proficiency), in

addition to, of course, knowing his native languages of French
and Italian.

Maistre was a member of the Masonic Order, belonging

to the Refora Lodge at Charabery,

and this, plus his early advocacy

of freedom of speech and his youthful enthusiasm for the American

Revolution (which afterwards v/holly evaporated, to be replaced
by a loathing of America), earned him the reputation of a dan-

gerous yeung man who should be closely watched.
In 1786, Maistre married, and, despite the fact that hus-

band and wife were to be separated for many years, it was app-

arently a very happy marriage,

Maistre looked upon his wife

as a perfect complement to himself,

feeling her to have a great

facility for planning ahead, which he lacked (Maistre called
her Hadsjse Prudence.) and a real talent for teaching, which was
alsa net one of his talents..

This;

happy union led to three offspring.

They had not been married for long when the events took
place that were to shatter the normal routine of a family of

aristocrats*

The French Revolution broke out, and the Jacobin

armies spilled across the French border, sending the Maistre
family fleeing across the Alps to Aosta and safety.

Shortly

after their flight, the new French regime in Savoy passed a law

requiring all refugees to return immediately, upon pain of confiscation of all their property.

Seeking to save something of

their possessions, Madame de Maistre (who was nine months pregnant)

left v.lthout tellins her husband, who was in Turin, and proceeded
to cross the Alps on a mule In the depth of winter to return
to Savoy -with her two children.

Upon returning to Aosta from

Turin and learning what his vdfe

v/as

off after her, fully ejiriecting
less bodies of his
v/hat

at

undertaking, Maistre set

every moment to find the life-

and children in the Alpine snow«

vrfLfe

By

can only be called the grace of God, hov/ever, Madame de

Maistre and her children arrived safely in Chambery, to be joined
shortly afterv/ards by her husband.

After Maistre refused to

sign the register of citizens and contribute money to iha Jacobin
army, he waited until his jife delivered her third baby, and

then abandoned his property and fled to Lausanne, Switzerland,

shortly afterwards bringing his faraily,

Maistre stayed in Lausanne for three years, in
he

bscaiJie

a leader

wlLich tine

propagandist of the emigre movenientj de-

ai^'d

spite the fact that Kaistre, unlike the other emigres, despised

both the Revolution

the philosophy which had nurtured 'it;

the

steeped in the Enlightenment philosophy Maistre had

others

vrers

by

rejected.

nc."

aiid

One result of

liis

sojourn in S-^atzerland may

have been a softening of Maistre 's presumably hostile attitude

toward republics, as shall be seen later in this dissertation.
From Lausanne Maistre and his family went to Turin, where another
chapter in this life that sometimes resembles a melodrama was

acted out.

Shortly after Maistre'

s

arrival, the French conquered

again.
Turin, and so the Maistre family was obliged to take flight

this time

do'vvn

the Po on an overcrowded, ill-heated refugee boat

in the v/inter of

1797,.

with Austrian soldiers on one bank of

the river and French soldiers on the other.
blov/n up was, therefore, omnipresent.-

The chance of being

As bad as the boat ride

was, his family's lot in Venice, their destination, was even

worse*

Favlng been forgotten temporarily by

iiis

patron the King

of Sardinia, Kaistra and his family were entirely cut loose from
all me^ms ot subsistence, save for a few pieces of silver plate

that had been saved out of the general collapse of theii" fortunes.

John Morley, in fact, believes this period of Kaistre's life to
have worked deep effects on his philosophy, and it is difficult
to gsi.iasay hiE».

The student of Maistre^s philosophy raaj see in what crushing
personal ^nssuish same of its most tjinister growths h^id its roots,
Wlien the c.^rcjs of beggary coae suddenly upon a man in middle
Alone, and starving for a cause that is
life, they burn deep.
dear to liim:. he might encounter grim fate vn.th a fortitude in
which there eiiould be many elevating and consoling elements.
But the destiny is intolerably hard which condemns a man of humane
Kaistre certainly was, to look helplessly upon the
mould, as
physical pains of a tender woman and famishing little ones.
The hsjur of bereavt^ment has its bitterness, but the bitterness
is gradually suffused vdth a soft reminiscence. The grip of
beggary leaves a irark on such a character as De Maistre s that
no prosperity of after days effaces. The seeming inhumanity
©f his theory of life, which is so revolting to comfortable people,
was in truth the only explanation of his own cruel sufferings
in which he could find any solace. It was not that he hated
mankind, but his destiny locked as if God hated him, and this
was a horrible moral complexity out of which he could only extricate himself by a theory in which pain and torment seem to
stand out as the aain facts of human existence.^
'

^Joha Morley, Biographical Studies (Freeport, New York:
Books For Libraries Press, 1969)

i

PP.

1

81-1 82.

Whether or not one can go quite so far as Morley does in

ascribing political philosophy to personal events, it can be
said that this Venetian interlude

v/as

the worst period of Maistre's

life, though true prosperity never really returned.

As the for-

tunes of King Charles Emanuel lY of Sardinia slightly improved,
he began to remember those who had suffered on his behalf, which

certainly included Maistre.

Maistre was given the commission

of getting the government of the island of Sardinia, whose gov-

ernment had collapsed into anarchy during the war, functioning
again*

It need hardly be said that it is a very difficult task

to get people to pay taxes and to observe a settled system of

justice SLgain when taxation has vanished and vendetta has taken
the place of law.

That Maistre had any success at all (and he

had partial success)

v;as

a mark of his talent, and likely earned

him his next appointment, which to the King may have been a reward, but to Maistre was a severe test of his loyal tsy to his

sovereign.

In recognition of his successes in straightening out (somewhat) the affairs of the island of Sardinia, Maistre was to be

exiled from his family and friends and all he loved, and sent
to distant Russia as the ambassador of a debtor power.

exile was to last from l802 to l8l7.

This

There can be no doubt that

this was an excruciating agony for Maistre.

His patron, who

was himself a debtor, could do little to provide comforts to

his ambassador (What a proud title to cover such

a

sorry reality!),

r?

Such luxuries as a fur hat and fur boots were out of the question,
and, since two servants were required by an ambassador,
Maictre,

due

his sleader budget, was forced to employ a thief, whom

tft

he rescued from justice through ambassadorial privilege, ia that

capacity, on the understanding the thief would stay honest.
Ma>jay

night Maistre»c supper consisted of sharing the soup of

a

his valet.
ift

JL

As bad as the physical torments Maistre had to suffer

Russia were, the emotional agonies were far worse.

It was

rare night in which he got three hours' sleep, for as he lay

In bed he was posr.essed with the thought that he could hear his
weeping in Turin., and tried to picture to himself the

fafflily

appearance of his youngest daughter, whom he had never seen and
might never see, that "orphan child of a living father", as he

put it.

That Maistre did not go mad is rather amazing.

Know-

ledge ©f his torments was, however^ seldom shared with his family.

There were two factors that sustained Maistre during his
sojfturn

m

Russia.

The first was reading and studying.

Throughout

his life Maistre was an inveterate student, and the time spent

in Russia was no exception.

The very zeal Maistre had for learning

is summed up by this statement (quoted by John Morley)

,

written

from Russia.

Nay, wore than ever, I feel myself burning with the feverish
thirst for knowledge. I have had an access of it that I cannot
describe to you. The mast curious books literally run after me,
and hurry to place themselves in my hands. As soon as diplomacy
gives me a moment of breathing-time I rush headlong to that favourite
pasture, to that ambrosia of which the mind can never have enough.

Not only did Maistre read voraciously, but when he read he always

had a pen in his hand, prepared to transcribe into notebooks
whole sections he felt might be useful to him.

It is known that

at one time he had at least thirty of these large notebooks,

fully indexed.

The other diversion that helped Kaistre to main-

tain his equilibrium was the social circuit of Saint Petersburg.

Surprisingly for a writer whose philosophy was often so cold
and harsh, Kaistre was a truly sociable individual, who was willing
to befriend even those whose philosophies he detested.

For this

reacon, and because of his obvious ability, honesty, and devotion
to his royal patron under insupportable conditions, Maistre be-

came a favorite in the diplomatic circuit and at the Pussian

Kaistre's abilities and qualities even led him to be

court.

respected by the representatives in Saint Petersburg of revolutionary France.

Tsar Alexander showed great kindness to the

Sardinian envoy, giving to Maistre

's brother,

a post at one of the public museums,

Xavier de Maistre,

and to Maistre 's son a comm-

ission in the Russian army, this latter kindness causing Maistre
a great deal of anguish.

During the battle of Friedland, and

during every campaign thereafter, Maistre felt he could read
the news of his son's fate on the face of every acquaintance
he met.

In 1814, Maistre 's vafe and daughter joined him in Saint
them,
Petersburg, but his stay in Russia, unbeknownst to any of

was drav.d.ng to a close.

In l8l6, a number of conversions from

great outburst
Russian Orthodoxy to Catholicism took place, and a

19

of relisioue fanaticism resulted.

The Jesuit Society was expelled

from Rucsia and Maiistre himself, who was widely known as being
untiling if not

ait

ardent member of hie Church, fell under sus-

picion as having had a hand in the conversions.

Called before

the Tear to defend hiaself on that charge, Maistre swore he had

Hot encouraged the conversion of any Russian, but was forced

by honesty to add that if any Russian shared with him his intent
to convert to Catholicism^ he could not in good conscience tell

the RuesiaR he was wrong.

Realizing such an exchange had com-

promised his effectiveness as a diplomat, Maistre arranged for
his

9vtn

recall, and in l8l7 returned to Savoy for the first time

In twenty-five years.

On the way back to Savoy, Kaietre spent a few days in Paris,
his first and only

tiiae

ever on French soil.

While Maistre was

there, the King ©f France threw a reception in his honor and con-

ferred a klgh office
this, Maistre

cees of

death

y.or-iting

tocil:

B,.

r»>

hiia

ajid

a smiill rue of money upon him.

After

turned to his beloved Savoy, and was in the pradown his philosophy of man and politics when

in February of l821.

The Origins Of Conservatism,

philosophy of these thinkers came to be.

We Eust now see how the

One should not expect

that any major system of philosophical and social thought would
come into being ex nihilo

;

concrete historical events may cause a

law-giver (or law-givers) to assemble in a coherent package (or
packages) ideas that were floating loose up to then.

This happened

i

the cane of Conservatism, with Member of Parliament Edmund Burke

of England and Count Joseph de Maistre of Savoy serving as the
niidwives for a pair of twins who, as is true of fraternal (not

identical) twins, have both striking similarities and dissimilarities to each other.

These twins are libertarian and author-

itarian Conservatism, and the event that brought them to conscious
life was the French Revolution.
As will be seen later in this chapter, one of the key el-

ements of both kinds of Conservatism is the feeling that it is

necessary to defend Western civilization, though different Conservatives may (and do) differ on those elements of Western trad-

ition that are worth defending.

Considering

tliis

universal as-

pect of Conservatism, hov/ever, it becomes logical that a creed

resting upon such a premise would become fully conscious of itself only when Western civilization and its traditions were threatened.

With the coming of the "Enlightenment" and its offspring

the French Revolution, a very basic questioning of the V/estern

way of doing things developed that had not been seen in Europe

since the fall of the Roman Empire, or, even earlier, since the

introduction of Christianity into Europe.

God was effectively

banished as a force in the world by having His existence doubted
or denied, by being seen as existent but irrelevant to the con-

temporary affairs of men (the Prime Mover doctrine), or by being

identified as inextricably immanent in nature (Pantheism).

Man

through
was declared to be the center of the universe and was felt,

either his mind or his

vd.ll,

to be capable of reshaping the world.

Finally, a radical democracy declared it to be its duty to export this creed to all lands, by force if necessary.

Under these conditions of ideological war, it is not sur-

prising that Burke and Maistre, who, like many others, had been
Inclined to avoid philosophical defenses of a system that did
not seem to need defending, were forced to bring their ideas

on aan and society into clearer focus.

Burke was not a man much

inclined to set down his thoughts on the philosophical bases
of government.

One who wishes to vrrlte on Burke's philosophy

is required to wade through an enormous collection (his collected

works total twelve large volumes) of essays, speeches, letters,
and reports of Parliamentary commissions, few of these v/ritings

being expressly philosophical in nature.

Burke

v/as

a man who

was more inclined to act out his philosophy than to write about
it.

It was, therefore, with considerable reluctance that Burke

undertook to defend his principles of government in the Peflec tions On The Revolution In France and later works.

The philo-

sophical impact of the Revolution on Maistre was considerably

greater than it was on Burke.

There is, simply speaking, little

evidence that Maistre had any sort of coherent philosophy before
the French Revolution.

He was,

due to his inherited nobility,

freedom of
a member of the Savoyard Senate, was a believer in

speech (a position which earned him the reputation of a dangerous
stand
character), was a well-wisher of the American Revolution (a

that was to b« transformed into a positive detestation of America),

and was an early advocate of the French Revolution.

The funda-

teatal alteration these views underwent suggests they were not

held very deeply.

Before the Revolution, Maistre had apparently

been a fashionable young noblenan adhering superficially to all
of the fashionable Enlightenaent ideas of his time.

Wlien,

how-

ever, the bases of Western civilization came under attack, Maistre*

basic Conservatism came powerfully into play, possibly surprising
his in doing so.

The foregoing should not be taken as saying Conservatism
was born in the French Revolutionary crisis.

Many of the elements

©f Co n er vat ism date back to the beginning of human reflection
IS

on philosophy and politics.

Wisdom Of Conservatism

,

The excellent four-volume set, The

dates the pedigree of Conservatism from

Plato. ^

As will be seen often in this chapter, ConcervatiEm'

separ'?«.te

theoretical components have probably existed as long

as human thought has.

It is the development of Conservatisa

as a conscious, and somewhat integrated, ideology that dates

frem the French Revolution.
C. What Is Conservatism?

The question of the nature of

Conservatism is one on which there is a great deal of disagreement.

This question divides internally those neutral toward

Censervatisffl, those hostile toward it, and those favorable toward

^eter

Witonski, ed., The WLsdon Of Conservatism ; 4 vols.,

(New Rochelle, New York: Arlington House, 1971).

it.

The

Affi

erican Heritage Dictionary Of The English Language

declaree "Conservatism" t© be "The disposition in politics or
culture ta oaintaln the existing order and. to resist ©r cppose
change or innovation"

attd

sees "censervative" as "Tending to

favsr the preservation ©f the existing order and to regard pro-

posals far change

'ffith

distrust; moderate, prudent, cautious;

Traditional in Manner or style; Tending to conserve; conserving;
A dictionary of a substantially different type,

preservative.."'^
Tlie

Devil

»

s

Dictionary ©f the great nineteenth and early twen-

tieth-century kuKorist and cynic Ambrose Bierce, feels the Conservative to be "A statesman who is enamored of existing evils,
as distinguished from the Liberal, who wishes to replace them

with others,"^

Ne matter how useful, or,

for that matter, amus-

ing, a definition found in a dictionary can be, its actual value

whsa dealing with a major philosophy like Conservatism is likely
t© be very strictly limited*

It is necessary, therefore, to

turn to Huch more rigorous attempts at defining the philosophy

of Conservatism, some of these attempts running to an entire
volume in length*

F©r RO very special reasoa, we shall begin by examining
the views about Conservatism held by its opponents.

tkese will ^e William

First among

Newman's The Futilitarian Society , a

^The American Heritage Dictionary Of The English Language

fourth edition, 1970, p. 284.

^Ambrose Bierce, The Devil's Dictionary (New York: Hill

aad Wang, 1968), p. 27.

,

rather stupid and heavy-handed attack upon Conservatism,
with such a
what

sonie

v/ork is,

Dealing

nevertheless, useful as a way of learning

think Conservatism is,

Newman starts from the belief

that unrestricted innovation is necessary for freedom, or is

evea the essence of freedom.

He never permits himself to enter-

tain the possibility that his definition might not be correct,

Newman's view of Conservatism follows from this first principle.
Conservatism has as its rn_ain concern the necessity of order
in a disorderly civilization (This is overstated, but not entirely
It is a search for a society in which innovation will
false"^.
have come to an end, so that what exists may continue to exist;
a society in which there will be no problems and no danger because no one will be allowed to repudiate the past and venture
into the unknovm; a society in which rational, scientific, and
inquiring man v/ill be replaced by traditional, obedient, and
placid man.
It is a search for a society in which essence mil
replace the excitement of concrete reality, and everyone will
have his fixed place, and freedom will have come to an end.
The essence of Me^wman's position is that Conservatism is

militantly opposed to everything in life that is worthv/hile and
is an enemy of freedom and of all decent men.

Conservatives

believe in Original Sin, and therefore "Conservatism is the refusal
o

of freedom."

This book must be considered intellectual dishonesty

at its worst.

A series of statements are made about Conservatism,

some of which are true, others of which are grossly exaggerated,

and still others of which do not necessarily follow from the

premises Newman ascribes rightfully to Conservatism,

One v;ould

"^William J. Newman, The Futilitarian Society (New York:

Gdorge Brazillsr, Inc, 1961), pp. 38 and q8-i+9.
^

Ibid .

,

p.

13.

not even have to deal with this book at all, so little is its

significance as an intellectually meaningful work, but that it
does represent rather well some of the more hysterical views
some opponents of Conservatism have of that doctrine,
A more responsible criticism of Conservatism is found in
M. Morton Auerbach's The Conservative Illusion .

Auerbach that "He
orical progress

{the

[Sic"])

We learn from

ConservativJ rejects any theory of histor human perfectibility." and that "Conser-

vatism solemnly confides to the world that man is inescapably

evil," 9

These points are, in my estimation, exaggerated, and

yet must still be kept in mind in any correct definition of Con-

servatism.

Auerbach's main objection to Conservatism stems from

the vlev/ of history he ascribes to it.

This

\'ievv

of history

is that of "a series of cycles in v/hich the early periods of

harmony are succeeded by cumulative degeneration".^^

Auerbach

sees Conservatism as seeking an impossible degree of harmony

rooted in tradition and explaining its unavoidable failure by
reliance on belief in Original Sin.
"the primacy of morality"'^

Conservatism believes in

and sees an alteration in ideas of

social organization as proceeding an alteration in social structure; degeneration in morality preceeds degeneration in society.
It is Conservatism's alleged stress on the omnipresent tendency

^K, Morton Auerbach, The Conservative Illusion (New York:

Columbia University Press, 1959), p. 310,
^'^

Ibid .

,

p.

286.

V^Ibid., p. 238.

to degeaer»tioa that causes Atterbach t» see it as a philosophy

for losers, for those always left behind by the advance of history.

Even if this view were true, and there nay be soae truth to it,
it is begging the question to judge the truth or falsity of a
pkilos4)pUy by its success in the so-called Earketplace of ideas.
Tliio

beet product need not sell the best.
A different type of criticisa of ConservatisHi is found

in Herbert McCloskey.

In his work, we find that Conservatives

are a group of people afflicted with mental illness; this is a

"fact" which must lesson one^s regard for their philosophy.

To

get the full diraensions of McCloskey 's views requires a rather ex-

tensive quotation.

By every caeasure available to us, conservative beliefs are
found most frequently among the uninformed, the poorly educated,
and so far as we can determine, the less intelligent .. Uniformly
every increase in the degree of conservatism chows & corresponding increase in submissiveness, anomie, eense of alieiiation,
bewilderment, etc. ..Of the four liberal-conservative classifications, the extreme conservatives are easily the most hostile
and suspicious, the most rigid and compulsive, the quickest to
condemn others for their i?aperf ections or weaknesses, the Most
intolerant, the most easily moved to scorn and disappointment
in others, the Host infle^d-ble and unyielding in their percepAlthough aggressively critical of the
tions and judgements.
shortcomings of others, thay are unusually defensive and armored
in the protection of their own ego needs. Poorly integrated
psychologically, anxious, often perceiving themselves as inadequate, and subject to excessive feelings of guilt, they seem
inclined to project onto others the traits they most dislike
•r fear in themselves. . .In other words, conservatives believe
what they do not because the world is jDhe way it is but because
they, the observers, are the way the^ 'emphasis McCloskey 'a are...
Related to this is the tendency for conservatives to be attracted
to sentiments that would have to be described as mystical, and
.In many ways hostility is a principal comeven obscurantist
ponent ef the conservative personality, as it is a principal
component of conservative doctrine. It does not seem accidental.

27

considering the data on hostility, that conservatives prefer
to believe in man's -.dckedness, that they choose to see man as
fallen, unt rust v/or thy, lawless, selfish, and weak.. .The inflexible and exacting features of conservative social doctrine are
related to the prototypical personality attributes of conservative
believers. ., Conservatives make a fetish of community, although
it is apparent that in many ways they are more alienated from
the community than most. 12

This is quite a remarkable bill of particulars.

Unlike

the first two theories covered, the Conservative is not so much
a villain or a fool as he is a lunatic.

While it must be con-

fessed that there are undoubtedly emotionally disturbed Conser-

vatives (as there are emotionally disturbed Liberals, Marxists,
and Zen Buddhists), McCloskey's treatment of Conservatiso makes

three errors of a fundamental nature.
what might

v/oll be

Liberal society.

rational responses by a Conservative in a
Can it be called mad for a man to feel alien-

ation tov/ard a society that scorns

sanity?

First, he sees as irrational

hira

and even questions his

Second, he condemns as a manifestation of emotional

disturbance a political philosophy of at least two centuries'
duration, and does so on the basis of a

sajr.ple

of several hun-

dred people.

Surely if Professor KcCloskey had tried hard enough

he could have

found a sane Conservative somewhere!

Third, this

being related to the second point, McCloskey identifies as evidence of mental illness certain factors that from another point
of view may be taken as evidence of mental stability.

If man

is "fallen, untrustworthy, lawless, selfish, and weak", why should
^

^Herbert McCloskey, "Conservatism and Personality," Amer -

ican Political Science Review. Vol. 52#1 (March 1958), pp. 35i 37-38, 40-43

©ne aot deem him to bo such?

McCloekey falls into essentially

the eame sort of error as Newman and Auerbach.

He takes certain

attributes of Conservatism (or caricatures of certain attributes

of CcpnserTatism) and, based on his own biases, automatically
beiievee them t9 be incorrect views of the world.

If ycu declare

by definition that anyome who believes in the fallibility ef

man is emotionally disturbed, you have succeeded in condemning
all CoiRservatives t© rooms with rubber walls, but until you test

y©ur initial hypothesis against the empirical universe, you have
not really proven anything at all*

Still another way of attacking Conservatism is to say it
kas no ideas.

A good example of this sort of position is the

fellowing:
It ie not the business of conservatives to state a fully
fashioned philosophy. They defend the established order of things.
It is enough, therefore, to appeal to tradition and sentiment
and inertia; and any attempt to build philosophical foundations
for their attitude is invariably evj-dence that the attitude no
longer claims the instinctive allegiance of the massea of men...
Conservatism is no more than the art of wise accomodation to
environment and a distrust of radical change... an alliance of
genial character and poverty-stricken intellect .. .It is the tradition of wealth, comfort, elegance, and mannersj of a ruling
class that has regarded its power to govern others as a natural
right in a world of timeless perfections. The conservative seeks
not to create a new society but to resist the transformation
©f the existing. ^-^
Itt

Lewis* treatment of Conservatism, one finds the toler-

ance that is often expressed by a warrior as he speaks a tribute

^^Gordon K» Lewis, 'The Metaphysics Of Conservatism," The

Western Political Quarterly
730, 731, 737, and 738.

,

Vol.

(December 1953)

i
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over the corpse of a fallen foe.

Since Conservatism ie a class

Ideology, as are all ideologies, and since its
class (the landed

aristocracy) has nearly everywhere in the Western world
ceased
to wield predominant power, Leu-is simply looks on
Conservatism

as something irrelevant in the modern world and therefore
of

only historical interest •

Even if one accepts this basically

Marxist view of the character of political ideologies, it does
not explain why this fossil, Conservatisn

,

lacks the good grace

to retire to the museum and even continues to win elections based

©a tho votes of those who control nary a single serf.
A similar,

though also very different, view of Conr.ervatisa

is found in Saiauel P. Huntington.

This description of the nature

of Conservatisa follows:

Concervatism is the intellectual rationale of the permanent
institutional prerequisites of human existence. It is a high
and necessary function* It is the rational defense of being
against Ciind, of order against chaos. Conservatism is not just
the abcence of change.
It is the articulate, systematic, theoretical resistance to change. Conservatism thus reflects no
perraanent group interest.
Depending upon the existence of a
particular relation among groups rather than upon the existence
of the groups themselves, it lasts only so long as the relation
lasts, not so long as the groups last... The substance of conservatism is essentially static. Conservative thought is repetitive,
not evolutionary.
It^ manifestations are historically isoiatec).
and discrete. Thas, paradoxical though it may seem, conservatir;ra,
the defender of tradition, is itself v/ithout tradition; conserTatiiQ, the appeal to history, is without history. .. Conservatives,,
however, do not subdivide into schools, nor do they, like liberals and Marxists, engage in fiery arguments over the meaning
• f their faith. . .'(Conservatism has a lack of both an intellectual
tradition and a substantive ideal.
Huntington, "Conservatism As An Ideology,"

'^Samuel

American Political Science Review, Vol.

^1,

if68,

L^69,

and

51i^2 (June

1957)

i

pp. ^60,

It is preposterous to say that Conservatism is without

its schisms, as even a brief comparison of the vn^itings of Mr,
Franl\.

Meyer and Mr. L, Brent Bozell would make clear.

be pointed out at greater length later in this chapter.

This shall
It is,

hov;ever, necessary for Huntington to declare Conservatism to

be ethically united, because he believes it to be ethically empty.

There is just nothing for potentiaJ. schismatics to fight over,
for Conservatism is the ideology of an endangered status quo,

whatever the objective character of that status quo may be«
Huntington, in fact, ends

tliis

article with a clarion call for

Liberals to become Conservatives, in order to conserve Liberalism,
It in, therefore, possible for anyone to become a Conservative,
be he a Liberal, a Fascist, a Socialist, a Communist, an Anar-

chist, or anything else.

The only thing one is not permitted

to conserve is Conservatism!

Conservatism is only a tool for

the preservation of other ideologies and has no actual existence

in itself,

Huntington's

of Conservatism

vri.ll

viev;

of the philosophical non-existence

be answered in the course of this chapter.

In Bernard L, Kronick we find a position that allows some

snail measure of philosophical content to Conservatism, but only

within the confines of a given society.

The situation develops

in the following fashion.
True conservatism is not a form of political paralysis.
irIt is a predisT30sition in favor of the past rather than an
rather
change
in
discernment
is
It
it.
revocable committment to
than frustrated reaction. ., The conservatism of one people may
that
well be the radicalism of another... It is sometimes said
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the conservative of today worships the radical of yesterday.
This merely points up the relativity of T3olitical creeds. It
shows the tendency of all institutions and arrangements, hov/ever
abruptly conceived and hastily adopted, to become identified
v,lth a traditional order v/hich conservatives de fend.
. .There is
a process of innovation, reluctant acceptance of a fait accompli,
gradual adaptation, complete habituation, all adding up to—conservatism.

'

Though Kronick sees Conservatism as serving a useful purpose, that of restraining radicals from going too far, it is

also evident that Conservatism, in his estimation, must be a

frustrating position for anyone to hold.

It is purely negative

in content, being the opposition to change or too rapid change,
and» as was seen above, is continually suffering defeats to v/hich

it ultimately becomes reconciled.

For Conservatism to come to

pCTrer in its own name is impossible by definition, since Conser-

vatism docs not, and cannot, have any ideas as to how things
should be done.

Another point Kronick makes is that there is

no such thing as Conservatism, but only American Conservatism,

British Conservatism, French Conservatism, German Conservatism,
etcetera.
serve the

This is because the role of Conservatism is to con(

sver-changing) traditions of a given nation.

That

there could be such a thing as a concrete and relatively change-

less tradition of Western civilization as a whole for Conservatism
to safeguard is an idea Kronick does not seriously entertain.

Still another critic of Conservatism sees its essence as

lying in anti-individualism.
^

Nisbct's explanation follows.

^Bernard L. Kronick, "Conservatism: A Definition," South -

western Social Science Quarterly , Vol.

ZZttZ

(September

19A-7),

pp» 175-177*

In a significant sense, modern conservatism goes back to
medieval society for its inspiration and for models against which
to assess the modern v/orld. .. Conservatism opnoses individualism,
secularism, and equalitarianism. . , the conservative insisted upon
the primacy of society to the individual historically, logically,
and ethically. . .From this it follows that society cannot be broken
dovra, even for conceptual purposes, into individuals. . .Not fictitious natural rights but unalterable needs (emphasis Nisbet's]
of man, his "wants'', as Burke termed them, are primary. ,, (Conservatism is marked by, its essentially tragic conception of history,
its fear of the free individual and the masses, and its emphasis
upon community, hierarchy, and sacred patterns of belief. ^°

—

It shall be seen that there is a good deal of truth to

Nisbet's belief that Conservatism is inclined to be anti-secularist,
non-individualist (though not necessarily anti-individualist)
and elitist.

It would, hov/ever, be a mistake to exaggerate the

degree or universality to which Conservatives hold these viev/s,
for they are precisely the issues on v;hich

in the ranks of Conservatism.

scMsm

is most common

Further, some Conservatives may,

as Nisbet says, seek guidance from the medieval world, and yet
it is equally likely that there are other Conservatives

medieval society as irrelevant or contemptible.

see

v/hc

Finally, v/hile

many Conservatives undoubtedly condemn the concept of Natural

Rights (largely because of the historical movements with which
it has been connected), others, notably including Burke, defin-

itely support it.
is found
A thoroughgoing Marxist critique of Conservatism

in Randhir Singh's Reason , Revolution

,

and Political Theory;

Notes On Oaheshott's Rationalism In Politics .
^^Robert A, Nisbet,

Journal Of Sociology

,

A quotation follows.

"Conservatism and Sociology," American

Vol. 58#2 (September 1952), pp.

169,

170,

and
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Conservatism denigrates human reason and human purpose, and
leaves man v/ith no real critaria for judr;in- the worth of hunian
actions and attitudes. It distrusts scientifically grounded
ethics and politics, and doubts or mocks the reality of man's
Promethean struggle for the better, for social justice, for happiness and prosperity here on this earth. It... denies the legitimacy of man's attempt individually to control his own fate
and collectively to build his ovm world. For it social action,
especially of a radical nature, is suspect. It not only emphasizes its futility but questions in fact the very assumption
of human capacity to solve problems of human existence. And
it therefore, sooner or later, urges upon man to bear the evils
and iniquities of tliis v;orld as necessary and inescapable, to
acquiesce patiently in the injustices of the existing order based
on private property, privilege and minority rule, . . ConsorvatiGm,
whether old or new, has been rarely a positive creed, a positive
enunciation of principles, purposes and programmes. It has always been primarily a defensive, a truly negative reaction
reaction, generally speaking, against the main direction of social
and historical development of our times. . .Elitipm has always
been one of the basic premises of all authentic conservatism.
It is the central political demand of contemporary conservative
philosophy. . .This elitism is always the expression of an attitude
of contempt or indifference toward the raas^^es, an attitude in
whose recesses lurk fears v/hich can transform it in a single
moment of genuine confrontation into an attitude of violent,
merciless hostility. This elitism means not only the fear and
rejection of popular democracy, which is obvious enough. It
also involves a defence and Justification of the continued existence of an unjust, privilege-basod minority ruled and selfdivided society. It seeks to make the present class divisions
of mankind the schisms of humanity a permanent feature
of social existence. 17

—

,

—

—

Conservatism is every bit as evil here as it is to Mevmian,
but at least the Conservative is not evil out of a sheer love

of

e"-/!!,

as Nevmian seems to feel him to be.

The Conservative

is against change, advancement, and human liberty, and is for
elitism, because he seeks to keep in pov;or a given social structure
^"^fiandhir Singh,

Reason , Rovoluticn , and Political Theory

ITotes On Oakeshott s Rationalism In Politics (New Delhi:
'

Publishing House, 1967), pp.

13^^,

158n,

169, and 170.

;

People's

based on ffilnority rule.

There is, therefore, contrary to McCloskey

view, nothing irrational in Conservatism, for there
can be no-

thing irrational about trying to keep yourself and or your
friends
in power by fair means or foul.

Much of the criticism of Singh's

position can be found in the criticism of Lewis,

Suffice to

•ay that, while there may indeed be Conservatives who are moral

monsters, it does seem to be unlikely that there is something in

Conservatism that causes its adherents to lust for the oppression
of their fellowmen.

Still another view of Conservatism is given by Louis Hartz.
He is critical of the possibility of an American Conservatism,

though not 60 much of the nature of Conservatism itself.
One of the central characteristics of a nonfoudal society
i« that it lacks a genuine revolutionary tradition, the tradition
which in Europe has been linked with the Puritan and French revolutions: that it is "born equal", as Tocqueville said. And
this being the case, it lacks also a tradition of reaction: lacking
Robespierre it lacks Maistre, lacking Sydney it lacks Charles II.
Its liberalism is what Santayana called, referring "oo AmttriCG.n
democracy, a "natural" phenomenon. . .Law has flourichod on the
corpse of philosophy in America... We can thus say of th«5 right
in America that it exemplifies the tradition of big propertied
liberalism in Europe,!^

Leaving aside the question of whether

EartT. is

factually

correct in seeing America as almost universally Liberal, it is

interesting to see the outlooks about the origins of political

philosophy and about the nature of Cons;ervatlsm that derive from
this.

First, political philosophy is not something that exists

^^Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition In America (New York:

Harcourt Brace and Company,

1955)

i

PP» 5»

10,

and 15.

in a society independent of that
society's culture and or history.
It is not the truth ®r falcity «f the
belief that determines a

«aa»s adherence t© a political philosophy,
but whether that philosophy is congruent with his nation's past.
An American cannot,
tkerefore, be either a true Conservative or
a true Socialist,,
cince, Hartz believee, both of these
philosophies derive ultim-

ately fro« a Liberal attack on Feudalism
which, since Feudalism
never existed here t» a meaningful extent,
never to«k place in
Aaerica.

This position ef Hartz is remarkably close to
belief

ia a group Kind,

That is, however, a question which is rather

extraneous t© the subject under investigation.
decis-.res CosservatisBi te be

social iHstitutisas.

His positiest

a defense 9f Feudal political and

This would Imply Conservatism t© be anti-

ittdiviri^alist, elitist, and possibly theocratic.

As this chapter

proceeds, it will be possible ta analyze the validity »f those

assertions, though the very magnitude ©f writings for and against
Ciraservatisis would seen to answer the suggested belief in its

irrelevance to the aeodera American society.
It has beea seen by now that many areas of disagreement

exist awsng the critics of Conservatism as to its nature.

Some

feel Conservatism t« be a real philosophy, others see it as simply
a rationalization of the power of a ruling elite, others (primarily

McCloskey) feel it appeals ©nly to those who are emotionally disturbed, and still others see it as a conserving of any philosophy
or syste*,.

There are^ however, certain areas of agreemeHt among

the critics of Conservatism •

They see Conservatism as being

substantially elitist in character, as seeking lessons from the
past, as being opposed to or at least skeptical of change, and
as stressing the ^/irtues of community^

As shall be seen momen-

tarily, the advocates of Conservatism also have strong disagree-

ments as to its character.
Russell Kirk begins his work The Conservative Mind

,

From

Burke To Santayana by declaring that "Burke »£ is the true school

Of conservative principle."

1

^

This statement gives hints of

schism, of which more shall be seen later,

YUrk goes on to say

that "Conservatism is not a fixed and immutable body of dogma,
and conservatives inherit from Burke a talent for ra-expressing

their convictions to fit the time."'"

Kirk then proceeds to

explain what the convictions of Conservatism are.
think that there are six canons of conservative thought
(l) Belie.? that a divine intent rules society as well as conscience,
forging an eternal chain of right and duty which links great
and obscure, living and dead. Political problems, at bottom,
are religious arjd moral problems. ..( 2) Affection for the proliferating variety and mystery of traditional life, as distinguished
from the narrovdng uniformity and equalitarianism and utilitarian
aims of most radical systems. .. (3) Conviction that civilized
society requires orders and classes. The only true equality
is moral equality; all other attempts at levelling lead to desPersuasion that
pair, if enforced by positive legislation. ..
property and freedom are inseparably connected, and that econ(5) Faith in prescripomic levelling is not economic progress.
tion and distrust of "sophisters and calculators" ^he phrase is
Burke ^sJ^^'C^) Recognition that change and reform are not identical,
I

^

^Russell Kirk, The Conservative Mind, From Burke To Santayana

(Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1953) »P» 5*

^ Ibid .,

p.

7-

,

and that innovation is a devouring conflagration more often
than
it is a torch of progress.^'
It can be seen that, according to Kirk, Conservatism is

nothing if not an ethical doctrine, and, in fact, a doctrine
founded upon a belief in a God Who intervenes in the affairs

of men.

It must be said at this point that the question of whe-

ther a Conservative can be an atheist has been one of lively

controversy ivithin Conservatism.

IVhat

exactly Kirk's point numbe

two means, other than (apparently) being a paean to pluralism,
is hard to ascertain,

V/hether or not Conservatism as a v/hole

is, as charged, obscurantist, it would have to be confessed that

this statement of Kirk's is ranging on obscurantism.

Point numbe

three declares that Conservatism takes a middle position on equal
ity.

True social equality is felt to be impossible and absurd,

and yet the moral equality of all men is taken as a fact of life.

This convicts Conservatism of elitism, but not to the degree that
Singh
an?/

T.'ould

have one believe.

There

vri-11

not, and cannot be,

abolition of classes, and so Singh is correct in saying that

Conse-rVcitism seeks to maintain the class divisions of society,

in much the same

waj'.

Kirk might declare, as one who points out

the existence of the sun can be accused of advocating its con-

tinued 6-d.stence,

In a more fundamental sense, however. Conser-

vatism departs from elitism.

Though classes

vo.ll

continue to

exist and the few will run the government. Kirk implies that
the government shall not be run for the benefits of a few, which
^^Ibid., pp, 7-8,

some critics of Conservatism contend is its position, but for
the sake of all.

Point four places Conservatism squarely behind

the institution of private property, but does so, Kirk declares,
for the sake of freedom.

Point five pleads "guilty" to the charge

against Conservatism that it values institutions based on their

longevity and sees a nation's history as incorporating v/isdom.
The finil point, point six, implies a willingness to accept gen-

uine reform, but shov;s a decided skepticism tov/ard the value

of change.
An analysis of Kirk's points of Conservatism indicates

that he is somev/hat inclined toward what shall be described later

in this chapter as the libertarian form of Conservatism.

Point

two gives an accolade to pluralism, point three suggests limit-

ations on government, point four declares freedom to be valuable,
and point six gives an at least half-hearted endorsement to reform.

It shall be seen later that not all Conservatives agree

on these points.
Franlc Meyer,

a rather more consistent Conservative Liber-

tarian (though he considers himself, a centrist so far as Conservative doctrine is concerned), has his

vative belief.

ovra

six points of Conser-

These may be profitably compared vdth those of Kirk.

(1) Conservatism assumes the existence of an objective moral
order based upon ontological foundations. ..( 2) Within the limits
of an objective moral order, the primary reference of conservative political and social thought and action is to the individual
person... (3) Conservatism is profoundly anti-utopian. . . (if) On
the basis of concern for the individual person and rejection
of Utopian planning, conservatives believe in a strict limitation

of the power of government ... (5 ) From these points
American conservatiem derives its firm support of the Constitution of the
United States as originally conceived— to achieve the protection
of individual liberty in an ordered society by limiting the oower
of governrasnt.. ,(6) In their devotion to Western civilization
and taeir firm American patriotism, conservatives are deeply
aware of the danger of Communism as an armed and messianic threat
to the very existence of Western civilization and of the United
States. 22
It is noticeable that there are certain themes in Meyer

that are not present in Kirk, and still others that are expanded
far beyond their dimensions in Kirk,

It can be seen,

first,

that while both Kirk and Meyer believe in an objective, knowable

moral order, that of Kirk is exclusively religious, whereas that
is not necessarily true of that of Meyer,

Second, Meyer clearly

embraces individualism (though point two shows it to be a qual-

ified individualism), whereas Kirk supports individualism only
by implication,

Meyer also coaes out much more strongly and

unambiguously for the limitation of government than does Kirk.
In point number six, Meyer raises explicitly an issue about which
a great deal more will be heard with regard to the nature of

Conservatism: the role of Conservatives as conservatore of Western

civilization.

exception of

It is also of importance to note that, with the
a

stricture against utcpianism,. one does not find

in Meyer's defintion of Conservatism Kirk*s rather strong ad-

monitions against the dangers of change, nor is there the stress
upon social elitism.

These arc, in all likelihood, more diff-

erences of degree than anything else, but differences of degree

^^rank

S, Meyer, The Conservative Mainstream (New Rochelle,

New York: Arlington House, 1969), pp. 1^-16.

can, nevertheless, be of very great significance in the
under-

standing of a political philosophy.
A substantially different view of Conservatism is found

in the theory of L, Brent Bozell, a man who cannot be accused
of being even a modified libertarian.

The flavor of this comes

through very strongly in Bozell' s writings.
We of the Christian V/est ovie our identity to the central
fact of history the entry of God onto the human stage.
IVe do
not regard the Incarnation as a supernatural stunt, but as a
terrestrial event: God, in time, with us... The Christian eschaton
is post-human. The purpose was to impart the means for dealing
with human imperfections for easing man's way to his ultimate
goal, and for realizing, in this life, his maximum human potentialities. , .Our commission is to plant in history the ideals
and the standards contained in Christian truth and to build
institutions and foster mores that vri.ll help sustain these ideals
in short, to build a Christian civilizatior. emphasis Bozell' s...
The V/est, the geographical place, is unimportant. The '-Vest,
the civilization, is of consuming importance.
It is what happened when man set out to build Augustine's earthly city... Our
good fortune belongs to the human race.
'.Ve
are chosen only in
this sense; that because we have received, we have the duty to
give... If we know v/hat our mission is, the "will" to carry it
out Yfill follow as a matter of course... The V/est is.; a God-orie^nte
civilization. 23

—

—

—

Several months later, Bozell sketched in further details

of his theory of man and society.

It shall

>^e

seen that this

addition was even less amenable to the notion of liberty, at
least insofar as liberty is felt to have anything to do

'jri.th

individual freedom of choice, than was the above writing.
If freedom is the " first principle" in politics, virtue is,
at best, the second one; and the programmatic aspects of the
movement that affirms that hierarchy will be determined accordingly... The freedom that is necessary to virtue such as the
,

^^L» Brent Bozell, "To Magnify the West," National Review,

Vol. 12#16 (April 2k, 1962), p. 287.

desire to go to church, whether one is able to or noB is presumably a freedom no man vail ever be without. ..If moral freedom
is beyond the reach of politics, surely politics has better
thing;
to do than making the preservation of moral freedom its
chief
preoccupation. . Man's nature is such, hov/ever, that he, uniquely
among created beings, has the capacity to deviate from the patterns of order to, as it were, repudiate his nature: i.e. he
is free. So viewed, freedom is hardly a blessing; add the ravages of original sin and it is the path to disaster. It follows
that if individual roan is to have any hope of conforming vri.th
his nature, he needs all of the help he can get. That is why
the role of grace is so vital to the Christian view of things,
not only supernatural grace, but the natural grace that springs
forth from man's constructs: his institutions, his customs, his
laws the ones that have been inspired by his better angel and
that remain in time to give nourishment to all of the human, race.
V/hen a comraonv/ealth builds according to the divine patterns of
order, then it is in a position to help man conform to his nature
which is the meaning of virtue. .. Since man v/ill always have sufficient moral, freedom, i.e. sufficient occasions for "proving
himself" and even for doing so heroically; and since these occasions are basically traceable to his corruption, the ideal to
which man should aspire is to minimi ze such occasions to develop
the kind of character that will generate virtuous acts as a matte
of course.
For, as the mystics tell us, true saaictity is achieve
only when man loses his freedom v/hen he is free of the temptation to displease God. ..The urge to freedo'ri for its own sake
1b, In the last analysis, a rebellion against nature; it is the
urge to b8 free from God. 2Z+
.

—

—

—

—

—

It can be seen that the Conservatism of L. Brent Bo sell

is radically different from that of Kirk and especially that

of Keyer.

What he does is to take themes present in

thera.

and

basically in all of Conservatism, and carry them far beyond the
limits Kirk and Meyer vwuld be ^Tilling to go.

Though Kirk goes

part way in endorsing a sanctified state and Meyer might do so,

Bozell endorses what in effect is a theocracy, though he argues

rather unconvincingly that this is not

v;hat he

advocates.

In

Brent Bozell, "Freedom Or Virtue?", National Review
Vol.

13#10 (September 11,

1962)

»

pp» 1SI-I82,

l3if,

and l87.

.

line with this position, in a radical departure from what might
be called the mainstream Conservative position, Bozell says
no-

thing at all about the desirability of limited government.

In

fact, by stressing the need of government and society to erect

institutions to direct man to the good, in Bozell' s phrase, "to
help nan to conform to his nature", Bozell goes a long way to

denying the possibility of limiting the government to any great
extent.

Further, by stressing so strongly the need for a Christian

civilization, Bozell effectively transforms Kirk and Meyer's

skepticism about change to an absolute animosity against change.
If the state exists only to realize Christian doctrine, this

doctrine having been set irrevocably centuries ago, change (except toward Christianity) can never ba either safe or desirable.

Finally, this attitude tends to extend the Conservative view
that prescription is a reasonably accurate guide to the proper

functioning of society into a view that prescription is the infallible authority for all questions on earth.

later in

tliis

It

shall be seen

chapter and elsewhere in the dissertation the great

extent to wiiich Bozell 's thought, possibly not accidently, reflects that of Maistre,
Since World War II, a new view of Conservatism, or perhaps
a new variant of it, is said to have developed.

This is what

has been called New Conservatism, and its principal exponent
is Peter Viereck,

Viereck's view of Conservatism will follow.

h3

The conservative principles par excellence are vrovortlon
and measure; self-expression through self-restraint^; preservation through reform; humanism and classical balance; a fruitful
nostalgia for the permanent beneath the flux; and a fruitful
obsession for unbroken historic continuity. These principles
together create freedom, a freedom built not on the quicksand
of adolescent defiance but on the bedrock of ethics and law...
The core and fire-center of conservatism, its emotional elan,
is a humanist reverence for the dignity of the individual soul...
Democracy, though slowly attained and never by revolutionary
leaps, is the best government on earth v^hen it tries to make
all its citizens aristocrats.
But not when it guillotines whoever is individual, superior, or just dif f erent . . .In times of
shallow prosperity, the conservative function is to insist on
distinguishing value from price; vdsdom from cleverness; haiopiness from hedonism; reverence from success-v;orship. In times
of defeat, conservatism reminds us that we must still respect
moral and social law, no matter how desperate our apparent crisis
and no matter how radiant the ends that would "justify" our using
lawless means... The conservative lays the greatest possible stress
on the necessity and sanctity of law. To him the "general laws",
to which Thucydides referred, must be supreme over the particular ego of any individual or class or state. General ethics
must restrict the particular means, regardless of ends... Sad
experience v/ould teach us that man can only maintain his existence through guiding it by the non-e]<istent by the moral absolutes of the spirit .. .Whenever possible, bad should be eliminated. . .Western conservatism is evolutionary; Eastern and often
Central European conservatism is authoritarian and irrational...
The conservative evolves change peacefully and gradually from
above instead of by unhistorical haste or by mob methods from
below... The conservative resists the trend to sacrifice liberte
to fe'galite .. .Freedom should be the goal of all political action...
Tc prevent majority rule from becoming majority despotism, every
stable society has certain traditional institutions acting as
brakes on precipitous mass action... For the history-minded conservative, individual liberty derives less from political abstractions and economic tinlcerings than from Christianity and from
its extension of the' free Athenian ideal. . .Inward moral reform
of the individual, which economic determinists are perennially
"er-rposing" as a reactionary trick to postpone progress, must
preceede or at least accompany the outward material reform of
society. ..Conservatives claim that every human being is by nature
barbarous, capable of every insanity and atrocity. . .Conservatism,
which is for politics what classicism is for literature, is in
2^
turn the political secularization of the doctrine of original sin.
:

^^Peter Viereck, Conservatism Revisited

Revolt (Hew York: Charles Scribner'e Sons,
.

27, 29, and 30

:

The Revolt Against

I9it9)i

PP» 6, 9,10, 13iT4

,

l3,
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To have called Viereck»s theory of Conservatism
"New Con-

servatism" may well have been an error.

While there are undoubt-

edly major differences between Viereck's theory and
that of Bozell

(centering primarily around the former's greater willingness
to accept reform and greater stress on individualism and liberty),

Viereck's theory nonetheless fits in rather well with a given
current of Conservatism, that of Burke.

What is significant

Is that Viereck, as has been seen, recognizes the fact that Con-

servatism is divided, and has some idea of the issues that divide it.

Beyond this, however, the basic structure of Viereck 's

thought fits into a pattern of Conservatism that need not be

called "new".
Michael Oakeshott, in his view of Conservatism, takes the
stress on individualism and limited government further than any

other Conservative.

He basically comes to the view that Conser-

vatism is an endorsement of the Lockean "Night V/atchman" state,
and he even uses some Lockean language in his description.
What makes a conservative dispositiop. in politics intelligible is nothing to do wdth a natural lav/ or a providential order,
nothing to do vrich morals or religion; it is the observation
of our current ^i.^nner of living combined ivith the belief (which
from our point of viev/ need be regarded as no more than an hypothesis) that "overning is a specific and limited activity,
namely the provi.siori and custody of general rules of conduct,
^vliich are understood, not as plans for imposing substantive activities, but as instruments enabling people to pursue the activities of their ovm. choice vath the minimum frustration, and
therefore something which it is appropriate to be conservative
about. ..The office of government in the Conservative vievr is
not to impose other beliefs and activities upon its subjects,
not to tutor or to educate them, not to malie them better or happier
in another way, not to direct them, to galvanize them into action,

to lead them or to coordinate their activities so that no occasion of confict shall occur; the office of government is merely
to rule.
This is a specific and limited activity, easily corrupted when it is combined v/ith any other, and, in the circumstances
indispensable. The image of the ruler is the umT)iro v/hose business it is to administer the rules of the game/. .In short, the
intimations of government are to be found in ritual, not in religion or philosophy; in the enjoyment of orderly and peaceable
behaviour, not in the search for truth or perfection, ^6

Oakeshott appears to be virtually alone among Conservatives
in feeling Conservatism to uphold the notion of an ethically-

neutral state.

Government, in Oakeshott 's view and (according

to hin) that of Conservatism, is to permit men "to pursue the

activities of their own choice

v/ith the

minimum frustration",

or, in contemporary usage, to do their ovm thing.

seen

hov;

radically these views of Oakeshott

might be called orthodox Conservatism,

It can be

's depart

from 7;hat

The society is, first

of all, either entirely ncrmless, or, at most, gets its norms
from the common consent of the ccmmun^.ty.

Any system of universal

morals, be they religious or non-religious, is expressly denied.
The fact that Oalteshott believes this to be part of Conservatism

leads one to believe that he does not believe Original Sin, or
human inperf ection, to be part of Conservative doctrine, for
if men are capable of compacting together to determine what their

moral law ought to be» they must be either perfect or very close
to it,

V/hile,

as has been truly said. Conservatism is not an

infallible Church capable of enforcing its strictures upon pain
26

ed,

,

Michael Oakeshott, On Being Conservative

The Wisdom Of Conservatism,

I,

,

in Witonski,

110-111, 114-115* and 117»

of excommunication, any philosophy must have a
certain core of

belief binding morally upon those who claim to be
its adherents.
It seems to me that, ;vith regard to Conservatism,
Oakeshott has

passed beyond the boundaries into some sort of Ayn Rand-type
atomism.
It has been seen that,

just as there is great disagreement

among anti-Conservatives as to the characteristics of Conservatism, so there is substantial disunity among the advocates of

Conservatism on this question.
clearer understanding, it
of some

v/ho

vo.ll

With a hope to establishing some
nov; be

well to examine the thoughts

are neutral on the conflict between Conservatism and

its foes.
In general, conservatives v/ish to preserve present or oast
values rather than to create or adopt new ones. . .Conservatives
oppose equalitarianism and support the Constitution and private
property. », Conservatives are likely to be skeptical of the rationality of men, especially when_they act in groups. .. Convention
and experience are safer guides lin the Conservative vievr thar.
experiment, statistics, and inference for the foundation of huiuan
institutions. . .If an institution exists, that e>d.stence is priina
facie evidence of its validity. The burden of proof is always
upon the advocates of change ... Cons ervativo.g do not approve of
concentrated poiver in public governments. . .(Continuity isj a leading
principle of conservatism..^'^

There are certain basic canons that have been commonly recognized by intellectual conservatives from the days of Burke
to the present time. These can be summarized as: (1) man is
a blend of good and evil; he is neither perfect nor is he perfectible; (2) society is the product of slow historical growth;
(3) existing institutions embody the wisdom of prior generations;
there is a presumption in favor of that which has survived the
test of time; ik) religion is the foundation of civil society;
27
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(5) prudence, experience, and habit are often better
guides than
reason and logic; (6) society requires claeces and
orders— tho
superior clneses must be allowed to have a hand in the
directjon
of the ctate in such a wsy as to balance the numerical
preponderance of the inferior classes; and (?) duties are superior
to rights.
Although the rneaning of these principles has changed
from generation to generation and even from thinker to thinker,
there is a substantial area of agreement among genyine conservatives in respect to their ultimate assumptions.'-^

A conservative is one who wishes to preserve or conserve
certain existing institutions or nrinciples. .There have, of
course, been profound differences among the various conservative
thinkers, but they have generally agreed on certain basic principles of political philosophy. They have always been skeotical
of the idea that there is any single clear-cut scheme which will
solve all of man's political, social, and economic difficulties.
Though many of then; have been ardent reformers, they have refused
to believe that human nature can be completely transformed by
legislation or that any sot of political reforms will bring about
the creation of a golden age.
The conservatives have always
claimed to be great admirers of reason, but they have rejected
all political schemes based solely upon abstract reason without
reference to concrete experience and the accuraulat-jd wisdom of
many generations. They have insisted that any one generation
of men can progress only if it is willing and able to profit
from the mistakes and successes of pact generations and to msike
use of the stored-up practical wisdom of its ancestors. . .They
have argued that to be successful any system of government must
be in accord with the spirit, the ideals, and the traditions
of a people, . .Most conservatives have also argued that the actions of the majority ( li ka the actions of any minority) should
be subject to the dictates of "natural" or higher law, ..The conservatives have always
been devout believers in the general
principle of individualism. . .They have argued in favor of vrtvy
far-reaching freedom of thought and expression, but they hnve?
insisted that this freedom cannot be absolute or unconditional...
They have always been in favor of the general principle of private property and of property rights, but they also believed
that the state should take an active interest in tho economic
welfare of its citizens, . .The conservatives have usually claimed
not only that man is naturally and fundamentally sinful, but
also that it is almost if not absolutely impossible to change
human nature at least by governmental means. '^9
.

—
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(Milwaukee: The Bruce Publishing Company,

I960), p. 323.

^^Williara M. McGovern and David S. Collier, Radicals and

Conservatives (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1957), PP» 15-19 and 8l.

Now that so Kany varying views of Conservatism

hsive

been

seen, it is necessary to distill from thea the
answer to the
questiott tkat is the subject of this section, namely,

CoBcervatism?

what is

When dealing with a subject such as this, great

pains must be taken to keep it from becoaing either (based on
•Re»c feelings) an apologia or an attack.

As much as one

c-^n,

I shall endeavor t© be objective,

Tke foremost fact that must be considered about ConservaticM is its belief that there is a knowable and universal moral
law.

There is no room in CoiaservatisM for ethical relativisa,

at least as far as the key principles of moral law are concerned,

Tbcse principles have been set once and for all time and, hewever derived, ©we none of their legitimacy to their popularity.

The

ffioral

law is strictly beyond the control of huiaaa beings.

It is probably a majority position aiaong Conservatives tkat
ii«st iffpartant
Gi&d

tr.e

portions of the Horal law derive from a beneficent

Who intervenes in the affairs of men, and yet a Conservative

could believe in opposition to this that moral laws derive fraa
the unshakeable necessities of human existence or the actions

•f a brilliant ancient law-giver,

A Conservative could embrace

deisM, pantheism, agnosticism, or even atheism, without necessairily

being false t© his philosophical creed,

Iffhile

the two

Conservatives treated as archetypes ia this work were both firm
theists, this seed not be taken as a necessary part ©f the def-

iaitioa.

It is quite likely that this belief in a knowable moral

law, unchanging throushout the generations, is what
gives Con-

servatism both its sense of rightness (no pun intended) and
its
frequent rigidity.

It is difficult to muster un-self-conscious

zeal if one is only blindly defending the status
quo or protec-

ting one»s property, but when one feels he is a warrior
for the
cause of revealed and perpetual truth, that is a different
sit-

uation indeed*
Conservatism viev;s man as

a

fallible being.

The degree

to which tliis view is held, however, differs enormously among

Conservatives.

There are those like Maistre and Bozell who tend

to accept the idea of Original Sin with little or no diminution,

and therefore see man as a rather evil creature.
are Conservatives like Burke and Meyer,

v/ho

,

Then there

while possibly in-

fluenced by the idea of Original Sin, just do not see man as

being particularly sinful.

I'/blle

not blind to man's weaknesses

and even \'ices, these Conservatives, either expressly or by intimation, tend to minimize the potency of these attributes.
Mar.

is no saint, and yet without an inordinate degree of effort

or tutelage he can be expected to lead a reasonably moral existencea

It is, therefore, correct to say that not all Conserva-

tives believe in an unadulterated version of Original Sin, or
at least do not apply this theological concept to their polit-

ical theories.

This important difference betv/een the authori-

tarian and the libertarian schools of Conservatism, one seeing
man as sinful and the other merely as fallible, lies at the root
of the very real disputes between them.

Conservatism sees itself as the guardian of Western
civilization, or (more correctly) as the guardian of certain
principles

-v-rithin

Western civilization.

This point cannot be stressed

too strongly, both for what it shows of Conservatism
as a whole

and for what it points out about the divisions vdthin Conservatiem.

To the extent Conservatism seeks to maintain institutions

or social patterns deriving from the past, it does so not nec-

essarily out of an advocacy of the past as past, but out of adherence to principles enbodied in these institutions or social

patterns.

Conservatism is either a principled advocacy of the

status quo, or, should its beloved principles have been dethroned,
a principled advocacy of change.

There is nothing necessarily

incongruous about spealcing about Conservatives as advocates of
change, because adherence to a set of principles is just as likely
to dictate holding the position of a social critic as it is to

dictate being a pillar of the "establishment"; it shall be seen
shortly, however, that Conservatives lack enthusiasm for change
as such.

Another point of great importance to the understanding

of Conservatism must be stressed in this regard: Western civilization, despite

v;hat

some of its defenders may say, is obviously

not a homogeneous tradition.

Those who, therefore, see it as

their role in life to defend the principles of Western civilization
may divide into csunps based upon which of the principles of Western
civilization they wdsh to defend.

Specifically, there are those

Conservatives who feel called upon to defend the right of the

individual to manifest his personality, keeping in
mind, however,

man'G fallibility.

This is the group that is called Conserva-

tive Libertarian (;vith both elements of the name
stressed equally).

Then there are the Conservatives who stress the more
authoritarian
aspects of Western civilization, who favor the unlimited
corporate
society and the group over the individual, and

v/ho,

far from

feeling individual self-expression to be even a modified good,
feel it to be the root of sin and evil.

This second group is»

of course, the Conservative Authoritarians.
i£5

V/hat

must be stressed

that both schools are honest in claiming the title of "defender

of Western civilization", and yet they are defending very different

elen-.onts

within it.

The very act of defending .Vestern

civilization, therefore, pulls the two schools of Conservatism
apart.

Conservatism feels the principles it defends derive either,
as has been seen, from the changeless moral law, or from the

accumulated customs of the nation, or from both.

Conservatives,

however, differ on the source of a country's customs.

Some feel

that they are the result of God's intelligence (or the workings

of some other, often unspecified, non-human source) acting
history.

vd-thin

Others embrace the view that custom is the collected

experience of many generations of men, each generation being
both as wise and as foolish as the present one.

It can be seen,

therefore, that there is a significant difference of opinion

among the two Conservative camps in their attitude toward custom;

one side respects custom and the other venerates it.

For one

group of Conservatives, custom is something not of human origin
and either unchanging or changing in a way men cannot control.

To the other, custom is a record of the usages of many genera-

tions of human beings, with custom therefore being evolutionary

in nature by human action, and a possibility even existing of
there being bad customs (something the logic of the first Con-

servative school cannot really concede).

This leads to an examination of the Conservative attitude
toward change.

Conservatism is either skeptical or antagonistic

toward change.

It does not overly trust the ability of the human

mind to judge the quality of its inheritence or to plan alterations of it.

Such changes as are undertal^en should be based

on a true understanding of what man is and what bis history teache

Beyond this, however, the two schools of Conservatism vary mar-

kedly in their feelings toward change.

The authoritarian school

is inclined to see society as perfect, or at least as perfect
as man is able to make it, and therefore views as either foolish

or heretical the attempt to institute any more than the most

trivial changes.

The libertarian school, while having no enthu-

siasm for change, does see major changes for the better as possibl

and sometimes even necessary.

That these differences between

the two Conservative schools bespeak major differences in their

views of man and society need hardly be stressed at any great

length*

Both forms of Conservatism believe there
should be limitations on government, but they differ importantly
on what the

nataxe of these limitations should be and
who should be the re-

cipient of the benefits of them.

The Conservative Authoritarians

believe there is a moral law above the government to
which it
must adhere and which it may not alter.

This is obviously a

very real limitation on government, but not, as it turns
out,
one that rebounds to the benefit of individual freedom.

This

is so bec-.use, while it is not permitted to determine the char-

acteristics of the moral law, the government is morally obligated to enforce them.

It is felt that the individual is just

too weak to do what he ought to on his own volition, but he can,

nevertheless, be "forced to be free."

It can be seen instantly

what this does to any possibility of individual liberty, but
it must be pointed out in addition that this tends to uiake the

government itself subordinate to some other authority that rules

infallibly on the contents of the moral law and hands dovm binding

orders to government for their enforcement.

Such a syatsm, there-

fore, robs both the individual and the de jure government of all

claim to rights and (based on the principle that power, like
nature, abhors

a

vacuum) temds t« vest all power in a de facto

theocratic government of priests.

What starts out in authori-

tarian Conservatism as a system of sweeping limitations upon

government ends in a system of potentially totalitarian power.
Conservativo Libertarianism also believes government should be

limited and made to adhere to the moral law, but here the natures
of the two forms of Conservatism diverge.

Libertarianism, based

on its rather more optimistic view of man, does not think quite
so much of taking power from political authority in order to

place it in the hands of established moral authority, but rather
seeks a true limitation on the authority which can be v/ielded
by any institution over the indi\rLdual«

ianism, therefore, tends to think more

Conservative libertarin.

the direction of in-

dividual rights which may, if necessary, be vindicated by individual action, than does its authoritarian sibling.

It is not

that one wing of Conservatism believes more in the validity of

moral

lav;

or In the necessity of having it pervade the entire

society than does the other, but that the two v.dngs differ ra-

ther fundamentally as to
is-

to be brought about.

hov;

this desirable state of affairs

7/hile

Conservative libertarianism denies

the right, or even the power, of government to command observance

of the moral law

(v/ith the

exception of those acts which are

properly subject to the authority of criminal justice)

,

it does

nonetheless insist that government ought to serve as a good example for the citizens under its care^

The logic of the above would seem to dictate somewhat different attitudes toward private property from the two variants

of Conservatism.

It must be said, at the outset, that both types

place a high value on private ovmership of property, but do so
for different reasons.

Libertarianism stresses the need for

private property both becauce it believes it to be
a basic human
right (and important for the moral well-being of the
individual
as well) and because it serves as a powerful check upon
govern-

ment, by giving the individual a powerful means of self-suf
ficien(
It has already been seen that the libertarian fears political

institutions claiming excessive power, however defined, over
the individual.

The authoritarian vd.ng values private property

because it believes it to lead to beneficial social results.
v;hile the

libertarian probably agrees on this point, he does

not believe it to be the primary reason for the existence of

private property.

In the authoritarian scheme of things, there-

fore, private property has a somewhat uncertain tenure.

It may

continue to be in effect so long as it remains socially productive (v;hich there is a strong presumption it

T/ill

continue to

be), and only so long as this is true.

Conservatism has been said to be elitist, and though this
is true, it is possible to overstress it*

In the Conservative

view, orders and classes are a permanent part of human existence.
It is vain to expect all people to wield the same degree of in-

fluence in society or government.
of people are just not equal.

This is because the abilities

Based on superiority in intell-

igence or the advantages accruing to favored birth (neither of

which can ever bo equalized)
excel.

,

some people vdll just naturally

For a state to legislate an end of inequality ;70uld be

just like it repealing the law of gra'i/lty.

Political and social

inequality do not, however, imply moral inequality.

Conserva-

tism feels all people to have equal rights to the
protection

and benefits the state can offer, though, of course,
different
Conservatives differ on the nature of the benefits government
can offer.

It was this opposition to treating people as morally

unequal that caused Burke and Maistre, vmo

vrere

different in

so many ways, to be as one in their opposition to slavery.

As

proof of Conservatism's belief in moral equality, at least until
the individual in question commits a crime, it will be seen that

even while they

v/ere

reviling the French revolutionaries as sav-

ages, criminals, and renegades against God, neither Burke nor

Maistre at any time intimated that these criminals

v/ere

way congorJ-tally more given to crime than anyone else.

in any

Both

the authoritarian and libertarian v/ings of Conservatism agree

on this belief in moral equality, this being something that diff-

erentiates authoritarianism from Fascism with which it is sometimes (erroneousl.y) compared.

As has already been seen, hov/ever,

the two forms of Conservatism differ in their view of the moral

level at which men are equal.

The authoritarian has little faith

in the moral goodwill of the human being, whereas the libertarian
is somewhat more optimistic on this regard.
An important characteristic of Conservatism is its doubt

about the efficacy of human reason and the definition it often
gives to the term "reason"*

While Conservatism does not necess-

arily deny the existence of reason, it believes there are sharp

limitations upon it»

To talk about people creating or recreating

their society based on their individual complements of reason
is treated as the greatest folly.
not felt to be that powerful.

Individual reason is just

The course of true reason consists

in following the dictates of morality and the customs of the
nation, either with or without understanding.

The attitude of

the two sides of Conservatism to what is generally termed "reason"

is an important difference betv/een them*

Both are inclined to

accept the existence of individual reason, but after that the

differences set in.

Libert arianism believes individual reason

to be of a certain degree of use, so long as it is kept in a

subordinate position to morality.

Despite this, reason can be

of value in understanding morality.

other hand, equates indi-'/idual reason
iousness.

Authoritarianism., on the
v/ith sin,

evil, and rebell-

The dictates of morality require that individual reason,

which allows man to doubt and question, must, in the authoritarian

perspective, be totally effaced from the earth.

It is, there-

fore, quite correct to say that Conservative authoritariarJ.sn

is an enemy of human liberty, at least if liberty is felt to

involve the power of individual decision-making.
This last point brings up a major difference between the
tvio

aspects of Conservatism..

Both consider themselves to be

defenders of liberty, but their definitions of liberty differ
significantly.

Libert arianism definitely believes liberty to

consist in choosing

v;hat

is right, but believes in addition that

this choosing must be free.

It is only the choice of virtue,

while under no external constraint to so choose, that is the

essence of liberty.

The libertarian position is, therefore,

a compromise between positive and negative theories of freedom*
V?hile

free choice is a necessary part of freedom (negative freedom),

this freedom must end up directed into the proper channels for
the person to be correctly designated "free" (positive freedom).

Ko such compromise position is present in Conservative author-

itarianism.

Here freedom is deemed to be the embracing of correct

attitudes, however this embrace comes into being.

In other words,

coerced freedom, which is a contradiction in terms to libertarianism, may not be so to authoritarianism.

That is not to say

an authoritarian is necessarily a devotee of coercion through

torture (Maistre, for example, opposed the use of the Holy Inquisition, except for defensive purposes, this being, in practice, an ambiguous distinction.), it is just that there is no-

thing in his creed to preclude such a position.

In summation,

it can be 60en that the two strains of Conservatism have rather

sweepingly different ideas as to what liberty is, and how it
is to be achieved*

Conservatism, even in its libertarian

?Tianife station,

lieves the cor'porate nature of man must be considered if

is to be understood.

world of social atoms.

be-

msin

Man is not a social atom existing in a
He is a member of many social groups,

most of them at most only semi-voluntary in nature, and some

of them entirely involuntary: the family, a religion, a
social
class, possibly a significant educational group (the Old School

Tie), an occupational group, and lastly a nation,

Man is by

his very nature an organized being and is not made to live in

isolation.

Not only is man naturally a member of groups, but

this fact gj.ves him an at least semi-fixed position 7athin the

larger society and the state.

Conservatism believes in what

has been called an organic society.

Society is one structure

of many interrelated and interdependent parts, with the good
of one part ultimately depending upon the good of all, and vice
versa*

No individual, under ordinary circumstances, could ever

be right in seeking to set his will against that of society,

but if the society is acting rationally he should have no desire
to.

Both libertarian and authoritarian Conservatism agree on

the foregoing points.
betv/een them even here.

There are, however, noteworthy difference

Authoritarianism believes man can be

understood perfectly by understanding the sum of his group
berships.

tnem-

There is nothing ultimately independent about any

human being,

Libert arianism differs on

tliis

point.

iVhile by

no means minimizing the importance of man's associationai rela-

tionships, li be rt arianism believes there is still an individual

left v;hen all the person's social groups are, as it were, sub-

tracted from him.

This makes some sort of independent existence

possible, and thereby gives to man a certain grandeur resting

in his individuality.

While the human being is not the proud

and 7/holly independent atom envisioned by some Liberal
tiiinkers
(for example, Locke, in his theory of the State of
Nature), nei-

ther ie he wholly determined by his group memberships.

He is,

in the final analysis, at least somewhat free*
D, One Conservatism Or Two?

Now that a description of

the bacic principles of Conservatism has been given, and some

understanding of the divisions within Conservatism has been gained,
it becomes necessary to ask the important question whether Con-

servatism is one philosophy

currents

vri.thin

v/ith

authoritarian and libertarian

it, or v/hether Conservative Libertarianisra and

Conservative Authoritarianism are, in fact, two separate philosophies, vn.th certain points in common?

The answer given to

this question must of necessity be somewhat subjective, and yet
I

believe my answer can be supported by recourse to the facts*

The two philosophies have somev/hat different views of man, the
^rlevf

of man held being the root of any philosophy.

One believes

man to have an understanding of both good and evil and, while
having an omnipresent tendency toward evil, also has the ability
to freely choose good.

The other philosophy also sees man as

a mixed being, but feels the mixture to be so slsinted toward

evil that nan can only save himself by subordinating himself
to some other- worldly authority, or to the earthly representa-

tive of this authority.

The two formulations of Conservatism differ on what is

worth defending in Western civilization.

As was seen, one defends

what could be called a Conservative version of the
libertarian

tradition, whereas the other seeks the conservation of
a modified

version of the Western authoritarian tradition.

The two Conser-

vatisms just do not seek to conserve the same thing.
Devotion to custom, a key element of Conservatism, far
from being a source of unity to the two philosophies, is actually
a fount of discord.

This is because "custom" just does not mean

the same thing to both authoritarian and libertarian Conserva-

tism.

As has been seen, the first sees it as a direct emanation

of the mind of God or of some great ancient law-giver alone,

and consequently feels custom to be unchanging and beyond the

power of man.
altered.

Custorn is to be obeyed,

Libertarianisra

,

and not questioned or

on the other hand, definitely accepts

the belief that custom is to be respected, but that is because

it is a record of the knowledge and achievements of many gener-

ations of men, a process which, it must be added, is still going
on.

When two schools of thought both claiming to be Conserva-

tive disagree on a matter so important to Conservatism as the
D;eaning of "custom", one has a right to take this as evidence

of a major divorce.
It has also been seen that the two Conservatisms differ

rather significantly, in practice, on the subject of governmental
power.

Libertarianism favors fairly strict limitations on gov-

ernment, mainly because it favors more authority being left to

social (as opposed to political) structures, rather than to the

state, and also because it believes the individual
to be morally
fit to be allowed some measure of authority over
his

ov/n

life.

What authoritarianism feels about man has already been seen.

Nevertheless, authoritarianism claims to favor limited government also.

This limitation, however, is of the nature of sev-

erely emasculating the political agency, and vesting absolute
pov/er over the individual in a moral agency.

agency would probably be a Church.

Usually this moral

What the genuine positions

of the two Conservatisms on government power are, therefore,
are limited government on one side, and at least incipient tot-

alitarianism on the other.

That this is a basis for deep and

probably bitter dispute need hardly be belabored.
The different attitudes of the

tv/o

Conservatisms toward

private property must be closely considered.

It must be stressed

that the defense of private property is a very important theme

of Conservatism.

Libert arianlsni, in essence, sanctifies private

property and aakes its defense as close to a moral absolute as
anything in the theory (It vdll be seen later that it took truly
enormous abuses in India to get Burke to consent to the virtual

nationalization of the East India Ccm.pany,).

Authoritarianism's

defense of private property is more pragmatic, and therefore
not as strong.

It sees private ovmership of property as desir-

able because it is felt to lead to beneficial social results,

which is a less than rousing defense of the institution.

In

the final analysis, according to the authoritarian perspective,

the individual cannot claim private property
as a matter of in-

disputable right.

His property may be legitimately taken from

him if his possession of it is felt no longer to
serve the needs
of society.

The two Conservative philosophies also differ in the forms

their elitism takes.

Both believe in the social and political

inequality of men, and in their moral equality.

As has already

been seen, however, the absolute moral level at which this moral

equality is felt to exist differs markedly between the views
of the two philosophies, based on their different conceptions
of man.

These philosophies have different attitudes toward the

extent of human reason and toward its safety and efficacy.

Nei-

ther believes man to be a primarily rational animal, but liber-

tarianism believes reason to be a greater attribute of man than
doos authoritarianism.

Libertarianism is inclined to believe

man can order his existence through reason to some extent, whereas
authoritarianism is not even this sanguine.
ianism believes reason to be always dangerous
work in the affairs of

ro.en,

Finally, authoritarv/hen

allowed to

whereas libertarianism believes reason

can be made safe if placed under proper guidance.

It is true

that these are basically differences of degree, and yet they
are still fundamental differences between the two philosophies.

This difference of opinion about reason is matched by one
on liberty.

Liberty just does not mean the same thing to the

6^.

two theories.

For both, liberty is essentially the leading
of

a proper moral existence, but libertarianism
insists this moral

life must be freely chosen for liberty to
be said to exist.

Authoritarianism insists upon no such limitations.

In its view,

that man is free who adheres to a moral style of
life, however

that adherence comes to be.
free.

A man can indeed be forced to be

Here again is another point on which there is a substan-

tial base of agreement between the two philosophies, but cn
which
the disagreements are equally significant.

Finally, the two Conservatisms even differ in their views
about the limits of corporate society.

Both believe corporate

associations to be very important for the molding and well-being
of the individual, but authoritarianism believes corporate struc-

tures pre-empt the entire social v/orld.

Libertarianism, in con-

trast to this view, believes a cert.ain (probably not very large)
area

of autonomy is left to the care of the individual.

Again

this difference is only a matter of degree, and yet it would
be a mistake to underrate its significance.

One should not over-estimate the differences between Con-

servative Libertarianism

gind

Conservative Authoritarianism.

Of the many political philosophies extant, they are probably
closer to each other than they are to any other political philosophies.

Nevertheless, they are separate philosophies, not

merely variations within a single philosophy.

Therefore, in

reply to the question that opened this section, it is possible
to declare with some confidence that there are

tv/o

Conservatisms, not one.

The remainder of this dissertation shall
be devoted to

exploring the political philosophies of Edinund
Burke and Joseph
De Maistre, as representatives of the two
Conservative philos-

ophies.

It is obviously somewhat dangerous to use the
political

thoughts of persons as archetypes for general philosophies,
and
yet in the cases of Burke and Maistre

I

believe they are suff-

iciently true to the varying traditions of Conservatism to allow
an intensive examination of their theories to serve as an expli-

cation of the two Conservatisms.
work.

That shall be the goal of this

Chapter II: Views On Man
A.

Man As Creation Of God.

Both Burke and Maistre are con-

vinced that man is a creation of God, and, at his very worst,
continues to show marks of his divine origin.

This belief is

taken in somewhat different directions by the

tv;o

theorists.

For one thing, Burke apparently felt man partook more of the

essence of a semi-divine creature than Maistre did.

One part

of the bill of indictment Burke drew up against the French Rev-

olution concerned its unwillingness to accept a right of dissent.
Severs.! ideas about the intrinsic nature of man must follow

from this.

of the

First, man, as creation of God, shares in enough

'sn.sdom

of his Maker to cause dissent to be something

other than the folly of a rebellious creature.

Man can perceive

his goals and seek to achieve them with a great possibility
of success,

Han, due to his divine parentage, is able to work

his will on the physical and social environment, never in ways

counteracting the long-term goals of God, but still acting as
an independent furtherer of God*s will»

There can be little

doubt that Burke saw himself as doing exactly this in his crusade

Man is, of course,

against slavery and for the rights of India*

not a fully divine creature by any stretch of the imagination,

^Edmund Burke, A Letter To a Noble Lord
the

Ri.?;ht

,

in The Works Of

PTonourab] e Sdr?:und Burke In Twelve Volumes

Ballantyne, Hanson & Co., l899), 175»

,

V (London:

but he is able to see God's moral law,
and act effectively in

accordance with it.

The aspects of God that Maistre sees
man

as possessing are somewhat different.

Man is, by his very

nature, a powerful being, but without the help
of God his power

only leads to destructiveness.^

To Maistre, man is in some

ways, through his divine genesis, even more powerful
than Burke
felt him to be.

Not only can man draw up plans of action, but

he can put these plans into effect, even when, in the
short

run, they directly resist the will of God.

Man will, in the

long run, suffer terribly whenever he is so foolish as to attempt
Bonething like this, just as the French are suffering terribly
for their revolution against God's vn.ll.

The crucial thing

to consider, however, is that Maistre believes man can actually

declare war on God, and even win a few battles.

It may well

be that the authoritarian, nature of so much of Maistre »s theory

stems frow his appreciation of the tremendous, though unguided,

power of man.
God.

Man is a little god without the judgement of

Such a creature must be fenced about securely so that

he will not hurt himself*

Burke's view of man's divine attri-

butes is simultaneously more complimentary and less complimentary

than that of Maistre.

Burke's man has considerably less power

than that of Maistre, in that he is not able to challenge God,
even unsuccessfully.
2

Though Burke shared Maistre 's view that

Joseph de Maistre, Essay On the Generative Princi-ole Of

Political Constitutions , in The V/orks Of Joseph de Maistre, ed.
by Jack Lively, (London: Allen and Un\7in, 1965)

»

P»

170.

the French Pevolution was a challenge
to religion, he did not

trouble himself much with the deeper philosophical
meanings
of this fact.

The power man has, however, he is, due
to his

God-given reason, able to use effectively to
reshape the physical
and social world. Man is able to be a true
partner of God,
albeit, of course, not an equal partner.

On the whole, therefore.

Burke sees man as more powerful than Maistre does.

It is the

long-term results that, are truly important, and these
are the
partial prerogatives of Burke's man, not Maistre »s.

When the

latter »s man seeks independent activity, he will be finally
frustrated.

This component of the thought of Burke and Maistre should
serve as a partial corrective to those who might view these

thinkers as pessimistic about man.

There can be no doubt that

the charge does stick to a significant extent, but neither one

is blind to the special qualities of man that lift him above
the other animals.

He is, indeed, capable of doing very great

Sood, when in league with his Malcer.
B. Original Sin.

Though some writers do see Burke as

a believer in original sin-^, recourse to Burke's actual writings

makes this by no means clear.

If he were an orthodox Christian

in his political thinking, one would expect him to embrace the

concept of original sin, but the degree to v;hich Burke's thought
was genuinely Christian (as opposed to generally religious)

^Alfred Cobban, Edmund Burke and the Revolt Against the

Eighteenth Century (London: Allen and

TJnvri.n,

I960), p» 84«

is not certain.

At any rate, it would be more correct to
say

that Burke deals with a flawed man, rather than a
fallen man.

If Burke ever believed man to be fundamentally different
from

the way man was at present, that is not evident.

If man was

flawed, this was due to his innate attributes as a human being,

and not to any sin he or his ancestors may have committed.

Man is a mixed being, but the mixture is not so weighted toward

rebelliousness and sin as to preclude the possibility of liberty.
A reasonable approximation of liberty is possible, so long as
ffian»s

imperfect nature is taken into account.

The notion of

original sin takes on a much clearer and greater importance
in Maistre.

Maistre refers to man as having a "naturally re-

bellious heart", and adds that it is incorrect

to

say that the

innocent suffer with the guilty in this world, for original
sin neans that no men are truly innocent.^

The idea of original

sin explains everything that happens in the world, constantly

recurs, and, due to the inheritence of moral evil, shows all
mv?n

to bo corrupt to the core.

It is amazing that a personally'"

kindhsa.rted man like Maistre was absolutely convinced of the

moral degradation of his species.

This may be termed properly

the heart and soul of his theory.

Man will run to do evil out

of a sheer viciousness, and not out of any desire to receive

reward.

It is not likely that any theorist ever painted a more

'^Maistre, First Saint Petersburg Dialogue
Workfr Of Joseph De Maistre,

p.

l83.

,

in Lively,

horrible picture of man.

All things that Maistre does not like

stem from original sin, the spirit of false
pride and rebell-

iousness.

Among these baneful derivatives of original
sin are

Protestantism, Gallicanism, the Enlightenment,
reformism, and
(of course) the French Revolution.

All moral and physical ills

that man suffers are the direct result of his original
sin and
serve as fitting punishment for it.^

Ko punishment, be it at

the hands of man or of God, can be deemed unjust, for
every

man*s sin is so great that any punishment he receives he has
merited, whether it be for the crime charged (in the case of
a human tribunal), or for another crime never detected.

The

punishment meted cut to man by God may bs the work of an angry
God, but is also the work of a just and loving God.

God punishes

so that man may turn from the ways of sin and return to Him,

which is the only way in which human happiness can be achieved.

Maistre is ^Adlling to admit that in some rare cases a truly
innocent person may be punished, but even this sacrifice stems
from original sin, in that the condemned serves as "a propitiatory

victim" for those most deeply mired in sin.^

Maistre does have

a clear (and perb^^ps exaggerated) view of the griraness of human

existence, and agrees with many of the thinkers of his time,
such as Locke, that God causes this grimness, but unlike them,

^Ibid.

,

p.

189.

Maistre, Enlightenment On Sacrifices
Of Joseph De Maistre, p. 298.

,

in Lively, Works

he feels God to be only the proximate cause,
with the ultimate

cause of the human tragedy being man himself.

That these two

views of original sin in Burke and Maistre decisively influence
their opinions as to the possibility of liberty and the necessity
of authority certainly follows.

Though Burke (knowing his fellow-

man rather well) does recognize man's penchant for sin, the

idea of sin does not bulk very large in his thinking.

In BurK;e»s

theory of man, in fact, the true notion is much more adequately

expressed by the phrase "human weakness", than the phrase "human
sin".

Man is not so corrupt that he may not act in an indep-

endent, though somewhat controlled, fashion.
cannot be trusted co be free.

Maistre 's man

He is simply too evil (or,

at

best, misguided) a creature to have any hand in governing himself.
As previously stated, the only solution to this dilemma that

Maistre can conceive of is to vest all Earthly authority in
a state that is not a typical state, ruled by a man

v;ho

is not

a typical man.
C. Degree Of Good and Evil In Man,

Obviously, neither

Burke nor Maistre believes man to be either a pure saint or
a pure devil.

The truth lies somewhere in between, but to set

its exact location is quite impossible, because neither man

stated his position on this subject explicity.

Burke did not

have any great respect for the popular will (to put it mildly),
for in defense of a certain bill he once said that it was demanded

by the people "whose desires, when they do not militate with

s

.

the stable and eternal rules of juctice
and rcacon (rules which
are above us and above them)
ought to be as a law to a House
,

of Commons."'^

This is not exactly a clarion call for
follovdnc

the inevitably good will of the people.

It is strongly suggested

that a man will, as often as not, demand that
which is contrary
to reason and justice.

This theme recurs again and again in

Burko, but never so forthrightly as in a speech
given in an
(not surprisingly) unsuccessful attempt to achieve
reelection
to Parliament

from Bristol.

In defense against the charge of

having sold out the interests of Bristol, a major trading center,
with regard to America and Ireland, Burke declared: "I conformed
to the instructions of truth and Nature, and maintained your

interest, against your opinions, with a constancy that became
me,"

It

is rather refreshing to read of a politician who is

willing to say of his constituents right to their faces that
they are a pack of short-sighted immoral fools.

This is not,

however, the best way to win votes, as Burke learned to his

misfortune.

This speech ends

that "The charges against

rae

v/ith

the stirring declaration

are all of one kind; that

I

have

pushed the principles of general justice and benevolence too far.'
The implication is very clear that man can be regularly relied
7
Ci

Burke, A Plan For .

.

the Economical Reformation Of bhc

vil and Other Establishments
g

,

in Burke

'

s

Works,

Burke, Spoech At the Guildhall In Bristol

Works, II, 382.
"^Ibid.

,

p. if23.

.

II,

;^7l.

in Burke

'

s

upon to flaunt the dictates of r^ature, justice,
and decency.

This is a none too optimistic view of man, and
it is one which
Burke never abandoned. That there is a very
large component

of evil in man is something that Burke never
doubted.

There

is, however, another side to Burke's view of
man, one stressing

the sociability and decency of man.

In his Fragment Af^ainst

the An ti -Po pery Laws, Burke rebuts the allegation thaz
the

Catholics of Ireland must not be treated with moderation,
lest
they rebel, by saying that people rebel against oppression,
not moderation.

Man is, therefore, able to recognize when

he is being treated fairly, and will return good for good.

Man, furthermore, may often do wrong, but he does not wish to
do so.'^

It is impossible to say just how evil or how good

Burke felt man to be.

Much of this would depend on the mood

ho happened to be in as he was v/riting a given speech or book.

On the v;hole, however, Burke was relatively optimistic about
man,

Man may often be ignorant, but he is not really bad«

The average man, for example, is not naturally rebellious.
As will be seen later, a truly national revolution is always

provoked by the evil actions of government.

There is very little

consistency, as has been seen, in Burke's view of man's good
and evil.

The overall trend is, hov/ever, a positive view.

^^Burke, Fragment Against the Anti - Popery Laws, in Burke'

Works, VI, 356.
^

'Burke, Thoufrhts On the Cause Of the Present Discontents

in Burke 's Works, I,

z^z+l.

,

Maistre's view of the mixture between human
good and evil
is rather easier to relate than that of Burke.
Man is corrupted
to the core by original sin, is rebellious
against all authority,

and for his own good must have his
of the nation and the Church.

broken to the dictates

Man not under the guidance of

religion is naturally a cannibal.

The savage, the fallen man

unredeemed by society and religion, is far from the virtuous
and happy creature Rousseau felt him to be.

He instead is a

wholly corrupt and miserable being, whose salvation constitutes
a genuine miraclo, which can therefore be achieved only by the

true church.

The savage is not, as Rousseau believed, the orig-

inal man; he is the man who has once lived in the state and has
EOmehov; been removed from this condition.

Such a man is more

monster than man, and Maistre does not hold out much hope for
his redemption.

One reason why Maistre did not desire a speedy

counter-revolution in France was that he desired all the revolutionaries, who were savages, to be exterminated so that France
might be prepared for her next king.

Four million people would

have to die before France could be saved. 2
1

A terrible fear

that Maistre had was that the monarchy would be re-established

before all the savages had fallen in war, and the monarch would
mercifully, but foolishly, spare them.

The only realistic way

to treat a conquered savage is to put him to the sword.
1

2.

Naistre, Considerations On France

Of Joseph De Maistre, np. 56-57.

,

Maistre

in Lively, Works

is thereby reading one large class of
human beings out of the

human race.

He really believes that the French
revolutionaries

are literally demons.

A more balanced view of the Jacobins

is found in Burke when he says that conquered
Jacobins must
"be put under the guide, direction, and government
of better

Frenchmen than themselves, or they will instantly relapse
into
a fever of aggravated Jacobinism. "^^

Burke xeels, therefore,

that even Jacobins are redeemable, and that the problem
they

pose is primarily one of education, though undoubtedly a
strict

regimen of education.

There will be punishment of guilty in-

dividuals, surely including some executions, but punishment
will not be meted out to a whole class (one of Burke's key

charges against the revolutionaries).

It is this last proposal

that Maiotre specif ically intends to undertake.

Large numbers

of people can, to Maistre, be so radically and fundamentally

evil as to be beyond the pale of humanity.

There is in Maistre 's thinking a second class of human

being with an admixture of evil all its own.

This is the bar-

barian, the true original man, who still survives in some areas
of the world.

He is a strange mixture of good and evil.

The

barbarian is the only truly creative man (Ke is, for example,
the only man capable of creating language, a facility Maistre

prizes highly as symbolic of creativity in general.) and, though
''Burke, Remarks On the Policy Of the Allies With Respect

To France, in Burke's Works, IV,

z+27.

without religion in any institutionalised sense,
is somehow

under the direct sovernment of God.

As for human government,

the barbarian has it only in the form of the family.

It might

seem that Maistre idealizes the barbarian much as
Rousseau

idealized the "noble savage", but such is not really the
case.
The barbarian is not what man ought to be.

He is the undeveloped

man, and since God wills man's development he is in that degree

divorced from God.

For this man to truly be what he ought to

be, he must have government, because he is also fallen man,

though Maistre himself is net fully cognizant of this at all

times and sometimes almost regards the barbarian as analogous
to Rousseau's noble savage.

The barbarian must be civilized,

but since the barbarian has never had civilization and lost

it (like the savage), it is not hard to give it to him.

The

barbarian is, in fact, subject to ci\'llization by the bearers
of any religion (a major concession from a fervent Catholic

like Maistre)

barbarian's

,

chis showing just how easy it is to do.

criir:es,

The

other than those stemming from his nature

as a fallen human being, stem from his lack of refinem.ent and
not from any special depravity.

The average man, fallen but under government, was Maistre 's

main interest.
and part beast.

This being is "a monstrous centaur", part man

Man is a degraded creature

v/ho

seeks what

Maistre, Second Saint Petersburg Cialo^ue, in Lively,
y/orks Of Joseph De Maistre, p.

199.

he does not really want, and shuns that
which he does want.

His saving grace, however, is that he senses
his degradation,

this sensation being the source of both misery and
grandeur.

Man is not like the other animals.

He knows when he does wrong,

and Is therefore capable of being a criminal (which
an animal
cannot be) and of being good (which is also impossible for
an

animal).

God has given man the innate ideas of good and evil.

Kaistre, however, is so convinced of the horrible evil of the
average fallen man that ho despairs of the individual man ever

being able to make himself good.
for that to be possible,

mat

The will is just too base

the human can do, by (paradox-

ically) an enormous act of will, is to place himself completely

under authority, both political and spiritual.

The greatest

act of individual will is achieved in the extermination of vd.ll.

Unlike Hobbes, whose solution to the problem of human evil,
the placing of oneself under the, in practice, absolute authority

of another human being, is highly illogical, Maistre's view,
if one accepts his view of the nature of authority, makes perfect
sense.

Sinful man is not subordinating his will to the wills

of bther, equally sinful, men, but to institutions created by

God.

Kan is not subordinating his will to man, but to God.

The extreme nature of Maistre's solution to human evil shows
Just how deeply imbedded he thought it was.

Burke's solution,

which is never really clearly spelled-out, is for every individual
to personally adhere to the known law of God.

Only in the rare

instances of flagrant acts of evil, such
as those of Hastings
in India, is any authority external
to the individual to intervene.

This bespeaks a strong faith in human
rectitude that
is missing in Maistre.
A further example of this difference
between Burke and Maistre on the degree of
human evil is shown
by their difference of opinion as to the
popular base of the

French R.^volution, which both regard as
radically evil.

Burke

was of the opinion that any genuinely
popular revolution is

always a reaction to misrule and tyranny.

Consistent with this

belief, he declares the French Revolution to have been
the acti
of a conspiratorial elite carried out in direct
opposition to
the expressed will of the French people, as manifested
in the

cahiers given to the men elected to the Estates General,

The

evil was, therefore, the work of a very small minority, with
the large majority of the French being guiltless.
a very different view of these events.

Maistre has

He forthrightly declare

that a majority of Frenchmen for two years supported the action

that ultimately culrtainated in the murder of King Louis XVI
Lest it be thought that these differing viov/s on the popular

character of the French Revolution reflect a dislike for the

French by Maistre and a warm feeling for the French by Burke,
and not an attitude toward the dimensions of human evil as such
it

should be said that the situation was quite the opposite.
^

^Maistre, Considerations On France

Of Joseph De Maistre

,

pp. 52-53.

,

in Lively, Works

Evon before the French Revolution, Burke had a strong
dislike
for and diotrust of the French, probably stemming
from his great

British patriotism.

Maistre, on the other hand, was very much

the Francophile, and the Revolution did not seriously
dent this.

France was always seen by Maistre as the leader of temporal

European Christian civilization, standing by the right hand
of the Pope.

Burke, in other words, feels human evil to be

relatively shallow in the individual and not very widespread
in the community, while Maistre feels it to be both deep and
wide

.

It is important to understand Maistre' s view on the nature

of human evil, as this greatly influenced the type of authoritarianii~m he embraced.

Maistre accepts the Augustinian view

that evil, including human evil, is a flaw in being that was
no part of God's original creation.

1

r

Had man not sinned, there

would have been no evil in human beings (this being,

wfhon

one

thinks of it, a very confused belief) or any suffering in the
world.

Evil is contrary to what man's nature ought to be, and

all suffering, including all illness, is the result of moral

vice and exists due to God's desire to expiate man's guilt while
he yet lives,

and thereby earn

hin:

some redemption cheaply.

Man, not God, is therefore the ultimate author of evil and

suffering.

The reason why Maistre desires human subordination

^^Maietre, First Saint Petornburg Dialogue

Works Of Joseph De Maistre

,

p.

l88.

.

in Lively,

to authority is the same reason why
Maistre's foes desired human

freedom from non-responsible authority.
be rendered whole and,

Maistre wants man to

since his evil subtracts from his whole-

ness, evil must be removed at all costs, in the
name of humanity.

The removal of

unhappiness.

e-ril

vdll be the removal of all disease and

The realization of man is the goal of Maistre,

and this is to be accomplished by removing from man that
which
is unreal.

itarian.

Maistre may, therefore, be called a humanistic author-

There is really very little

of the nature of human evil,

to

say about Burke's view

for such a deeply philosophical

subject was not generally to Burke's liking.

About all that

can be done is to suggest what Burke's approach to such a question

rould have been if he had had to tackle it.

It is clear that

Burke's belief in a merciful and loving God would not have per-

mitted him to believe in God as the ultimate source of evil.

This would have forced Burke to say that either God was not
omnipotent

T

much evil and suffering thereby being purely for-

tuitous, or that man himself was the source of evil,

ks one

may assume Burke would not have been prepared to deny God's

omnipotence, he would therefore have been driven to either vest
absolute pov/er over man in some divinely-sanctioned institution
or institutions (v/hich was Maistre's solution) or succumb to

despair.

That he did neither was the result of his extreme

disinclination to live in the rarified realms of pure philosophy,
though there was certainly an impressive foundation of ITatural

Law philoscphy to his thinking.

Burke was obviously aware of

the existence of human evil (the belief in
which may be said
to be a central tenet of conservatism)
and there is little reason
to doubt he
Lav/

felt it to stem from violation of God's
Natural

by man.

The main reason why, with these first principles

which are so fundamentally similar to those of
Maistre

,

Burke

reaches a much more hopeful view of man is that he does not
permit himself to "brood about human evil.

Perhaps he would

have if he had been driven from his home by invading armies
as Maistre was.

If, however, Burke had been given to brooding,

the death of his son, his continually desperate financial sit-

uation (which was aggravated by an absolute incorruptibility
and a noble ^--enercsity)

,

and the scurrilous attacks calling

him a secret Jesuit (about tne worst attack imaginable in eight-

eenth century England) and, after 1789, a Don Quixote, woald
have given him cause to do so.

Whenever Burke brooded, and

he unquestionably cad do so, it was about the future of his

family and oi
men.

E'l^-land,

and not about the wortn of his fellow

One cannot do justice to a thinker's theories without

considering his temperament from which so much of these theories
arise, and Eurke was just too kind a man to think his fellow
man to be really evil.
D. Free V/ill In Burke and Maistre.

Both Burke and Maistre

believed man had free will, but this statement alone obscures
ncre than it clarifies, for there were important differences

in v;hat free will meant in their theories.

Burke starts off

from the belief that God has given man innate
ideas concerning

good and evil and the ability to identify each.

These ideas

are common to all men, and men are thereby united
on the basic

question of what is good and what is evil.^"^

The free will

of man, therefore, concerns his choosing between good
and evil,
but not the defining of the concepts.

Here man is not free*

Kan lives in an ordered moral universe which he can defy, but
which he cannot redefine.

Burke, as will be seen later in this

dissertation, does believe there is a pre-planned goal to human
history, and it is a happy goal, but he is certainly no believer
that things v;ill necessarily work out right in the short run,

which can be very long.

Burke »s actions show this belief.

He undoubtedly felt it necessary to support the Americans in

what he deemed their just struggle with England, even to the

extent of toying with the superficially treasonous idea of raising
a regiment in England to fight for the Americans, lest the forces

of tyranny (England) defeat those of liberty (America).

The

emotive terms used express the ideas, if not the words, of Burke,

Burke was here afraid that evil would triumph over good.

During

the French Revolution, Burke had absolute terror that evil would

defeat good, spoke quite seriously of the possibility that he

would one day look through the "National 7/indow" (the hole through
17

Burke

,

A Philosophical Inquiry Into the Origin Of Our Idea

Of the Sublime and Beautiful
Taste, in Burke

'

s

Works

.

:

Introductory Discourse Concerning

I, 79.

B5

which one inserted his head in the guillotine),
and required
that after

liis

burial his friends should secretly exhume
his

body and rebury it in a secret place

so that if the

Jacobins

triumphed in England they could not do indignities
to the body
of their great enemy.

could

'/an

Any thought in Burke's mind that evil

triumphs over good would have been confirmed by the

case of India, where Burke was absolutely convinced that Gov-

ernor General Hastings had committed murder, enslaved the people

under his charge, and violated the Natural Law, and despite
years of effort to punish Hastings for his crimes
against God
and man, Burke lived to see him exonerated.

Men were free to

commit vile crimes and to escape all earthly punishment.

There

is, moreover, no doubt in Burke's mind that this cannot be ex-

plained by saying these men escaped earthly punishment because
they acted as God's agents for

a

good purpose invisible to men

and to the criminals undertaking these deeds.

Burke does not

spell out his belief in free will in so many words, but his

actions bear out the contention that he held this belief in
free will.

While a thinker's actions need not necessarily

adhere to his beliefs, Burke was a man whose life reflected
his philosophy.

This belief in free will is indicated by the

fact that Burke was alv/ays willing to hold people morally re-

sponsible for their actions, whether for good or ill.

When

he counselled lenience in punishment, as in the case of the

anti-Catholic rioters who, among other things, had endangered

^

BUrke»« own life, it wa« not because
people were not morally
responsible, but because prudence dictated
this course.

In

the case mentioned, the rioters were to be
treated firmly, but

leniently, not because they were not morally
culpable, and cer-

tainly not because they were right, but because
this would be
the course that would most further the
cause of tolerance.
All men could, in fact, achieve their own
salvation through

the help of free will, right reason, and good
institutions J
A man in an evil society would have a difficult
time redeeming

himself, and a man lacking right reason (a phrase
which will
be explained later) probably would not be able
to do eo at all,

but free will was also a fundamental necessity for moral
well-being.

No man could save any other man, and institutions could,
at the
most, play a supportive role.

Man's rectitude or lack of it

was ultimately of his own doing.

It is really somewhat sur-

prising to find such a strongly individualist view (though not
one wholly discounting the effects of society) in a man who

in £0 many other things was inclined to stress organic theories.
It is likely that this individualism stemmed either from Burke's

early Lockeanism or from his Protestantism, or from both currents
together*

Man is ultimately an independent moral entity.

There

i«, however, one aspect of Burke's thinking bearing on the idea

of free will that renders the whole logical structure rather

fragile, and casts severe doubt on Burke's actual adherence
id

Peter J. Stanlis, Edmund Burke and the Natural Law (Ann

Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1965)» PP» 136-1 87.

to a free

mil

position.

As was already mentioned, God has

decreed a goal to human history.

What is necessary to make

Burke's view on free will hang together, therefore, is to reconcile free will in individual human affairs with determinism

over the long haul of history.

Burke, who in a rather unfairly

sell-deprecating attitude viewed himself as no philosopher,
did not ever attempt to undertake this task.
all, not consciously a system-builder.

He was, after

Philosophical niceties

were things he was quite content to leave to other people.

There is no indication that Burke was aware of this inner conflict in his theory, nor should one believe he would have been

terribly concerned if someone had pointed this out to him.
Suffice to say that Burke simultaneously held a belief in man's

individual moral freedom and hence moral responsibility, and
in the existence of a divine plan for history.

Even the greatest

of thinkers may slip up.

Maistre's view of free will is a good deal more complicated than that of Burke.

He begins, as was seen, by -'/iovlng

even illness and the Lisbon Earthquake as the results of

erring

v;ill

of man.

tho:

There is, therefore, virtually nothing

that can happen to man v;hich is outside the realm of his own
free will.

Maistre, though, as was seen earlier and will be

seen again, belie\a.ng there were knowable laws of man and society,
at another point explicitly contradicted his belief that there

were such laws and accused philosophers of spreading the canard

9

about invariable laws of nature and society in
order to dis-

courage men from praying.

""^

V/hatever one may think of the logic

of this accusation (to me the logic seems very scanty,
seeking
to debunk belief in invariable laws because of
the belief's

effect on prayer), it does show that the power of prayer
is

limitless, or at least very greats

As each individual must

make his own decision whether to pray or not, for even under
the most repressive theocracy a person could merely go through
the motions of prayer, each individual must ultimately decide

whether or not he will reshape the world through prayer to God,
This, hov/ever, is a form of free

v/ill at

one remove.

Though

man does freely pray or not pray, it is God ^^o hears or does
not hear.

It is God's will that calls forth changes in the

though man's prayers do have great efficacy in calling

vTOrld,

forth God's will*

This view of Maistre's follows his belief

in the ultimate uncreativeness of man.

Maistre's concept of the justification for punishment
muddles the notion of free

v/ill

even further.

First, he did

believe that each man's punishment was individually merited.

How this comes to pass does, however, cast severe doubts on
the extent to v/hich Maistre believed in free will.

after all, a fallen creature.

Man was,

The original sin of his first

ancestors, while not closing the door of redemption to all their
1

Maistre, Fourth Saint Petersburg Dialogue

Works Of Joseph De Maistre, pp. 216-217.

,

in Lively,

87

descendents, did render redemption a very uphill
struggle^

This idea of Maistre»s is generally subsumed
within his theory
of substitution.

One can, and does, inherit both good
and evil

from his ancestors.

It would seem that original sin and
the

theory of substitution effectively destroy any real
free will
that man might have, but Maistre is not of this
opinion.

He

does consider man to be morally culpable for his own
deeds,
but he also feels a man to be culpable for the deeds of
his

ancestors.

Incredibly, Maistre the royalist concedes as just-

ified the argument of the French revolutionaries that the current

French

i^oyal

family may be held to account for the crimes of

its ancestors over the centuries.

Men might be able to free

themselves from the good or evil history of their families to
some extent, but what the use of the stupendous effort required

would be if this history rightfully pursues them nonetheless
is a good question.

Despite his occasional paeans to individ-

uality, "without which immortality is nothing"^\ it is clear
that Maistre does not really believe man to be a morally auton-

omous individual.

As society is and must be corporate, so is

all history and every family.

Man is simply not 3 moral entity.

This inheritence of guilt or honor from one's forebears
raal^;e

v;ould

reward or punishment morally suspect, if it did not also
20

Maistre, Tenth Saint Petersburff Dialogue

Works Of Joseph De Maistre, pp.
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,

in Lively,

s

involve inheritence of sin or virtue.

Man is, in a sense, pun-

ished and rewarded for his own sin and virtue,
but these are

qualities which the individual cannot really control.

This

view degrades man to the level of the offspring
of syphlitic
parents, who is quite literally cursed from the moment
of conception.

It is strange that Maistre did not realize
just how

destructive of individual good behavior his theory of
familial

predestination could be.
Even if this belief in the inheritence of virtue and vice
were not enough to destroy all individual free will, Maistre
»s

strictures on the role of society in man's moral development
would surely do so.

Burke once declared: "Let us only suffer

any person to tell us his story, morning and evening, for but
one twelve-month, and he will become our master. "^^

It was

exactly this that Maistre advocated that the state and Church
should do, and not for "one twelve-month", but for eterni.ty.

Religious and political dogmas are to unite to form a "national

mind" which exists "to repress the aberrations of the individual
reason which is, of its nature, the mortal enemy of any association whatever because it gives birth only to divergent opinions"; the national mind is, in Maistre 's own phrase, "indiv-

idual abnegation."
22

All the pov/ers of state and society are
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,
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to be harnessed to indoctrinate the individual
in this national

mind and to cause him to submerge his own mind
in it.

Anyone

who vri.shed to see Maistre as a forerunner of
modern totalitar-

ianism could have a field day vdth this teaching.

between Maistre

's

The parallels

"national mind" and Rousseau's "general will"

are also interesting to ponder.

Suffice to say that it is diff-

icult to see how individual free will could exist in any
state
with either a "national mind" or a "general v/ill" that the state

was v/illing to enforce by all the tools at its command.
final summary statement on the subject of free

^rlll

having been created free, he is freely led."^^

Maistre

is "Man

This statement

is objectionable for several reasons, both as a true statement
of Maistre 's own beliefs and as a work of logic.

First, Maistre

treatment of his own State of Nature theory shows he believes

man was not created free.

The defining condition of man's

original state was that he had no free will, at least not so
far as God was concerned.

It is parenthetically intriguing

to note the similarities betv/een thijs quotation and that opening

the first chapter of Rousseau's Social Contract .

have been beyond a man of Maistre

's

It v;ould not

literary ability and

vri.t

to parody one of the most famous statements of his arch-rival.

There are a number of problems in the second part of Maistre 's
statement, that referring to man as being "freely led."
PL

First,

Maistre, Fifth Saint Petersburg Dialogue , in Lively,

Works Of Joseph De Maistre

,

p. 231.

in a loGical sense, the relationship of
leader and led is not
a free relationship, or at least not wholly
so.

When the leader

acts rightfully and within his legally ordained
term of office,
he is the leader without having to seek the consent
of anyone.

As Maistre observed, it is this which separates a
true leadeifroEi'

the "leader" of a club.

The latter, if he takes a consti-

tutional, but unpopular, position, may lose all or part of
his

club's membership through secession, but in a state this would
be treason.

Even if the nature of leadership were free, Maistre

obviously did not intend it to be so.

Man was not to be led

by any choice of his own, but by the force and moral authority

(supported by the control of information) of the state.

There

seem, therefore, to be three possible interpretations of the

above-mentioned quotation.

Either Maistre was making an asser-

tion that goes against the grain of the dynamics of his phil-

osophy (which his early attraction to liberalism would render
possible), was making a statement he felt to be absurd, just
to have a little private fun with Rousseau, or
to b© free is to be led in the right direction.

mostly to the third possibility, for reasons

v;as

saying that

I subscribe

v;hich will be made

clear later.
Burke believes man to be really the architect of his fate

on earth, though this power by the individual is somehow to

coexist with a final control of history by God.

Maistre, on

the other hand, believes the human will, in concert

v/ith God,

or even, in the short run,
out of concert, to be
extremely eff.
icacious, but whether or not this
will is
to be used, and how,

is determined by original sin,
family background, and the restraints exercised by society. Burke
believes free will to
be a positive element necessary for
individual redemption, but

Maistre thinks free will (in the normal
definition) to be a
manifestation of human rebelliousness, and is
therefore to be
effaced as much as is possible.
E. The Role Of Passion and Its
Relationship To Reason.

A belief in the power of human reason was one
of the dis-

tinguishing characteristics of the Enlightenment, and
the way
in which Burke and Maistre respond to this belief
is an important
difference dividing them.

Burke did lay great stress on the

power and importance of passions.

This has led some, Sabine

among them, to feel that Burke negated the importance
of reason.^^

This is essentially false.

BurkQ was by no means an irrationalist.

Reason and passion were two independent facts of life,
but they
could be made to work together.
the most important.

Of the two, reason was to Burke

As Watkins put it. Burke "believed that

reason was the most valuable and distinctive of human gifts, "^^
Reason could not, however, stand alone.

Passion is needed to

be the activating principle of reason, which is itself passive.
25
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Frederick M. Watkins, The A£e Of Ideolo,qy (Englewood Cliffs,

New Jersey; Prentice-Hall, 196^), p. 32.

As Burke puts it:

'-ejudice, with its reason, has

a motive

to give action to that reason,
and an affection which will
give
it permanence. Prejudice is of
ready application in the emergency; it previously engages the
mind in a steady course of
wisdom and virtue and does not leave
the man hesitating in the
moment of decision skeptical, puzzled,
and unresolved. "2? ^^^^^
is, it must be noticed, nothing here
that says that passion is an
intrinsic good, for Burke does not believe
it to be so.
Passion
can be no better than the reason and the
social order it con-

serves.

Passions, to be good, must be under the
governance

of reason, and, through education and the
beneficial results
of social living, must be rendered tractable

and improved into

morals.

Burke does not believe all passions to be good
necess-

arily; those which are not may even have to be
redirected or

suppressed.-

Passion is, therefore, in a highly subordinate

position to reason.

Burke is sensible enough not to have any

unrealistic views about the qualities of human passions,
but
neither does he hold the opinion that passions can be eliminated.

They are even very valuable, but not for themselves.

This is

nothing if not a libertarian position, for Burke is neither

prepared to destroy society in pursuit of man's "noble natural
self", nor to exterminate man's passions so that he might achieve

his "rightful rationality".
27

There can be no doubt that a strong
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(Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, I960), pp. 58-61.

social conservatism is a major reason
for this, but a sen^
ise
Of the right Of the individual to
be left alone is also a facto
A very different view of passion is
found in Maistre.

Reason is here in a very subordinate
position.

Maistre says

scornfully that in the eighteenth century
by the time he had
left school a student had already created
on paper a system
of education, a constitution, and a society.^^
Passion is the

necessary element in creativity, for when man has
any part in
creation at all, it is as an inspired servant of God.

An in-

stitution, in fact, cannot last "if it has not a name
taken
from the national language and self-generated, without
any

previous or known deliberation " (italics mine).^°

Deliberation

far from being a necessary or even neutral element in man,
is

positively baneful, as a symbol of man's evil pride.

As far

as man is concerned, intuition is certain; man by following

his "intellectual conscience" (with the stress on the second

element) will very often guess right in the natural sciences,
and will have a nearly perfect score in philosophy and religion
the last two being what Maistre considered to be the most im-

portant spheres of human endeavor.-^^

There is not even any

special need to engage in reasoning at all (though Maistre is
29
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^^Ibid.
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Works Of Joseph De Maistre, pp. l33 and l86-l87.

,

in Lively,

so.e»hat content to let this
foolish sa«e be played
in the natural
BClencos. which do not matter
very ™uch by themselves),
for
••Nature itself if

^sely consulted

fchich means following one' s

passions to Goi leads us toward the
truth.-^S

n^i^^re feel,-S

that, contrary to the view of the
Enlightenment, that which

differentiates man from the other
animals is not his reason
(though Maistre does concede the
intellectual superiority of

man over beast), but his ability
to intuit the existence
of a
spiritual world separate from but

united to the world of sense

experience s»^-^
There are several important consequences
of Maistre's
stress on passion. One of these is
that reason, being opposed
to passion (which is a thing of
God), is necessarily anti-religious
in Maistre »s estimation. This
anti-religious element is true

of the Enlighteniaent theory of reason
against which Maistre
was fighting, at least according to Maistre.

As vrill be seen

in a later chapter, Maistre had his own definition
of a ki^d
of reason he felt to be morally acceptable.

From this belief

in the anti-religious nature of reason followed
an extreme hos-

tility to all intellectual inquiry.

Maistre believed that no

man could ever go wrong by following his passions.

The passions

came directly from God and hence could never lead
a man astray.

32
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Thic is not necessarily true of
reason.

God, Who is the Creator

of all, is, of course, also the
Creator of human reason, but

much that men deem to be reason is
actually the prompting of
their rebellious hearts. Passion is
certain, whereas reason
is not.
This downgrading of human reason is one
of the characteristics Maistre most shares with Rousseau
and is one of
the factors in Maistre 's thought giving
some credence to the

claim that he was, at least in part, a
precursor of Fascism.

There was, however, another side to Maistre's
view of human

passions.
12,

In his letter to the Comte de Vallaise of
December

1815, he vn-ote: "Prejudices resemble inflamed ulcers, one

must touch them gently to avoid bruising them."^^

Whatever

else one can say about this statement, it is clear
that it is

very far from being an endorsement of human passions.

It is

difficult to know what to do vath this contradiction, and the

other contradictions in Maistre.

There is no doubt that Maistre

did consciously exaggerate positions of his in order to make

them more forceful intellectually.

The question is, was Maistre

exaggerating when he stressed the perfect nature of passions,
or was he exaggerating when he called them "inflamed ulcers"?

There is only one man who could answer this question for certain,
and he has been beyond the pale of human com.raunication for a

century and a half.

It would seem that the view stressing the

^Slaistre, Letter To the Conte de Vallaise
Lebrun, Throne and Altar

,

p.

20.

,

quoted in

divinely-created and hence perfect nature
of passions is
consistent with the body of Maistre's

i.ore

thinking, for one of his

cardinal principles was the inability of
man to create anything,
even an "ulcer". The only problem with
this view is that if,
as could be suggested, Maistre stressed
the delicate nature

of human passions out of his strong social
conservatism, he

utilized a less sure defense of the status quo
in place of a
more sure one. Certainly there could be no
greater defense
of human passions, and of the institutions, both
social and

political, deriving from them, than to say they are
instituted
by God and utterly perfect.

It is just possible that there

was a degree of rationalism in Maistre lurking under all his

irrationalism.

Such would not be entirely surprising in a man

whose thoughts were in other spheres a combination of different
elements.

The question is, therefore, the degree to which Maistre

was an irrationalist

,

but beyond doubt it

v/as

quite large.

The consequence of Maistre 's irrationalism, whatever its
degree, is a sanctification of all established authority.

The

true results of human passion either cannot or ought not be

judged, whether this be because of their divinely-instituted

perfection or (in direct contradiction to the first) because
of their extreme susceptibility to damage.

Most of all, the

derivatives of passion cannot be judged by reason, for passion
(whatever its possible imperfections) is infinitely superior
to reason.

Such is not Burke's belief.

He stresses that passion

±3 superior to reason only because it allows
man to act with

dispatch in the ways reason dictates.

The institutions of

society are, furthermore, the products of
reason, both human
and divine, but reason nonetheless.

It is therefore not incon-

ceivable for human reason to be permitted to judge
social institutions, as Burke himself most surely did with
regard to
the institution of slavery.

Such judging had to bear in mind

the will of God and the necessity of gradual
historical devel-

opment, which greatly restricted its scope, but it
was possible

nonetheless.

The Pandora's Box that Maistre slammed and locked

was left open by Burke, albeit only a crack.
F. The Extent Of Human Reason.

Neither Burke nor Maistre

had unbounded faith in individual human reason, but their views
on its extent were quite different.

Burke, first of all, did

not lil:e to have the human mind directed tov/ard determination

of ends, wishing instead that it accept the goals handed d.omi

by the society's traditions and work to devise means to these
ends.

One of the many things Burke found objectionable about

the French Revolution was that the Jacobins instituted a whole

new set of goals for society and pursued their quest for them

irrespective of the means needed to achieve them.

That man,

or at least some men, could thinly about the goals of human

society

v/as

implied (without being expressly stated) in much

of Burke *s theory.

In his Speech On Conciliation

V/ith the

Colonies , for example, Burke declared that it is the duty of

a state to provide for the
happiness of its people.

^his is a

view that has probably been held by
most political theorists, but
it is not a truism, and might moreover
be disputed by some theorists
and politicians.
When it came to the extent and
limitation of human
reason, Burke was definitely not an
equalitarian. Some people were
clearly superior to others in both their
intellect and, consequently,
the role that they should play in the state.
Only very few men
could be relief upon to adhere to the institutions
of the country

because they understood them; in the case of
almost all men, this

allegiance would have to arise from prejudice.

This understanding

by the superior of the country's institutions
was not to be of
a speculative nature.

Instead, Burke could state that

"^Vhat

in the

result is likely to produce evil is politically false;
that which
is productive of good, politically true."^^

It was a society's ad-

herence to the laws of God and to the traditions of the
nation through

understanding that was most likely to be productive of good, and
this intellectual union with all of creation could be the prerogative

of only a very select group.

The vn.ser would have to protect and

lead those who were poorer, weaker, and less intelligent.^"^

Intell-

igence was, however, very far from being in the sole possession of

either the social or intellectual upper classes.
35 Burke,
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the ruling classes could be blind to
the traditions of the

country and to the necessities of policy.

He believed they

provoked revolution in America, sanctioned
injustice in India,
sought to strip Parliament of its legitimate

powers, and created

an unsettled situation in Ireland.
of perfect intelligence.

These were hardly signs

Finally, it was the ruling classes

of England who were first willing to temporize
with revolutionary

France and were then inclined to surrender to her,
while the
common people urged resistance.

At the very minimum, much

intelligence could be found in the middle class.

It was one

of Burke's boasts concerning the first administration of
bis

patron Lord Rockingham that "That administration was the first
which proposed and encouraged public meetings and free consul-

tations of merchants from all parts of the Icingdom; by which
means the truest lights have been re ceived, "-^^

A degree of

elitism is evident even here, but it is clear that intelligence
for the running of the state is spread at least fairly widely.

Burke, in many cases, could be extremely harsh toward the ciris-

tocracy.

At one point he declared of them,

in cold and decent respect.

I

held them to be of an absolute

necessity in the Constitution; but

I

think they are only good

when kept within their proper bounds." 39
53

in Burke

"I hold their order

Burke, in fact, goes

Burke, A Short Account Of a Late Short Administration
'

,
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,

one .top further and says that
the aristocracy might act
in
such a v;ay that he ^vill have to side
with the people "to the

last extremity, and to a contest of
blood."^°

Despite these

statements. Burke did feel the upper classes,
both noble and

non-noble, to be the natural home of rationality,
and did believe these men to be rational enough to
diagnose ills in the
state and, if absolutely necessary, to seek to
correct them.

This act of correction was, however, not recommended,
because
the interconnections of society were so complex
that no mind

could really understand them.

Therefore, a seemingly harmless

reform in one area could severely damage a necessary
component
of society in another area.

In time of crisis, reform may be

justifiable because the tumult of the time leaves little to
lose, but generally a reform should be carried out only to

remove an intolerable abuse that a majority of the people agree
exists.

Tv;o

points can be discerned from this.

First, the

ruling classes, despite their relative superiority of intellect
do not have the mental pov/er to reform the state all by them-

selves, and except in extreme conditions ought not to attempt
to reform the state at all.

The mind of no man is really so

acute that he can carry out reform with real confidence w

It

is by no means a Platonic aristocracy that Burke advocates.

^^Ibid.

,

p.

I3if

Burke. Sueoch On the Acts Of Uniforrriity , in Burke

Works, VII, 10.
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As will be seen momentarily, Burke left
more to the common people

than even Aristotle.

In Burke »s scheme of things, the
average

nan is not permitted to determine matters
of policy; such is
beyond his intellect. The average man does,
however, know when
something is wrong, even though the cause of
the problem
elude him.

v/ill

There are two basic reasons for this
ignorance

of causation.

The first is a simple weakness of intellect.

The average man is just incapable of mastering
the intricacies
of government.

It was, of course, seen previously that Burke

doubts that anyone can really do so.

The second reason is

(paradoxically) the conservatism of the average man.

Burke

declares that the average man cannot have an active role in
the governing of the state because he tends to think along lines

that are fifty years out of date.^^

He will not bo able to

recognize the nature of a problem, and will confuse a new problem
for an old one.

The relationship of the common man to the

rulers of the state is therefore like that of the wearer of
a pair of shoes to a shoemaker.

One does not have to know how

to make shoes in order to know they are pi'-icriing his toes, nor

does he have to know how to repair a shoe for his complaints
to be taken seriously.

It would be a very poor shoemaker (or

ruler) who deafened himself to the declarations of his customers.

42«
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the Cause Of the Present Discontent" ,

When It comes to intellect, therefore,
there are two distinct

types of people: those who sometimes have
the ability to plan
reforms, and those who have the ability to
point out the existence of problems,

Maistre's view of the extent of human reason is quite
different from that of Burke.

As was seen before, he does not

even value reason very highly, tending to identify it

belliousness against God.

^;d.th

re-

The aristocracy is to rule in Maistre

state, but the justification for this is not that the arist-

ocracy is more intelligent than the common people.
simply because it

v/as

formed the state.

It rules

the aristocracy and the sovereign who

Though Maistre may consider the aristoc-

racy to be more intelligent than the average people, their right
to rule is only secondarily derived from intelligence.

If the

ruling class governs stupidly, and more importantly, immorally,
it is likely to lose its rights over the state.

The state,

involving the lives of men, is obviously no ordinary possession
which may be abused with disapproval, but without forfeit jr??.

The relationship of rulers to state is one of stewardship which
if TLolabed

^vill

result in its loss, either through revolution

or through action by the Pope.

There is, furthermore, no reason

to believe Maistre considers aristocrats to be exceptionally

moral, morality being (as will be seen) Maistre's real definitio
Tiaistre, Considerations On France, in Lively, Works

Of Joseph De Maistre,

p.

77.
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of intelligence.

There are three reasons,
therefore, why it

is right for aristocrats to
rule the state.

the state.

First, they created

It goes ^.dthout saying, of
course, that they did

so as the agents of God.

Second, they are more intelligent

and possibly moral than other people.

Being fallen human beings

like everyone else, however, they
score very low on an absolute
scale on both these points. Finally,
a minority must rule the
state, so why not this minority? Whenever
it is thought that

Maistre is an extreme aristocrat (which in
many ways he un-

doubtedly is), it must be remembered that he
regards his fellow
aristocrats but little higher than he does anyone
else.

Aris-

tocrats are men, and men are not terribly bright
or decent.

Unlike Burke, moreover, Maistre feels human
intelligence should

never bo directed to social reform, under any
conditions.
If Maistre'

s

feelings toward the intelligence of the aris-

tocrat are unfavorable, his feelings toward the common
man on
this score are downright hostile.

The average person can never

be anything more than the ward of his betters, because he is
"a perpetual child, a perpetual lunatic, a perpetual absentee, "^^

and like these others needs a keeper.

Naturally, he has not

the intelligence to impose mandates on or even make suggestions
to his guardians.

As is to be expected,

though Maistre is

willing to permit and even concede the usefulness of an advisory
Maistre, Considerations On Franco, quoted in Roger Soltau,
^T^erich

Political Thoug;ht In the Nineteenth Century (New York: Russell

and Russell, 1959), p.

?.1.

]0k

council, not everyone has the intelligence
to serve on it or
even vote for it.^^ The man who wears
the shoes is not to be

permitted to say they hurt his feet.

As vd.ll be seen in a later

chapter, the customer may not criticize
the handiwork of the
cobbler, though he may cashier one cobbler
and get a new one.

Maistre, it is quite obvious, sees almost
everyone in society
as being one of Plato's men of iron.

They are to accept what

their betters do for them in a proper spirit of
humility, for

they truly do not have the intelligence to know
what is good
for them.

The average man is, simply speaking, a mental nullity.

The very most the average man could ever be was
a good follower,

which to Maistre was a blind follower.
It goes without saying that both Burke and Maistre had

severe doubts about the degree of intellect belonging to the

human being.

Beyond this, however, the differences between

the two on this subject are far more compellins than the sim-

ilarities.

The differences, moreover, take Burke in a liber-

tarian direction, and Maistre in an authoritarian one.

Burke

believes the upper classes (as judged by both ability and heredity) to be mentally superior to the average man and, on rare

occasions, to have the ability to repair defects in the state.
The average man, however, always has some role in the state,

and sometimes it could be a very decisive role.
•

Maistre, Study On Sovereignty

Joseph Do Maistre

,

p.

nS.

,

In the case

in Lively, V/orks Of

of Maistre, the average man was a ward of
the state, and even
the rulers of society were credited as
having only enough in-

telligence to administer policy decisions made
long ago.

Neither Burke nor Maistre could have been called
a fervent
admirer of his fellov.Tnan and certainly neither was
willing to
trust him with absolute power over the state.

Burke, however,

sees the individual as possessing the decency and
intelligence
to at least take care of himself, and Maistre does
not.

Burke's

society would, therefore, necessarily be
a freer place than
that of Maistre.
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Chapter III: Nation. Natural

La>,.

and State of Nature, and

Their Relation To Reason
A. The Nation.

It is necessary that ono
understand at the

outset Burke's ideas on the origins
of the nation, for these
ideas
are quite indicative of the general
configurations of his thought.
He feels the nation to be
simultaneously natural and artificial,

natural in that it is vdlled hy God
to aid man's betterment,
such
betterment being both possible and
necessary, and artificial in
that the particular forms it takes are
the products
of human in-

telligence.

God gives His sanction to a social
contract that

is everywhere the source of such legal
fictions as the people

and the nation.^

This social contract originally required
the

consent of all the people (Burke here shows a
definite sign of
his youthful attraction to Locke's philosophy.),
and the majority,

therefore, has no right to say that it is the
nation.

TM.s is

because the nation, besides its divine institution,
is also the

product of its history and traditions, which may be immanent
in
the whole body of the nation or in the nation's ruling
class acting
as virtual representative of the whole. ^

The nation is more than

anytliing else a moral unity to Burke, rather than a mere geograph-

ical area or an unrelated collection of people.
^Burke,
2

Aid

peal From the New To the Old

Burke, First Letter On the

Works , V, 326»

Re,'Ticid.e

.'/hi

Peace

Instead, the nation is
gs , p.
,

100.

in Burke * s

in most cases taken to be mutually
extensive with the mass of
the population, but in rare cases
(like the French Revolution)
even a dispossessed minority can serve

as trustee for the nation-

traditions.

In this sense, the nation does
have a soul, and

since, as will be seen, Burke's view of
history is one incor-

porating change through conscious human action,
it can be said
that the nation's soul, and hence the nation

itself, is in part

the creation of human intelligence.

The national soul is also

shaped by objective considerations such as geography,
which
act as limitations on the role of human intelligence.

Man does,

however, create his own nation to a substantial extent.

The

nations of Europe are, therefore, entities possessing
somewhat

different souls, though all members of one common Christiar.-

Germanic-Roman civilization.

Many of Burke's most bitter denun-

ciations of the French Revolution concern its fragmenting of
this perceived common civilization.

actor and a subordinate institution.

The nation is both

a

free

There is no institution,

on earth superior to the nation, and yet the limitations on
the nation are two in number.

First, the European nations,

though they will unavoidably engage in war with each other,
are to have their ferocity limited by appeal to their common

civilization.

Burke sees the nations of Europe to be in much

the same situation as the cities of ancient Greece.

Second,

the nations of Europe (and all other nations) are under the

God-given Natural Law.

A nation may not act in just any way

it feels Its self-interest
to dictate.

Therefore, Burke felt

that the nations of the world
(especially those of Europe) were
culturally diverse, yet united, and
independent, but subject
to a hisher (other-worldly)
authority. The restrictions
that
were to be placed on the nation
were purely moral in nature,
but nonetheless real.

Kaistre»s views on the nation are radically
different
from those of Burke, in a more authoritarian
direction.

First
of all, the origin of the nation is entirely
from the Hand of
God.

Tliis is so

directly and indirectly.

Maistre does declare

that the nation is the work of God and men
together, but

.;hen

nations are partially the work of men, this
is because God is
using men as His instruments.^ 7/hen nations
do differ from
each other (which Maistre could not deny happens),
this is becaus
God has willed these variations in national
character.^

Maistre

was very much influenced by Montesquieu's views on
the importance

of geography and climate in the shaping of national
character,
which in the former's hands were used as further pieces
of
evidence for the absolute predominance of God's will
in the

shaping of the nation.

Maistre, therefore, entirely denies

any real human role in the formation of the nation.

Man is

a mere passive instrument of God in the creation of the
nation,

-Maistre, Study On Sovereignty
De Maistre , pp. 93-9k»

^Ibid., pp. 99-100.

,

in Lively, Works Of

o^oseTjh

sometimes utilized and so.eti.es
not, but never of any
independent
consequence. All is the work of
God, the work of authority.
For this reason, Maistre denies the
possibility of any social
contract, even an essentially irrevocable
one such as that of
Burke.
Burke, as was seen, gave some
independent importance
to man in the formation of the nation,
but Maistre never would.

There is only one true lawgiver in Maistre

universe, and that

's

is God,

Whereas the nation in Burke's theory had
a large measure
of effective independence, in Maistre

's the

nation is generally

consigned to the role of an adraininstrative
sub-unit.

Maistre

reached this conclusion after abandoning an
originally Galilean
position.

The nation is everywhere consecrated, with divine

right rule a matter of course, but the Pope does
universally

have the right to punish, and ultimately to remove,
erring rulers.
As Maistre himself believes, one who could judge the
sovereign

would then be the sovereign.^

The power of the Pope thereby

stripe all the nations of Europe adhering to Catholicism
(which

Maistre hopes will soon become a truly catholic creed) of any

pretensions to sovereignty.

The Pope rather ungratefully let it

be known that this teaching of Maistre was embarassing to him,

for while he was fighting to preserve any of his authority in

revolutionary Europe, a claim to absolute authority might bring
down trouble on his head.

Even the power to make war does not

truly belong to the nation in Maistre'
^Ibid.

.

112.

s

view.

As will be seen

in the treatment of Maistre's
philosophy of war, war is undertaken by God's will to fit the
designs of God, not those of
men or nations. There is no reason
to doubt Maistre's statement that the Pope would not overuse
his power to punish or
remove rulers, as such an action would
cause no small convulsion.
This is not the reason Maistre gives,
however.
He feels the
Pope will be temperate in his use of this
power since he is
as passionless as any man can ever be, being
old, a priest,

and celibate.

If Maistre had his way, however, the
Pope would

be able to use the power to punish or
remove rulers whenever
he saw fit.

No nation of Europe could claim any
independence

against such a potentate.

Burke declared Europe to be a family

of nations living ultimately under one moral
law derived from

their common history and from God, but a series of nations
nonetheless.

Burke's view of international relations is therefore

the same as his view of the proper domestic situation, an
ordered

liberty (though international relations unavoidably involves
war and therefore has considerably less order than is true of
the domestic situation).

Maistre also extends his view of domestic

politics to international relations, and thereby eliminates
international relations.

His hatred of diversity is never more

manifest, and, as we shall see later, he subordinates all in-

dividual human diversity to a corporate spirit centered in the
nation; here he makes all national independence exist only on
the sufferance of God's vicar

-on

Earth.

To Maistre, Christendom

is truly only one absolute state v;ith one absolute ruler.

Before Burke and Maistre's ideas
on Natural Law and the State
Of Nature are treated, there shall
be an examination of their concepts of reason and causation.

The treatment of the former sub-

ject shall investigate the sources, meaning,
limits, and significance for man of the theories of reason
presented. These consid-

erations must vi.tally influence Burke and
Maistre's theories of
Natural Law and the State of Nature, for
they decisively concern
the potential of man,

The Sources Of Knowledge In Burke.

B»

Burke »s theory on

the sources of knowledge is incorporated into his
Philoso-ohical

^"q^^^y Into the Origin Of Our Ideas Of the Sublime and Beautiful .
]!±th an

Introductor y Discourse Concerning Taste (first published

in 1757).

Almost at the outset, Burke declares that "The standard

of reason and taste is the same in all human creatures."^

It v/ould

seem likely, therefore, that the most fundamental ideas are ultim«

ately the product of a single source.

It is not impossible that

different stimuli could lead to the same conclusions, but a single
factor explanation would be the more likely.

Burke is .of the im-

pression that identical standards of reason and taste among all

men are necessary to maintain human intercourse.
true on the most basic levels.

This is no doubt

As Burke observes, all men with

properly functioning organs of taste agree on what is sweet and
what is sour.

On a higher level, hov/ever, one involving questions

of philosophical import, agreement is not as unanimous as Burke
^Burke, Discourse Concerning Taste, in Burke*

s

Works

,

I,

79.

believes.

It .ay be, therefore, that
the ethical foundation of
society is not as fir. as was
Burke^. contention. All men's
senses

(Burke asserts) are the same, and
imagination affects one's tastes;
since imagination comprises only
the results of the senses,
all
men's imaginations must be the same.^
There is, of course, a glaring
weakness in this argument. There is
no way that one can be really
sure that all men's senses are the
same. Two men may call the cole
Lor

they are seeing green, but one may be
seeing green and the other
red. In such a concrete case,
experience may reveal the disagreement, but when one is dealing with
a question of ethics, even realizing the existence of a disagreement may
be impossible.
Before
it is thought that Burke adhered to Locke's
sensist view of the

genesis of ideas, it must be said that he
saw two distinct sources
of ideas: through sense experiences (acquired)
and innate to the

mind. (natural).

The most important ideas, which are basically

one's moral ideas, are the innate ideas.

As might be expected from

the general configuration of Burke's thought, God
is the Creator

of man's mind, and hence of

Ms

innate ideas.

The most basic ideas

man possesses have nothing to do with any action of man.
in these things, entirely controlled by God.

Man is,

In a secondary sense,

however, man is the architect of his own ideas.

As was seen, man's

less important ideas derive from his sense experiences.

To some

extent, every man chooses the sense experiences he will have.
^ Ibid

..

^Ibid.

,

pp. 86-87.
p. 86.

He

n3

.0 to one type or show o. another,

Uve

in the city or the country,

listen to a Rock and Roll
record or a Classical one,
etcetera.
This leaves a not inconsiderable
freedom to each individual

in the

kind Of knowledge he

.vill

possess.

It is possible for a
person

to restrict somewhat by choice
the degree of knowledge
he has by

having defective Judgement, such
defective Judgement resulting
either
from natural weakness or more
commonly from lack of exercise
of
the faculties.9 ;vhether Burke
believes natural weakness of
intellect
can be overcome by exercise to
at least some degree is uncertain,
but what is certain is that failure
to exercise the intellect is
in Burke's view the primary cause
of low intellect.
Several important
considerations derive from these views of
Burke on the sources of
knowledge. First, all men are equipped
equally when it comes to
the most important ideas, the moral
ideas.

Those ideas come dir-

ectly from God without translator or
intermediary.
fore, not be amoral.

No man can claim ignorance of the moral
law.

Man can, however, resist what he knows
morally.

A man may, there-

Immorality is quite possible.

'.vithout

question to be right

That man is responsible

for his acts is inescapable, for he has the
moral knowledge, and

may use it or not use it as he chooses.

A belief in the

moral equality of all men results from this.
seen that this equality is of a middle level.

nor brute.

fundamental

It has already been

Man is neither God

As to the other type of knowledge, non-moral varieties

of judgement, in these too men could be equal, or nearly equal.
9

Ibid .

,

p. 96,

1

^

V^th proper intellectual exercise,
inequality in knowledge night
possibly be much reduced. This is
a remarkably "radical- idea
to come from a man some have
seen as an advocate of social
stag-

nationJO

It is not likely that Burke
saw the potentially unsettling

effect of this belief of his.

There is another side to this coin

of fundamental intellectual equality
that does very little to speal.
well Of the average man. That a man
is intellectually average
or belov; is essentially his own fault.

Burke was too kind a man

and had too much love for his fellovmian to
stress this very strongly,
but the idea does necessarily follow from the
belief in intrinsic

human equality.

More on this subject will be seen in Chapter Eight,

which concerns social mobility.
A third major source of knowledge is entirely
separate from

the individual human being.

This source of knowledge is a country

and culture's history and traditions.

Burke put it thusly:

We are afraid to put non to live and trade each on
his own
private stock of reason, because v/e suspect that this stock
in each man Is small, and that the individuals would do better
to avail themselves of the general bank and capital of
nations
and ages. Many of our men of speculation, instead of exoloding
general prejudices, employ their sagacity to discover the latent
wisdom which prevails in them.
^

Three points must be observed from this oft-quoted statement.
First (and this is generally missed), this statement, at the
same time as it declares doubts about the amount of individual

reason, affirms that individual reason does, nevertheless, exist.
Cobban, Burke and the Revolt Against the Eighteenth Century
pp. 69-71.
1

Burke, Reflections On the Revolution In France

,

p.

99,

,

Under certain unclear circumstances, therefore,
man may not
havo to be entirely subordinate to authority
and his country's

history.

The ways in which a person can assert his
independence

are never explained (though his God-given innate
ideas probably

lie at the root of his possible independence), but the
belief

that such independence exists must follow from a belief in
3-ndividual reason.

Second, the country's history and traditions

are valued partly because they are old, but also, and primarily,

because they are seen as incorporating most of the reason to

which the human being can aspire.

If a country's traditions

did not possess reason, they could not have any claim to respect

based on age alone.

It

shall be seen

that Burke recommended

sweeping reforms for France, thereby showing he felt that country's absolutist traditions to possess little or no knowledge.

The country's traditions are, in point of fact, not very mys-

terious in their incorporation of reason.

Traditions incorporate

reason simply because they are the accumulated experiences of
many men.

The catalogue of the knowledge used in maintaining

a political society is rightfully deserving of great respect,

especially if that society has given substantial signs of fulfilling the proper tasks of a society.

To say that tradition

is the accumulated reason of many men (who are declared to have

only "small" reason in themselves) is to minimize the intrinsic

sanctity of conventional knowledge, and, more importantly, to
make the social component of knov;ledge a progressive and changing

process, and not a structure that is ever completed
once and
for all.

The knoxvledgo possessed by a society that
does not

disavow its past is increasing constantly from generation
to
generation, and it is this which causes Burke to be vdlling
to undertake some social renovation in the form of
elimination

of old institutions (such as some of the offices in the king

of England's household retinue) that clearly perform no function

anymore.

The knowledge possessed intrinsically by the current

generation is no less, and no greater, than that which was

possessed by any generation of the past, or

vn.ll be

possessed

by any generation of the future.
At the

same time that he is certain as to what are the

sources of knowledge, Burko is equally certain as to
not sources of knoy;ledge.

v;hat

are

As the individual human knowledge

that is innate, which is the most important knov;ledge, derives

from God, knov/ledge in opposition to true religion (however

interpreted) is a contradiction in terms.

That this could

sabotage scientific inquiry is obvious, but it is safe to assume
that it would never have done so in the hands of Burke (who
was known to keep his friends v;aiting when they v/ished to dis-

cuss a question of state, while he dissected a frog).

An initial

limitation is, hov/ever, immediatly placed on intellectual endeavor.

The man who called atheism "a foul unnatural vice"

v/ould be

ill-inclined to accept as intellectually respectable

any statement an atheist might

maice

on matters of morals.

1

Atheism could be no source of knowledge, nor
could a man tainted

by this vice.

Purely abstract reason could also not be a source

of knowledge.

For reason to be of any value, it had to be

grounded in the affairs of daily life and a keen understanding
of man»s actual nature, and be directed preferably to the
in-

cremental amelioration of the hunan condition.

Flights of fancy

aimed at the revolutionary reconstruction of society were most
definitely not sources of knowledge.

It was this last point

that caused Burke to be always very uncomfortable v;ith the concept of religious revelation, such revelation having the potential

of upsetting his carefully constructed edifice of knov;ledge

originating within an unbroken chain of human Irdstory.

Burke

never actually disowned religious revelation, which as a believing,

though possibly unorthodox, member of the Church of England
he would not have v/ished to do, but the very form of his thought

on the origin of knov^ledge bespoke a downgrading of that concept.

Burke, however, had no ambiguity in his thoughts on

political revelation.

He condemned it vathout reservation.

Burke's definitive statement on the subject follows.

Your ^he Frenc^ literary men and your politicians, and so
do the whole clan of the enlightened among us, essentially
differ in these points. They have no respect for the v.dsdom
of others, but they pay it off by a very full measure of
confidence in their own. With them it is a sufficient
motive to destroy an old scheme of things because it is
an old one.
As to the new, they are in no sort of fear
v/ith regard to the duration of a building run up in haste,
because duration is no object to those v;ho thinl: little
or nothing has been done before their time, and who place
all their hopes in discovery.''^
1

2

Burke, Reflections On the Revolution In Franco, p. 99.
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Two facts emerse from this rather long quotation.

First, fully

individual decisions (especially those deriving from
theoretical
conclusions, as opposed to those deriving from man's
innate

ideas or his experiences) cannot be a source of true
knowledge.
An individual understanding schooled in the academy of
daily

life and the nation's traditions could be brought to bear
pro-

fitably on concerns of practical importance, but a purely the-

oretical education, far from being a source of knowledge, was
actually a source of folly, and most dangerous folly.

Burke

obviously considered the Jacobins to be fools, and this was
one of the reasons.

A second and somewhat allied consideration

is that pure novelty can never be a source of knowledge.

That

which is not founded on the intelligence of the past generations
can have but little right to be called intelligence at all.

Burke's views on the sources of knowledge
libertarian, but in a most conservative sense.

ma^''

be called

Han can, first

of all, have ideas of his ovm, since one's ideas derive both

from innate universal ideas (which

ma^* bs

disavowed, but not

destroyed) and from one's ovm personal experiences, which are,
of course, unique.

Since the innate ideas are the most important

ones, Burke places severe limitations in practice on the poss-

ibility of free inquiry, but the possibility is not entirely
foreclosed.

All those ideas wliich are not innate, and hence

not from God (Burke never clearly draws a dividing line, though
the implication is that non-innate ideas are also of importancej

,

1

come from man, either in his current generation or in
his series
of generations.

This last point restricts again the sphere

of the individual as a source of knowledge,
but does not tot-

ally efface it.

Just what the sphere of the individual is when

it comes to examining the heritage of the past is never
spelled
out, it not being in Burke's temperament to do so, but neither

iB man required to regard all of the past as being of equal,

and unquestioned, merit,
C.

Maistre's Theory Of the Source Of Knowledge.

A sig-

nificantly, though not entirely, different view of the source

of knowledge is found in Kaistre*
that there are innate Ideas,

Maistre agrees with Burke

Maistre *s notion of innate ideas

is, however, quite different from that of Burke, in that it

rests not on the belief that men reason in the same way, but

on the belief that men have the same basic ideas v/ithout reasoning,^^

To deny a role to reasoning (which is a process restricted

to man and the higher animals) in the formation of innate con-

cepts is to undermine very markedly the human factor in knowledge.

Burke believed all men reasoned the same way about

moral matters, by dictate of God,

Thi.s

placed man in a dis-

tinctly subordinate position in the formation of innate ideas,
but did not remove him from the equation completely,

does so remove him*

Maistre

Men have the same innate ideas because

'^Maistre, Second Saint Petersburg Dialogue

Works Of Joseph de Maistre , p, 210,

,

in Lively,

V?

God injacts these ideas into their minds, v/ithout
even the

slightest activity on man's part.

Maistro also greatly expands

the dimensions of the innate ideas.

All thoughts are derived

from the soul, v/hich makes the Architect of the soul the
Ar-

chitect of all thoughts.

Man is, therefore, quite in keeping

with the overall structure of Maistre's philosophy, incapable
of creating even the simplest of ideas.

God, either immediatly or ultimately.

All ideas derive from

The most basic ideas

are in man's mind simply because God put them there.

These

ideas can be resisted (at the cost of madness and rampant evil),
but may never be resisted legitimately.

All knowledge dealing

with morality, which Maistre interprets very broadly, is placed

beyond human judgement.

This is because "Human reason is man-

ifestly incapable of guiding men, for

fevj

men can reason well,

and no one can reason well on every subject,"

15

The

other

broad source of knov/ledge to Maistre is one more or less doubted
by Burke.

This is authority.

Burke, of course, saw antiquity

as, in general, a reliable source of knowledge, but not because

antiquity

supported by authority.

v,ras

Antiquity was generally

trustworthy because it was the record of the experiences of
men both as wise and as foolish as the men of today.

Maistre,

on the other hand, sees an entirely different justification

Authority is to be respected because it is

for autnority.

^^Ibid.

p.

,

^^Ibid.

,

p.

208.

207.

ordained of God, and he who is in authority, be this authority
temporal or spiritual (a distinction not very clear, in practice, in Maistre's thinking), speaks as God's vice-re.-ent

vice-vice-regent (under the Pope).

,

or

To make authority unques-

tionable as a source of knowledge, as Maistre does, does not
derogate from his skepticism about human beings, for human

authority does not and cannot exist, but is instead authority
from God at one remove.

This is why, as shall be

may not judge those in authority.

There is a third important

source of knowledge in Maistre's theory.
ation, and specifically miracles.

Burke avoided this subject.

shown, man

This is divine revel-

It was seen earlier that

A reason y;hy Maistre embraced this

belief, apart from his fervent adherence to what he took to
be Catholicism, was that it serves as a strong corrective to

human pride.

All man's plans must be as nothing when the wave

of God's Hands can cause them to come tumbling down.

IToodloss

to say, God's revelations and miracles may not be questioned

by men.

Maistre never deals with the question of how

to

dis-

tinguish the false miracles from the true, being willing, one
v;ould assume,

to leave this task to the Catholic Church, as

divine an institution as exists on the earth.

There is one

source of knov/ledge that Maistre dismisses vdthout reservation.
He is unwilling to countenance the belief that sensory percep-

tions can ever be a source of knowledge, even to the subordinate
extent that Burke

if;as

walling to accept.

Sensory perceptions.

Maistre felt, could not be a source of knowledge,
unless one

restricted the sphere of God's pov;er.

Maistre was incorrect

in this belief, because for sensory perceptions
to be a true

source of knowledge, all that would be required
would be for
God to be vailing to forego interference in man»s
sensory per-

ceptions.

If this thought ever occured to Maistre, he dismissed

it out of a desire to avoid second-guessing God.

Science is

another would-be source of knov/ledge that really is not so.
Science has a role to play in human society, but this role is
the relating together of facts, not the judging of these facts.

Science, seen as a true source of knowledge, must result in

open or subtle opposition to God and could only end in debasing

man to the lowest stage of brutality.

Considering the histoiy

of the twentieth century, it is difficult to argue with Maistre

on this point.

All the foregoing shows that there is really only one

source of knowledge in Maistre *s philosophy.
God.

God, as the sole source of knowledge, appears in many

different guises, but they are all God,
to

That io, of course,

This leads inevitably

the result that man is entirely ignorant in nlmself and can,

therefore, make no claim to a right, or even ability, to question
any aspect of the existing order, all of which is the work of God.
16
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D. The

Meaning Of Reason In Burke.

Burke agrees substan-

tially, but far from completely,
with his age as to what constitutes reason. It was seen already
that he viewed much of

reason as deriving from sense perceptions,
which makes reason
to at least some extent a thing of
individual human cogitation.
This kinship Burke shared with the age of the
Enlightenment
was, however, only superficial.

Far more central to his def-

inition of "reason" was the traditional concept of
Natural Law.

This view sees Natural Law, which in this case may
be seen as
synonymous with reason, as deriving directly from
God, or as
coming from God after being processed through the
filter of
human institutions and common sense.

Burke has problems with

defining "reason", largely because the idea of doing so does
not appeal to him.

It is, however, possible to deduce certain

components of his concept of reason.

Reason, to Burke, is in

some way united with God»s ultimate designs for man.

This would

have to be so for such a religious man as Burke, but he is not

helpful in ascertaining just what these designs are, or
this process of ascertaining proceeds.

hovi

One thing that is clear

is that no institution or group of institutions, temporal or

spiritual, is able to hand down an authoritative definition
of reason.

One owed to the institutions of his society a certain

respect, as their longevity had shown them to incorporate at
least some reason, but that which can be judged by reason, as

was seen, cannot itself set the definition of reason.

Somewhat

*

surprisingly for a life-long adherent of an established church,
Burke includes the Church of England with all other institutionc
in this regard.

?Ie

puts this very strongly when he says, "For

the Protestant religion, nor (I speak it with reverence, I
an

sure) the truth of our common Christianity, is not so clear
as this proposition,

— that

all men, or at least the majority

of men in the society, ought to enjoy the common advantages

of It,"

17

What this says is that no particular Church, nor

even Christianity as a v/hole, can either be considered synon-

ymous with reason, or set the content of reason.

Reason is

independent of Christianity, though not of religion as such,
and is universal in its sphere.

This is because Burke ultim-

ately judges the presence or absence of reason in a community

based on how the members of that community are faring.

Burke

chooses to defend the Old Regime of France not because of the

correctness of its governing principles (for he definitely felt
absolute monarchy to be an incorrect governing principle), but
because it had superintended a France which was thriving in
size of population, national vYealth, cultural level, and public

spiritcdness.

As he says,

"ITo

country in v/hich population

flourishes and is in progressive improvement can be under a
very [Italics Burke

mischievous government,"'

That says such

a government must have at least a measure of reason on its side
17
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approaches the task of defining reason

Tills

back door.

That

v/liich

somewhat in keeping

frorr.

the

turns out right is taken to be at least

v/ith the

principles of eternal reason.

Despite superficial appearances, this should not be taken as
saying the end justifies the means, because Burke mentions these

accomplishments of the French monarchy as proof that it could
be reformed, not that it did not need to be reformed.

A good

end could serve to mitigate the culpability of bad principles,
but could in no way excuse the absence of good principles.

Furthermore, one of the things Burke found most objectionable
about the French Revolution was its "end justifies the means"

attitude.
to

In such a case, he would hardly have been likely

embrace such an attitude himself.
Burke finally comes to -/iow reason as that which serves

the interests of all or most of the people, v/hich thereby, in
liis

theory, connects reason to Katural Law, ITatural Eights,

and liberty.
little-

Burke believed that government should tamper as

as is necessary v;ith the workings of society,

for need-

less tampering could not but be destructive to the society.
Since ordered liberty (this being Burke's definition of reason)

is good for the society, anything that departs from ordered

liberty in the direction of either one of its components must
be irrational, to at least some degree.

Both the Old Regime

and Jacobin Regime of France were, therefore, irrational, with
the good
the irrationality of the former being mitigated by

effects it either promoted or did not retard
significantly.

Burke

made much of the fact that the Jacobin regime
was resulting in
the impoverishment of the mass of France's
people to prove the

badness, and hence irrationality, of that regime.

Burke's belief that reason is social has several important
results.

First, though society is to be judged as to how well

it meets the needs of individuals, whenever the
needs of one in-

dividual conflict with the needs of society, the former must
yield
to the latter,

especially since the society generally does a tol-

erably good job of providing for the needs of all.

There is a

community interest which can be pursued without seeking to add
up the interests of millions of people.

Second, it is illegitimate,

and even irrational, for an individual to seek to assert his will

against that of the com.raunity, since the latter, when functioning
properly, incorporates his interests.

The rational postures for

an individual to hold toward a properly functioning state are,

therefore, satisfaction and quiescence.
tion ought to

ar.'.se

Mass popular participa-

only in time of crisis*

Maistre'G Concept Of Reason.

From what has been seen

previously, one might expect that Maistre would declare himself
to be an unalterable foe of reason.

this not to be the case*

True reason has him as one of its greatest

supporters (so says Maistre).

philosophizing.

Maistre, however, declares

Reason is, first of all, not abstract

Reason is not, and even cannot bo, opposed to

intuition and common sense J ^

This suggests a limitation on auth-

oritarianism, for (Maistre agrees) all people are
equal in common
sense and intuition.

Maistre sees no firm division between reason

and what is generally considered to be unreason.

This is because

common sense and intuition are innate ideas derived from
God, and
therefore cannot be contrary to reason.

Each separate sphere of

reason is, moreover, self-contained and governed by its own
rules.
If a proposition can be proven by a "proof relevant to it", even
an unanswerable objection cannot be admitted against

it.^

Tliis

places severe limitations upon the workings of human reason.

If,

for example, it were possible to disprove logically the existence

of God (which may have been the case of which Maistre

7;as

thinking),

the fact that the Church said God existed would constitute "a proof

relevant to it", and would thus silence all rational dissent,
'^at this points out is that authority, far from being unable to
set the content of reason, as Burke believed, is in Maistre 's re-

gard the essence of reason.

For there to be sovereignty (which

is, of course, an absolute necessity).^ the ruler must be above
the accusation of error, lest disobedience be permissible.

PI

It

necessarily follows that the sovereign must set the content of
Maistre, Fourth Saint Petersburg Dialogue

,

in Lively,

Works Of Joseph De Maistre , p. 214*

^Ibid., p. 215
^^Maistre, The Pope
P» 133.

,

in Lively, Works Of Joseph De Maistre

,

reason, or reason could be used against
him.

Reason is not, how-

ever, changeable across national borders or
from one reign to the

next, because there is one authority that
infallibly sets the content of reason in keeping with the dictates of God
and is ne-/er-

changing.

That superintending authority is, of course, the
Papacy.

The keystone of reason is, therefore, obedience to both king
and
Pope, when they agree, and to Pope, when they do not.

This eff-

ectively removes the individual from any role in reason.

If he

thinks for himself, other than possibly finding arguments to support
the conclusions of authority, he violates the dictates of reason.

Truly individual reasoning is opposed to the will of God, and is
therefore both irrationality and heresy.

It was this that convinced

Maistre that Rousseau and Voltaire were both fools and sinners.
Another component of reason, one in no way contradictory
to the above, is "The general sentiments of all men Iwhich! con_t

Btitute, so to spe,ak, intuitive truths.""

Needless to say, Maistre

interprets "the general sentiments of all men" in a way supportive

of secular, and especially Papal, authority.

A necessary result

of this is to see non-Catholic countries as lacking in reason.
The fact that Protestant countries can be felt to be lacking in

reason shows an interesting twist Maistre gives to the phrase "the
general sentiments of all men*"

These sentiments remain valid

and universal, even if large numbers of people do not adhere to
22
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them, as was the case in France and,
in many respects, all of the

non-Christian world.

Not adhering to these "general
sentiments"

merely proves man's willfulness, and in
no way reflects on the
reason of such sentiments. These sentiments
of men do not rely
on man, and exist up in heaven much as do
Plato's ideal types,

which they resemble in many ways.

In what must be a major blow

to a view seeing human intercourse as setting
the content of reason,

Maistre declares man to be unable to even determine
the content
of his own "general sentiments".

Emotion and reason are also not opposed concepts to Maistre.
In fact, emotion is a truer part of reason than that part
of man's

nature which results from pondering a subject.

This is because

emotions constitute a way in which God speaks directly to zan and
guides him.

synonymous

V/hen
v/ith

Maistre praises emotions as being in many cases

reason, he is not referring to the emotions of

contemporary man, which he felt to be a major part of unreason.
That which has caused this problem of unreason is the tutoring

of man»s emotions by such false prophets as science and non-Christia
metaphysics.

The original man

(v;ho,

as was seen earlier, Maistre

calls the barbarian, not the savage) is in possession of untutored
emotions, direct communications from God without accompanying static
The great goal of Maistre »s life is to return man to this earlier

blessed state of true reason.

The similarities to Rousseau are

quite astonishing.

of freedom the
the Same.

tv/o

A.s

vrLll be

seen in a later chapter, the types

men

v/ish to

reestablish are even fundamentally

,

For Maistre, as well as for Burke,
reason is connected
the workings of history, but the cause
of this is not precisely
the same for both men.

Burke sees reason as intra- historical

because history is the record of God^s designs
for man. and because
it is the record of man's accomplishments.
On superficial examination, Maistre might seem to feel the same
way.

His works are

replete ;7ith references to history as "the first
and indeed the

only teacher in politics"^^, and "experimental
politics."-'^

In

this historical experimentation, however, man is
never the exper-

imenter.

History is purely the record of God»s reason, never man's.

The very attitude of Eurke and Maistre toward the reason in
the

historical process is different.
of history has,

vd.th some

Burke believes that the record

detours, been the record of the increase

of human reason, and that this process is far from completion.

Burke shared in the optimism of his time, though his idea of reason
was intermingled v/ith religious concepts to a greater extent than
was true of many of his contemporaries.

history from

an.

In contrast^ Maistre saw

early beginning point as constituting a retrogression

in real reason and its replacement

v/ith false

reason.

Burke's

period of greatest reason lies in the future and Maistre 's in the
past.

In this sense, Maistre may be considered a reactionary.
Maistre, however, does not seek to reestablish a past state

of affairs or maintain the status quo out of a blind adherence
^•^4aistre, Study On Sovereignty , in Lively, Works Of Joset)h

De Maistre

,

p.

ll/f.

^^Ibid., p.

Ilif.
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to atrophied forms of government.

He sees traditional forms of

government (at least traditional Catholic
forms) as having served
best the happiness of the people, which is
a major part of reason.
Despite this, Maistre, as a strong Ultramontanist

,

determined

in advance what constituted true happiness, and
like many other

ideologues was willing to spread misery throughout the
world
that true reason and true happiness might be achieved.

so

One may

assume that Spain was a happier country before the coming of the

Inquisition, but since true reason and true happiness were possible only through the true religion, any loss of false happiness

could not count for much.

Maistre

same as that of the Jacobins.

's

reason, or unreason, is the

Both feel that what ought to be.

which is the only reason, must be realized regardless of cost,
and anything less than true reason is unacceptable.
The notions of reason held by Burke and Maistre fit in well

with their general theories.

Burke is not enthusiastic about the

quality or extent of individual reason, but ho does believe it
exists and believes that any qualitative difference between social
reason, which he values highly, and individual reason, about which
he is more skeptical, stems from the greater quantitative extent

of the former.

To Burke, in other words, reason is set on a bas-

ically human scale.

To be sure, God's v/ill works itself out in

the processes of reason, but it usually does so through the actions

of men.

Any wise individual should exercise very great caution

in criticizing the results of age-old reason, but vdth Burke the

possibility Of such criticism is not
foreclosed.
;vith

Maistre.

Rurnan reason,

human v.dllfulness does.

It is, however,

as such, does not exist, though

All reason is God's reason, and it

is authoritatively interpreted through
an infallible institution

speaking for God.

One can be considered to have reason
only

to the extent he subordinates himself to
this institution and

gives up all claim to individual reason.
r.

Burke »s Concepts of Causation.

For human reason to

be truly effective, it must be possible to be able
to under-

stand cause and effect.

Whatever reason man might have

obviously count for nothing if he could not
the social and physical

^;.'orld.

on this very important question.

v.'ould

v;ork his vn.ll

upon

Burke takes an ambigaous position
He is convinced beyond doubt

that there is a chain of causation in history, but whether man

can know what this chain is, much less control it, is not clear.

The universe was not a haphazard affair to Burke, because God

decreed certain laws for it and adhered to those
though certainly capable of breaking them.

lav/s Hj.ri!self,

Burke never Qoes

into any great detail about what God»s laws are and where His

chain of causation leads, other than having a vague supposition
that the future vail involve increasing liberty and reason.

The ambiguity of Burke's attitude toward causation is expressed
well in his Speech On Parliamentary Reform.

In this discourse,

he does not deny the possibility of carrying out reforms, but

urges that before one attempts to correct even an undoubted

s

abuse, the effects of this on all other
parts of the constitution
must bo considered.
This suscests that man is not pov;erless
to invoke changes in his environment,
but ouf;ht to bo very

cautious in doinc so. lest, like a latter day
Sorcerer's Apprentice, he bo unable to control the forces he

has set in motion.

This idea occurs throughout Burke's writings and expresses
the
view that man may not bo able to affect his surroundings
in
the manner ho wishes, at least most of the time.

Man should

accopt his weakness in the field of causation, because of
the
wea'.mess of his reason to achieve what he wants, and only

he wants.

,vhat

This was not Burke's final word on the subject of

causation.

There were two other atti.tudes expressed in his

actions and

Iriis

writings.

As a practical politician of great

renown. Burke could hardly have felt that man could in no
way

affect his lot successfully.

That he, at least sometimes, held

to the opposite view is shown by his definition of "party"
as
"a body of men united for promoting by their joint endeavors

the national interest upon some particular principle in which

they are all agreed." and of "politician" as "the philosopher
in action."^

If man can promote such a grand goal as the

nationaJ. interest, he can surely succeed in promoting lesser

and more mundane goals.
25
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Burke, Tlioughts On the Cause Of the Present
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Man is seen here as a rational and decent
creature quite able
to reshape society (to at least some
extent), according to his
standard of what is right*

A temperamental conservatism dic-

tates that such a reshaping be carried out
with due caution
and with respect for the contributions of the
past, but that
such reshaping is possible, and sometimes
desirable, is con-

fidently affirmed.

Burke's writings.

There is a third theory of causation in
In the last three years of his life, when

ho was given to black depression over the death
of his son (whom
he loved greatly and in whom he hoped for the
glorification

and ennoblement of the family name) and over what he feared

was a hopeless struggle against Jacobinism at home and abroad.

Burke gave way to a dismal fatalism over the ability of men
to shape their own affairs.

England's youth and felt this

He saw Jacobinism spreading among
v/ould

inevitably destroy England,

the English constitution, and Christianity."'

Burke was quite

unwilling to give up the fight against Jacobinism, even with
this morose belief, for he was absolutely certain he was doing

what

v/as

right, and was literally prepared to die for it.

It

is incorrect to feel this third of Burke's theories of causation

should be discounted as the heartsick utterances of a broken
and neglected old man, for his opinions

v/ere

up to the time of his death, and this theory
27
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fashion, in keeping with Burke's
general philosophy.
Burke had
always believed that there was an
overarching God-given destiny
determining the ultimate ends achieved,
but up to this last period
in his life he had pushed these
ends into the distant future
and
had, moreover, seen them as benevolent.
It is unavoidable for
one.s personal life to affect his
philosophy, and this led Burke
to begin wondering whether the
battle of Armageddon might be won
by the forces of evil, despite
all that men could do, and whether
that last Tv;ilight of the Gods was
taking place in his own lifetime
What is one to make of these three
somewhat different theorie
of causation? It can be seen that they
have very different ram-

ifications for the extent and applicability of
human reason.

The

first affirms the possiblity of man reshaping
his world, but ad-

vises (in practice) against doing it, because
it is a process more
easily begun than controlled. This surely
places severe limitations both upon man's reason and upon his effective
freedom, but
does not declare him to be entirely a
control.

pam

of forces beyond his

Man's power is great, but is only very weakly under the

control of his needs and wishes.

The second theory of causation

is by any accounting the most optimistic for man's freedom
and

reason.

It is declared that analogies of the birth and death of

states are only analogies; the human mind is "the proximate eff-

icient cause" of states, and if there are any necessary "internal

causes" of the fate of states, they are "obscure and much more

difficult to trace. "28

3^^^^ ^^^^ ^^^^ practically
anything can

Change the course of history.

These statements suggest a vievr

Of man as in effective and fundamental
control of his environment
from (one may assume) the grand
developments of
world history to

the mundane events of daily life.

This burst of glowing enthusi.
.asm

stemmed from the fact that at this stage
in the French Revolutionary
crisis Burke was convinced the English
nation was rallying to crush
the threat to civilization.
However, even in this statement that
comes as close as Burke ever did to saying man
is all powerful,
the bet is still hedged.

efficient cause" of

tiis

It is said that man is "the proximate

world, and that any "internal causes" are

"obscure and much more difficult to trace."

The first point im-

plies there is a cause which determines final ends and
is beyond
man»s control, and the second point says this cause is
probably

beyond man's understanding.

Man does have total, or near total,

control over all of his everyday life and over much of history
as well, but the final ends are in the Rand of God.

Man's freedom

and reason are very impressive, but are still limited in the play's

last act.

The third theory of causation restricts man's freedom

very greatly.

It does not, however, do so by any really new de-

partures in theory.
up to the present*

It does so by moving the day of reckoning

The underlying theme of all of Burke's theories

of causation (which are consistent in philosophy, but not in app28
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lication Of philosophy) is that
.an's freedo. and reason are
real,
but limited. Short-run modifications,
often centuries in length.
Of man's destiny by man are
possible, but the final Determiner
of man's destiny is not, and
cannot be,
man.

G. Maistre On Causation.

It would be pleasant to say
Kaistre

clearly embraces either a determinist
or inde terminist view of
causation, but such is not true. It is
important, first, to ex-

plain what the terms "determinism" and
"indeterminism" must mean
with regard to Maistre, for he sees two
actors in the affairs of
men, God and man.

In this discussion, "determinism"
shall be seen

as the belief that the affairs of men
are not haphazard in their

causation, and are, therefore, possibly under
man's control.

It

would not be entirely improper, based on this
definition, to see
Maistre as an inde terminist , for he feels God to
be the primary
determinant of man's fate.
in the universe.

Without God there is no cause of anything

This is because, first of all, there are no causes

in nature, since nature is a result of God.^^
against the view that nature is predictable.

Maistre is adamant
He declares that

there is no inflexible chain of causation, but only "complex forces"

based on the vrarkings of "free agents.

"-^^

It is surprising to

see this phrase "free agents" (note the plural) in Maistre, as

his theory shows there to be only one free agent, God.

One may

believe this phrase was an oversight on Maistre 's part.

There
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are no invariable laws of
nature because "The splended
theory of

invariable laws would lead us
straight to fatalism and m.J.e
an
automaton of man."; this belief in
invariable laws "hardens the
heart", and is a ploy by philosophers
to keep men from praying.^l
This charge is preposterous, but it
does show Maistre realized
invariable laws of nature, however
derived, would result in the
banishment of God from the realm of
physical nature. Ke is not
entirely wrong in seeing such a view
as a form of atheism, or at
least an attack on God's omnipotence.
Both man and God cannot
stand at the center of the universe.
It is, however, paradoxical
to have Maistre accusing those who
say there are invariable laws
of nature and history of making man an
automaton and causing fatalis
for a theory making God the architect of
all would have the same

result.

Such would be true, if not for the power
of prayer.

Maistre has been accused of stating a form of
religion more
pagan than Christian^^^

^^^^ p^^^^

ification of war could support this.

^^.^

thought as his glor-

Ma5.stre, however,

feels God's

often harsh decrees can be altered if one approaches Him
with a
humble spirit.

Prayer can move mountains.

Maistre goes so far

as to say that if God were evil (a belief he does not accept),

it would be more necessary than ever to pray to lUm, in order to
Ibid., pp.
52
(PTew York:

Harold Laski,

and 216-217.
.^tnr^iP.Q

Xa

Iho.

Prohl^m Q±

Howard Fertig, 1968), p. 223.

cal.

Ili.:

.rath.33

p,,,^, ^.^^^ ^^^^ ^^^.^
subordination in .natters
Of causation and the great
power he has v.dthin his
subordinate
station. Maistre is sure God
v^ll answer genuine prayer.
This
could result in making man^s
control over nature and himself
al>
most absolute, for there are no
laws of nature preventing a
,ust
and pious man from" achieving his
desires, though a good man
would
not pray for certain things and
might even suffer temporal torment
so that he would take on others'
sins and avoid punishment in the
afterlife. The realm of the possible
is, nevertheless, unlimited,
for nothing can stand in the way of
the ;vill of God.
As one can expect from the direct
role God plays in the affairs

of men, miracles often break into the chain
of causation.
must interfere

'with

human plans considerably, for a miracle is

by definition unexpected and great in its
results.

It follows

that man can make plans only provisionally,
for he cannot

when a miracle

'^all

This

strike.

sents a fatalistic theory.

Maistre, in other words, himself pre^
If God brings on the results that He

wants when He wants them, paralysis of human
this unpredictability.

kiiow

vrill

L':ay

result from

This tendency could be seen in Maistre »s

own life, in that, except for some propagandizing, he was
willing
to leave the overthrow of Jacobinism to God.

Though there are no invariable laws of nature, there are
laws of nature.

So that man might not be miserable through lack

•^^Maistre, Eighth Saint Petersburg Dialogue

Of tJoseph De Maistre, p. 190.

,

in Lively, Works

Of prc-dlctabiUty, God. out of
love for nan. decrees general
laws
to v/hlch He usually adheres,
with no necessity
^'^

to do so.
Miracles are very rare, and must
be so if they are to be
miracles.
An unbroken chain of causation
does usually exist in everyday
life,
and so the predictability that is
absent in great affairs is
present
mundane events. Though this Is
by God's sufferance, the average
man v.'ould lose no sleep over it.

m

It is important to understand
what Maistre's theory of cau-

sation means for human freedom, for it
points up again the tension
in his thought of Enlightenment and
Christian elements. He is
unv/illing, in practice, to see everything
as the work of God, as

this would make a slave of man and make
him fear to take a single
step, .since man could not know if anything
he did would lead to
the desired result.

Maistre is equally unv.dlling to banish God

from His predominant position in causation.
same position as Maistre »s sovereign.

God is in much the

He is a legally unlimited

ruler Who is, however, morally bound by laws over
which He has
ultimate power.
This leads to an unsatisfactory situation from the point
of view of human liberty.

In appearance, man, when allied

mth

God, has control of his world to an extent that would have been

deemed presumptuous by many a Philosophe.

When it comes to the

scales of causation, however, man carries no real v;eight at all,
save to try to call on the overpowering weight of God, with
'"^^aistre, First Saint Petersburg Dialogue

Of Joseph De Kaistre

,

p.

190.

,

in Lively, Works

no

as.= arance

of success.

He is the only cause.

God is not merely the primary cause,

Despite the ambiguity pointed out
above,

it is clear that this is totally
destructive of freedom, for

Kaistre at one point admits there to be no
cause and effect
in human affairs.^^

Man can

;vork

his vail upon the environment

only to the extent that God permits him to do
so.
Burke, liberty on sufferance is liberty condemned.

To paraphrase

Fothing,

in Maistre's theory, is actually predictable in
the v/orld of
man.

The smallest detail of man»s life is completely
under

the command of God's v/ill.

The necessary result of Maistre's

theory of causation would be for

.lan

to be contemptible in his

own eyes, to completely lose heart in his own strengths
and

abilities, and to fear to attempt the most trivial action on
his own.

There is no room in Maistre's theory for human will,

for such will is not only vanity, it is the most absolute absurdity.

In the final analysis, it v/ould be correct to see Burke
as accepting the rationalist creed of his cen':ury, vrLth reser-

vations.

There is such a thing as knowledge, it is to a large

extent a product of individual human intelligence and sense

experiences, and it is of power to change the world, v.dthin
'.^dde

limits.

The basic prerequisites for individual autonomy

and freedom are, therefore, established.

There are, neverthe-

less, reservations as to the actual efficacy of human knowledge.
35

Maistre, Study On Sovoroignty

Do Maistre, p.

103.

,

in Lively, V/orks Of Joseph

This is a oualiried affirmation
of the possibility of
hu.an freedom.
Maistre, in contrast, despite
trivial concessions in for.
but not
substance, is an implacable foe of
the rationalism of the
eighteenth
century. Knowledge cones only from
God and His infallible interpreters (which the average individual
cannot claim to be) and is syn-

onymaus

.vith

total subordination to these
authorities.

To attempt

individual rational endeavor is only vanity
and heresy, and is
also doomed to fail. This knocks the
foundation out from under
human freedom, though Maistre does not (by
his
o;ra

theory) see

himself as an enemy of human freedom.
H. The Natural Law.

Before we enter the main body of this

section, a discussion of the theorists'
views of Natural Law, it
will be well to get an idea of what
"Natural Law" means, especially
in relation to the allied concept of
"Natural Rights". The key

element in both phrases is "natural".

One way in wliich zhe American

College Dictionary defines this term is "proper to
the circumstances

of the case".

This definition avoids an important question,

namely what are "the circumstances of the case"?

This question

has two answers, these dividing those who hold to Natural Law
con-

cepts.

The first, the traditional Natural Law view, sees "natural"

as meaning "proper to divinely-created nature", a nature of which

man is only a part.

The second, the proto-Enlightenment and En-

lightenment view, defines "natural" as "proper to man»s nature".
This is a basic conflict, pitting Burke and Maistre (along
^^

vn.th

The American College Dictionary > twenty- fourth edition, 1970,

traditional Natural Law thinkers such as
Aquinas and others), holders of the first view, against Hobbes,
Locke, Rousseau, and their
adherents, holders of the second.

This dispute is based on the

question of whether Natural Law concerns the
laws of man or God.
Based on

thj.s

dichotomy, the two Natural Law schools
are

inclined to have different views as to the
concept of Natural Riehts
these rights being rights of man. The
man-oriented Natural Law
is strongly pushed by its logic to the view
that there are rights

of man, rights of individual men.

Even Hobbes, who is no indiv-

idualist, upholds this view when he affirms the right of
an in-

dividual to defend his life against the state.

It would be absurd

for a school of thought which believes the Law of N.-turc
is, at

least somewhat, the law of the individual, to deny that the
individual has intrinsic rights.

The God-centered Natural Law school

need not necessarily believe there are rights of man.
man, determines what is

lav;

God, not

in heaven and on earth, and He is th3

One that determines the existence or non-existence of basic hunian

rights.

It shall be seen that this traditional Natural

L'av;

school

can incorporate the concept of Natural Rights, as is typified by
Burke, but noed not do so, as is shown by Maistre,

That Burke did believe in a Natural Law involving Natural

Rights is almost impossible to deny (though some such as Sabine
have denied it).

Popery

Lav/s

One of Burke's key complaints against the Anti-

of Ireland

v;as

that they violated both common and Na-

tural Law by (among other strictures) denying a Catholic the right

Of self-defense by denying him the
right to own

a

weapon.^^

Like
Hobbes, Burke feels self-defense
to be the most important of
rights,
but unlike Hobbes sees a decent
and happy life to be as important
as life itself. It vdll be seen
that this requires a whole catalogue Of Natural Rights. Further,
a law transgressing against
the ends of just government is "void
in its obligatory quality
on the mindM and is therefore no true
law.^^ Civil society, Burke
declares, exists for "a conservation and
secure enjoyment of our
natural rights", and no government has the right
to suspend or

annul the rights of nature, except for very
limited periods and
in very extreme emergencies, as these rights
are paramount to the
state. 39 This was one of those places in Burke
where the politician
got in the way of the philosopher, for how
can a right paramount
to the state be suspended by the state for
a moment, no matter

what the crisis?

It should be noticed, however, that Burke did

not take the easy way out and deny these temporarily
suspended

rights to be Natural Rights, this standing as proof of his
tlon to the concept.

devo--

Nevertheless, to allow the suspension of

a Natural Right opens up a Pandora's Box of dilemmas, the three

most important being that a practice once undertaken is easier
to undertake again, a time-limit on an extra-legal assumption of
37
Sdmund Burke, Fragment Of a Tract Relative To the Laws

Against Popery In Ireland , in Burke
^ ^Ibid

.

,

p. 319.

^^Ibid., p. 333.

*

s Works,

VI, 31if-315.

power is a loslcal contradiction,
and. considering hu»an
nature,
there can be no assurance that
a dictator will give up
power once
the crisis is past.
Men have rights to what the state
can do for them, keeping
in mind that the state exists for the
good of all tho people, not
just any part.

Lest it be thought that this talk of
Natural Rights

which may. as will be seen, be ^/indicated
against the state by
revolution is the work of a youth and not the
mature Burke, it
should be said that when Burke wrote this he
was thirty-six years
old with five major ivorks written, and was
the personal secretary
to the Prime Minister.

his life.

Also, these ideas remained with Burke throughout

In addition. Burke did not take this position
because

the case affected his native land of Ireland.

In 1783, eighteen

years after he v/rote the above-cited work, Burke began
a campaign
to impeach and punish Governor-General Hastings of the
East India

Company for his violations of the Natural Law in India.

There

was nothing sectarian or mean in Burke's views of the Natural Law.
All men had rights under the Ifatural Law which rulers had to observe, lest their rule be treated as "void in its obligatory quality

on the mind."

Burke's belief in Natural Rights was so strong that

he declared Negro slaves to have rights (among them property, marr-

iage and a family, inheritance, leisure time, education, and freedom
from physical cruelty) which were to be protected by the Attorney

General of the West Indies on frequent inspection trips, sale to
be arranged for any slave who had been unjustly deprived of his Natural

Rights.

These strictures were to be in
effect for only so long
as would be required to bring about
the gradual and total abolition
of slavery.
Nor was Burke willing to assert
Natural Rights only
for despised groups long distances away.
His services on behalf
of full civil rights for Catholics and
Jews in England, the most
hated people in England at that time, forced
him to endure the

terror of a mob intending to harm him and harmed
his political
career.

Natural Rights, as we have seen, are the rights of
self-

defense (and of all that follows from it) and of a fair
share of
the benefits of government.

itimize revolution.

To disregard these rights is to leg-

That his Natural Law position was the force

impelling Burke to a defense of the Americans in one revolution
and to an opposition to the Jacobins in another is difficult to
deny.

In his Speech On Conciliation With the Colonies

Burke says

,

that Britain's treatment of the Americans "is not reconciliable
to any ideas of liberty, much less with their's" and that
a state

ought to promote the happiness of its people, which makes Britain's

actions further illegitimate.^^

Burke did not deal much with his

objections based on Natural Law in the American case, preferring

Instead to deal non-philosophically with what he viewed to be a
UO
Of^

Burke,. A

Letter To the Right Honourable Henry Dundas

.

One

His Majesty's Principal Secretaries Of State, With the Sketch

Of a Negro Code
41

,

in Burke's Works

,

VI,

Burke, Speech On Conciliation

and 86-87.

276-277.
V/ith

the Colonies

,

pp. 70

.

fundamentally non-philosophical
dispute, but it .ust be
clear fro.
the above quotation that
Natural Law considerations
were very .uch
in his .ind. Burke.s recourse
to Natural Law is
^ch .ore explicit
the case of the French Revolution,
for here

m

he was faced by a

crisis that was penulti.ately
philosophical, and in which
Burke's
antagonists were claiming the sanction
of the Natural Law. A
rather
extensive quotation is called for,
for in it Burke states as
clearly
as he ever did his concept of
the Natural Law,
denying in theory, full as far is my
heart from
rffv,^n7^/'*°T
to
^'-'''^^
give
P^-^^'^
01 to^?hholS?
hold) if
the real ^^^tl^""^
rights of menltalics Burke'^. In
denying Seir
Of right, I do n6t mean to
injure
IhL^^'S.
"^^^
^^^i^
pretended
r^gh^s
wou?d totally
tnt'^^"*^destroy.
''r^'
would
If civil society be made for the
ad!
^''^ advantages for which it is
made
bel
"i'
loT.T.
institution Of beneficence;
fn^l
^^^^'"^fic^nce acting by a rule.
Men have
Tri^hr
a
right ll^iV
to live V
by that rule; they have a right to do
justice
as between their fellows, whether their
fellows are in pubUc*
occupation.
They have a right to the
f^n?^ ''^''fv,'-?
fruits
of their °f^^"^^y
industry, and to the means of making their
industry fruitful. They have a right to the acquisitions
of
their parents, to the nourishment and improvement of
their
offspring, to instruction in life, and to consolation in
death.
Whatever each man can separately do, without trespassing
upon
others, he has a right to do for himself; and he has
a right
to a fair portion of all which society, wdth all its
combinations of skill and force, can do in his favor. In this partnership all men have equal rights, but not to equal things...
Bat he has not a right to an equal dividend in the product
of the joint stock; and as to the share of power, authority,
and direction which each individual ought to have in the management of the state, that I must deny to be amongst the direct
original rights of man in civil society, for I have in my contemplation the civil social man, and no other. It is a thing
to be settled by convention. ^2
Burke, Reflections On the Revolution In France

p. 67.

s

This passage

shaiLd,

first, silence those, such as
Cobban,

who have felt that by attacking the French
view of Natural Rights,
Burke was attacking Natural Rights per
se.
a study of this passage,
in fact, shows Burke felt Natural Rights
to be the basis of civil

society and of all laws.

Men have, based on Natural Law, an ex-

tensive list of rights, but among these are not
the "rights" to

equality of property or to equality (or any power)
in the government of the state.

This second point should not be overstated.

Though Burke was cool to what has been called government by
the
people, he was not prepared to rule it out in principle.

The fact

that Burke, at the time he was fighting a philosophy declaring
the right to overturn the world in the name of the Rights
of Man,

affirmed his total devotion to those rights more than ever before,
shows just how deep his feelings for the Natural Rights were.
The Natural Law pervades the views Burke held on economics.
The state is to stay out of concerns involving the economy, except

when (as in the case of the East India Company in India) an econ-

omic concern is acting in a way violating the Natural Law.

B'-irke

held that the laws of commerce, whicn are supply and demand set
by the parties to a transaction, are part of the Law of Nature,

and are not to be tampered with by the state.

One reason for

this is that Burke believes the government in the economy is the

proverbial bull in the china shop, but another is that Burke feels
fidmund Burke, Thoughts and Details On Scarcity

Works, V, 157.

,

in Burke

'

government intervention in the
econo.y necessarily harns
libertv
and Natural Rights.
Burke will never per.it
this to happen.

It

is possible to attack the views
that Burke held on economics,
but
not his sincerity in holding them,
nor the degree to which they

comported

^.ell

vrLth the

other elements of his theory.

They were

drawn up not to be of benefit just to
any one class of society,
but in order to protect the liberty of
all.
This is shovm very
clearly by the fact that Burke was willing
to violate his cherished
laws of economics when their operations in
Itidia violated the Natural Law.

Burke was simply not the type of man to put
his theories

above the good these theories were designed
to promote.

Thi.s is

not to say that he was no philosopher, for he
was a great one,
but that he was no ideologue.

Burke's views on the origins of Natural Law are important.
The Natural Law concept, in various forms, had,
after all, been

held by many different theorists.

The difference between Burke

and Locke and Hobbes was that Burke held to the original
aod-ccnterod

Natural Law, whereas the other two held to the newer man-centered
"Natural Rj.ghts".
Law.

Burke believes God to be the source of Natural

God sanctions the moral law and the social con bract, the

latter being the source of all human laws and the former being
the standard against which all human laws must be judged.

Diff-

erent ideas of the Natural Law are found in Hobbes and Locke.

Hobbes favors an absolute sovereign because it is good for man;
Locke favors a representative system and safeguarding of rights, since

150

these are good for man.

Man, as Stanlis points out in
Edmund Burke

and the Natural Law, is the key factor
in Hobbes and Locke>^
is not so with Burke.

This

Burke holds to the Natural Law not
because

it is good for man (though he surely
believes it to be so), but

because it comes from the Hand of God.

Burke's belief in an

eternal moral order derived from God pervades all
his thinking;

man cannot perceive perfect moral truth, and
therefore cannot
be the arbiter of the human situation.

Because this is so, Burke

felt that any claim by a man or institution to absolute
power

was a clear infringement of the Natural Law and an attack
on God,
the ultimate Legislator of the universe.

It must follow that lim-

itations upon government are therefore an integral part of the
law
of God.

Many laws are, as has been seen, to be settled by convention,

but the roost basic goals and direction of government are set by God

in the name of liberty and the rights of the hunan being.

In con-

trast to Hobbes and Locke, however, Burke values the Natural Law

simply and purely because it is the Natural Law, the law of God.
A rather different view of the Natural Law is presented in

Malstre, and the concept is put to a very different use.

ilarities between Burke and Maistre initially look greater
differences,

The slm^
thar. the

Maistre, after all, does believe in a divinely-created

Natural Law that is centered on God and is irrevocably binding
on all men.

A.

national constitution, in point of fact, cannot

stanlis, Sdmund Burke and the Natural Law , pp. 25-2?.

be written by men.

The constitution of a nation
is written

by God through the actions of
divinely-inspired great men and
through the God-created traditions
and geographical locale of
a people.

The most important parts of a
constitution cannot

be written at all vdthout endangering
the state, for the very

act of writing a law would make people
think they have power

over it (which Maistre heatedly denies).

The essence of a true

law (as opposed to the code of regulations of
a club or similar
group) consists of its ability to coerce all
into obedience.
As such cannot be the work of man, for not even
all men could

make a law capable of coercing all men, law is
necessarily the

work of God.

This renders all laws Natural.

All laws are there-

fore outside the right of man to annul, interpret, or
expand.

This goes far beyond Burke in the sphere alloted to the Natural
Law,

for Burke left much to convention.

Maistre leaves no proper

act of government outside the Natural Law.

Sines the task of

a law is merely to declare a pre-existing custom (and this itself

is to be avoided), the legislative output of any state is necess-

arily as near zero as possible.

All the legislating necessary

for any well-ordered state was done by God at the moment of

its creation.

The most a human legislator can ever do is to

Maistre, i^ssay On the Generative Principle Of Political
Constitutions, in Lively, Works Of Joseph De Maistre

^Ibid.,

p.

151.

.

pp.

lU7-]t\3.

s

read the national constitution written
into the body of the
nation by God, and act accordingly,
v.'hereas Burke could say
"Early reformations are amiable arrangements
with a friend in
power"^^, Maistre opposed any reform, for
several reasons.
First, to seek reforms is to judge the work
of God, which cannot
be permitted.

Second, certain defects are inherent
to the

nature of any constitution, because God knew
the fallible nature
of the material for whom He was legislating.^^
Third, since

a true reformer would have to have unerring
insight into both
the essence of a nation and its future
(which is quite impossible

for any human), any reform carried out by human
action would

necessarily have abuses attached to it, abuses greater than
those it sought to correct.

Maistre, therefore, has identified

the Natural Law (which to him includes all laws)
firmly with

the status quo.
It is, furthernore, impermissible for an individual to

seek to judge whether or not a state has violated the Natural
Law.

A divine institution, the papacy, exists for that purpose.

Maistre never gives any hints as to how the papacy is to perform
this function, this being a matter between the Pope and God.
It is safe to assume from Maistre 's writings and temperament

Burke

,

Speech On the Economical Reformation Of the Civil

and Other Establishments
A.

,

in Burke

'

Works, II, 280.

Robert Caponigri, Some Aspects Of the Philosophy Of

Joseph De Maistre (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1945), P

that as long as a ruler does
not attack Catholicism,
the rights
Of the aristocracy, or the
customs of his country, he will
have
little or nothing to fear from the
Church.
The common people
have no rights deriving directly
from God, but instead
receive

their rights indirectly from God,
through custom.

The rights

of the common people are granted by
the sovereign in keeping
with custom, but the rights of the
sovereign and the aristocracy
"are constitutive and basic, having
neither date nor author. "^^^

Though the rights of all men (which
are viewed by Maistre as
being corporate pri^/ileges) necessarily
derive ultimately from
6od, as all things must, it is evident
that the rights belonging

to the pillars of society do so in a much more
direct fashion

than do the rights of the less exalted elements of
the society.

This is a thought that would never have been found in
Burke.

The question of the Natural Law in Maistre brings
up the

question whether he may be considered a Catholic
positical theoris

This is, after all, a central concern for the content
of his
Natural Law.

There has been much dispute on this point.

Lebrun

sees Maistre as departing from Catholic thought by dOTOgrading
the role of human reason in the formation of government and by

treating sovereignty as an end in itself

and Murray declares

Maistre, Considerations On France, in Lively,

Joseph De Maistre
^

,

p.

'.Vorks

Of

77.

Lebrun, Throne and Altar

:

The Political and Religious

Thought Of Joseph De Maistre^ pp. 100-101.

"Maistre.B treatment of religion
.ay have been good sociology
and good statesmanship, but it
was far fro. being good
theology.
These statements would have hurt
Maistre, who clearly
considered
himself a Catholic theorist.
Fortunately for the

1

Count, there

are other ^iews expressed on
this subject.

in 185^ referred to Maistre as

-'the

neo-Catholic school"52^ Edmund

'.Vilson

An anor:.r.ou3 writer

leading exponent of the
declared -The whole of

de Maistre 's system is founded
on the belief in a Catholic God

who has appointed a Catholic king"53,

Orestes Brownson was

confident that Maistre was "sound and
orthodox.
One cannot say with any real
justification that Maistre
views on Natural Law either were or
were
not Cr.tholic.

's

It is

my contention that his views on
Natural Law were shaped both
by his Catholicism and by the ideas of
the Enlightenment he
so despised.

It should come as no s:oecial surprise
that the

root of Maistre 's belief in the necessary
coerci veriess of laws
and the great stress he places on sovereignty
stem from his

belief in original sin, which is surely a sound
Catholic doctrine.
51

John C. Murray, "The Political Thought Of Joseph De
Maistre,

Heview Of Politics

.

(January,

XI

I9i^9),

77.

~"De Maistre and Romanism," North American Review, LXXIX

(October, ]Q3k)
53
24,

,

373.

Edmund Wilson, "Joseph de Maistre,"

rjew

Remibli^, August

1932, p. 33.
^ Orestes Brownson,

stitutions," Brownson*

s

"Joseph de Maistre On Political Con-

Quarterly Review

,

IX (October,

l847), 460.

Lebrun takes Maistre to task for being
non-Catholic in seeing
the state in a far less positive light
than
Aquinas does.

The
second part of the charge is, as will be
seen in a later chapter,
definitely true, but the first part,
that of being (based on
this fact) non-Catholic is clearly not
true.
Maistre stands

here in the good company of Augustine,
who viewed the state
as "a coercive order, maintained by the
use of force and relying
on the fear of pain as its major sanction
for compliance to
its commands."

Augustine is certainly as much a Church Father

as Aquinas, and so Maistre stands vindicated
here.
A more serious charge brought against Maistre
's Catholic

orthodoxy on the Natural Law question is that he does not
view
the state as serving the needs of all, which is
contrary to

Catholic belief.'56
to this charge.

It is possible to give a qualified assent

As was seen, the rights of all men are not

equally important in Maistre 's state.

The rights of everyone

are, however, all protected to some extent, and are all under

the care of God,

of all.

The state does, moreover, serve the needs

Man's fallen state requires a strong coercive authority

over him, but this authority, by controlling man's baser instincts

provides for his moral and educational betterment.

Maistre

expresses this in a rather striking fashion when he says "Man
55

Herbert

A.

Deane, The Political and Social Ideas Of

^aint Augustine (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966), p.
56

Lebrun, Throne and Altar

,

p.

101.

11^
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in general, if reduced to
his own resources, is
too wicked to
be free. "57 consequently,
the chief virtue

of the state, and

Of other institutions, is that
by not leaving .an to his
own

resources, they .ay succeed in
moralizing .an to the extent
that
he can be free.
As has already been seen to
some extent, and
shall be seen again, the definition
Maistre gives to "liberty"
is a strange one. At any rate, it
can be said that Haistre»s
state does serve all the people, but
does not do so equally.

Maistre is, therefore, at most unorthodox
on this count, but
not clearly non-Catholic.
Another serious charge that has been made
against Maistre
is that he downgrades religion generally
by using it, without
actually valuing it.^^ According to this
charge, Maistre is

captivated by what religion can do to preserve the
status quo,
and embraces religion for that reason. It is true
that Maistre
view of Christianity is rather hard, but not
any harder than
that of Augustine.

's

The equation that harshness equals irrelgion

that Soltau attempted to draw with respect to Maistre
Just does
not necessarily fit.

rnile it is true that Maistre did recognize

that rolgion couIjS help preserve the status quo, it must be

evident by now that he viewed the status quo he wished to
preserve
as fundamentally religious.

This is no argument for the view

that Maistre 's theory, including his idea of Natural Law, is
57

58

Maistre, The Pope

.

in Lively, Works Of Joseph De Maistre, p.

Soltau, French Political Thought

,

pp. 21-22.

M^k<

irreligious.

The entire character of the
.an also militates

against such a conclusion.

A man who,

as a religious duty,

as an adolescent passed the last
night with condemned criminals,
was always a firm friend of the Jesuit
Order, and was recalled
as Savoyan ambassador to Russia
because the Russian government

suspected him of working for the conversion
to Catholicism of
Russians, can hardly have his devotion to
religion questioned
fairly.
His view of religion was superficially
rather cold
and harsh, and this is undoubtedly what Soltau
sees as irreligion.

Maistre's coldness and harshness is, however, only
in means
and not in goal.

Maistre declares that "Nations have never

been civilized except by religion. "^^

The belief that civil-

ization, which is the only alternative to slavery,
can come

only through harshness is not, at root, harshness
per se.

Maistre'

ideas about religion may be uncongenial to many, but,
whatever
his relationship with Catholicism as a political creed,
his

loyalty to Christianity as a religion is clear.

Though he

recognized the socially conservative potentials of religion^^,
it is quite false to say,

for that reason, that Maistre' s ad-

herence to religion was unscrupulous.
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,
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,

p.

^'^Maistre, Study On Sovereignty

,

in Lively, V/orks Of Joseph

De Maistre

,

p.

106.

163.
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A charge against the Catholic
nature of Maistre's political
theory that is not so easy to deny
is that by stressing faith

over human reason in the creation
of the state he falls into
the heresy called Fi deism (the
lauding

of faith over reason).

It has already been seen that,
unlike Aquinas, Maistre reduces

'

to zero the independent role of human
intelligence in the trans-

lation of God's law to human concerns.

It does seem that there

is no way in which this can be reconciled
with Catholic ortho-

doxy.

To this extent, therefore, Maistre 's
Natural Law doctrine

is more authoritarian than is traditional
Catholicism.

Much of the complexity of Maistre

's

Natural Law theory

stems from the complexity of the man himself.

There is no

denying that Catholicism was an extremely powerful
influence
on his thinking, but Maistre was also "a philosophe
in spite
of himself, an eighteenth century man."^^

Tnis shows up in

many places through his whole theory, but never mere than in
his concept of the Natural Law.

The first sign of this is Maistre

belief that, just as there may be knowable rules of natural
science (Maistre 's writings are replete with analogies to natural
science.), so there are knowable rules of morality and society.

The publicizing of these rules is the main concern of Maistre.

^^Lebrun, Throne and Altar
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,

pp.

110-111.

Blisha Greifer, "Joseph de Maistre and the Reaction

Against the Eighteenth Century," American Political Science
Review, LV (September,

1961 ), 598.

's

For Maistre to be a true
philosophe, he would have to
feel that
man can manipulate these rules.
It is obvious from the
heart
Of Maistre 's writings that man
alone cannot do this. This
must
be so, because these laws are
the creation

of God, and are ever

under His control.

^;Vhen

man works in concert with God,
his

power is, if not limitless, at least
greatly expanded.

In a

case like this, man might indeed be
able to realize the Natural

Law upon Earth.

This is Maistre the Christian Philosophe
speaking.

Since Maistre endorses the Augustinian belief
that evil is "a
fissure in being"53, cooperation between man
and God can remove
this fissure and realize the laws of morality.
This "cooperation"
does require total subordination of man to God,
but it does

place man in a position to hasten the establishment
of God's

kingdom on Earth.

V/hat

one has here, then, is a combination

of Catholic and Enlightenment belief.

It is not surprising

that this should be so of a man who could make an Enlightenment-

sounding statement like
by the fever to know."^^

"I

feel myself consumed more than ever

This could, paradoxically, have served

as the motto of the Enlightenment.
It is quite possible that Maistre 's authoritarian view

of the Natural Law stems partially from the Enlightenment.
It is known that Maistre in his youth was far better read in

Maistre, Considerations On France
Of JoseT)h De Maistre

,

p.

,

in Lively, Works

69.

^^Quoted in Lebrun, Throne and Altar ,

p.

18.

the authors of the Enlightenment
than those of the Scholastic

tradition.

Furthermore, the similarities
between him and that
authoritarian precursor of the
Enlightenment, Thomas Kobbes, are
great. The similarities appear in
many places, though obviously
not in the way in which government
is formed. As to the ends
and means of government, however,
both thinkers agree that the

Natural Law is to provide for civil
peace and civilization through
the actions of an authoritarian ruler.^^
possible that

Kaistre got his authoritarian concept of
the Natural Law either
from his particular interpretation of
Catholicism,
from the

authoritarian wing of the Enlightenment, or,
most likely, from
both together.
The key differences between Burke's and Kaistre
»s views

on the Natural Law emerge from their different
views on religion
and their receptivity to different currents of the
eighteenth

century.

Burke

religious views, to the extent he defined

then» were probably more than anything else influenced
by the

libertarian heritage of early Christianity, whereas Kaistre

embraced Catholic doctrine at its most extreme point of authoritarianism.

Burke was probably also influenced by his early

period as a Lockean, for though he broke with Locke, many Lockean
ideas such as limited government, natural rights against the
Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, in The English Philosophers
From Bacon To Mill , ed. by Edv/in Burtt, (New YorK: Random House,
1959), 202-203.

state, and ultimate right of
revolution remain.

It .as already

seen that Maistre was influenced
by a very different current
of Enlightenment thought.
Both these men were religious,
influenced by the Enlightenment, and
conservative, but what they
did differently with these three
currents was often more decisive
than what they did the same. A concrete
application of this
will be seen in the next section on the
State of Nature.

The State of Nature. Burke's first known work,
his
brilliant satire of Bolingbroke

,

A Vindication Of Natural Society,

is in large measure an attack upon the concept
of the State
of Nature, and the kind of thinking which
follows from it.
It may not be a coincidence that this work
was written one year

after the appearance of Rousseau's Discourse On the
Origin and

Foundation Of Inequality Among Men .
broke

At any rate, it is Boling-

style that is copied, and copied so well that when this

's

work first appeared anonymously it was generally thought to
be a posthumous work of Bolingbroke, as Burke intended it should

seem.

Burke (as Bolingbroke) praises natural society, which

was "founded in natural apr^etites and instincts, and not in

any positive institution."

This was a pre-political paradise,

but was destroyed by governors and priests for their

ov;n

good.

Since then, all people, even the rich, have been made miserable
^^Burke, A Vindication Of Natural Society

;

Or a View Of

the Miseries and Evils Arising From Every Species Of Artificial

Society

,

in Burke

'

s

Works

.

I,

11.

by living under an
artificial society and
pursuing artificial
needs.
The solution to this cannot
be other than a throwing
Off Of these enslaving
superstitions and a return to
natural
society
the „a.e of reason.^? TI>e
goal of this wor. was
to show that Bolinghro.e.s
ideas on religion could be
profoundly
subversive of society, and that
abstract State of Nature doctrines generally „ere dangerous
to society.
Burke succeeded
too well, for this work has
probably been quite instrumental

m

m

deluding those who have thought
that Burke rejected the concept
Of a State of Nature per se, and
therefore rejected the concept
Of Natural Law.^^ ^^is work was
really
a satire on abstract

theorizing about the State of Nature, not
a true attack on the
concept of the State of Nature. Burke's

views on the State of

Rature were ambiguous.

He did retain enough of his Lockean

background to feel there was at one time
a State of Nature,
but as to whether the effects of this
State of Nature extend

to the period of civil society, Burke
is not entirely clear.

Burke does, as we have seen, believe that there
are Natural
Eights, and since these rights derive directly from
God and
not entirely from human convention, this would
suggest they
^'^
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Ibld .. p. 66.

Two writers who have made this mistake are: Sabine, A

^^g^Q^y 91 Political Theory

,

pp. 607-609,

and John MacCunn, The

Political Phlloso-Dhy Of Burke (New York: Russell and Russell,
1965), pp.

198-199.

were operative in the State
of Nature, and carried
fro. there
into the State of Society,
his
On the Resolution
In France, however, Burke
says "Indeed, in the gross
and complicated .ass of hu.an passions
and concerns the primitive
rights
Of .en undergo such a variety
of refractions and
reflections
that it becomes absurd to talk
of them as if they
continued
in the simplicity of their
original direction.
This is
simultaneously the most revealing
and the most befogging statement Burke makes on the relationship
between the State of Nature
and the State of Society. It must
be noticed that this statement does not deny that there are
"primitive rights of men",
or that these rights are carried
over into civil society. In
actuality, this statement affirms just
those points.
It does
say, however, that one cannot be
certain just how operative

m

KpOe^

man's primitive natural rights are in the
State of Society,
or in what way they are operative.

Burke recognizes the tre-

mendous potential the State of Nature concept
can have for liberty
and limited government, in that it makes
man's most basic rights
prior to any action of government, and he
therefore embraces
it, but he is also distressed by the
abstractness of the concept

and the multifarious ways in which it can be
used.

From his

very beginning as a writer. Burke understood
the tremendously
subversive potential of the State of Nature idea.
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ourke. Reflections On the Revolutio n In
France

,

p.

70.

I6it

This may be the
reason why Burke rhn.
' chooses not to
paint a
picture Of the State
of Nature 1 n t>,
«nd Rousseau do.
,
'or

,

Locke. Hobbes.

An allied reason 1=

treating abstractions
.ireotly.

n,.

*

probably his dislike

It is a reasonable
belief

nevertheless, that had
Burke undertaken to
paint such a pictur^
«ould have been intermediate
between that of Locke
a...

that

Of ™an 1, intermediate
between those of the
other two theorists
.n Burke.s estimation,
is neither so needin.
of a firm han^
.bove him as was felt by
Hobbes, nor so capable
of autonomy as
was Locke's belief.
Burke does not really
deal with the State of
Nature ve-y
»uch. Instead, he much
prefers to speak of the
State of Society
While assuming that there
is some (unclarified)
linkage between
these two states. It is
quite incorrect to say.
as Cobban did.
that Burke believed that
any effect of the State
,f Nature had
t» cease upon man-s entry
into civil society.^O
„„„ ^^^^^^^
View Is that put forward
by Canavan. who said that
Burke felt
Katural Law to be superior
to all human authority, but
also
felt that it was mediated
to society through the
nation -s traditions. Institutions, and
positive la, (This leads one to
suspect
an influence of Saint Thomas
Aquinas upon Burke.), civil society
is. therefore, both natural
and artificial.^' Just how these
two
Cobban, Burke and the Revolt
/Igalnst the Eighteenth Century
Canavan. Political Reason Of
Edmund Burke p. 85.
"

,

,

pp. 52-53

Ploces 0. t.e p,..,e
for Bu..e.s

ru

U.ln, ana

to.et.e. ,3 too
..eo.eUcaZ a ,.esU„„
not ans.e.eO. .ut
t.e. .0

at

and yet remain separate
pieces.

to.et.e.

In one sense, Burke
does feel that the
state of Nature
and the State of Society
are inseparably
Joined. Tnis is because.
Since "art is man's nature",
qt^fo ^-p
c
.
.
the State
of Society
is man's true
state of Nature.^a
,3
^^^^^ ^^^^ ^^^^
is achieving all that God
gave hi. the power to
achieve.
A
statement like this should
serve to refute those who
might see
Burke as some sort of
reactionary. A strong strain
of what
might be called conservative
Christian humanism runs through
Burke -s thoughts.
One of the main reasons
why Burke does not
especially like the State of Nature
concept, apart from its
excessive abstractness, is that
man could not achieve his true
stature as a man in any State
of Nature.
Burke did not question
the ability of man to be both
civilized and free. Hobbes stressed
civilization ar,d Rousseau freedom;
Burke sought to reconcile
the two concepts.
Neither concept alone was desirable,
or possible
Many theorists both before and
after Burke's time have
seen war as an example of the State
of Nature, a situation in
which there are no laws. Burke either
did not believe war to
.

be an example of the State of
Kature, or did not believe the

State Of Nature to be normless.

beliefs was Burke's.
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It is not clear which of these

The Natural Law is an overarching concept,

Burko, An Appeal From the Hew To the Old
Whigs

,

p.

1O5.

165

which is interDreted by
Dy first
firot the tLaw of
Nations, and then by
the laws of particular
states ''^ n^t^
states.
Both ^l,
the ,Law of Nations
and
the laws Of individual
states are subordinate
to the Natural
Law.
The Law of Nations
applies to international
relation,
and war. The property
of citizens in a
con,uered

state is in"lolable. and the conqueror
.ust assume a moral
responsibility
for the conquered; if
this responsibility is
not performed
the conqueror ^ay lose
the .oral right to the
sovereignty he
has won. ^
this goes to suggest that
Burke- s State of Nature
is more one with rules,
like that of Locke, rather
than one
without rules, like that of
Hobbes. In his treatment
of war.
at any rate. Burke has
again sought to banish the
primitive
State of Nature from the midst
of man in the name of
Natural
Rights and human liberty,

m

Maistre.s concept of the State of
Nature is far more complex
than that of Burke, and simultaneously
gives indications of
the authoritarianism and
mysticism of Maistre's thinking.

Maistre
begins by quoting approvingly Burks
»s statement that "art is
man's nature." Whereas, however,
Burke had not intended this
to be a generalized attack upon
the possibility of a State of
rrature, Maistre feels that this is
what it should be.

Maistre

declares that as God wills the development
of man. the developed
man is the natural man. By talking about
man in an impossible
73

Stanlis, Burke and the Natural Law

''^Ibid.

,

pp.

91-93.

,

pp. 88-89.
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Oo.

„ai3t.e .eXieves Housseau
to .e, are also
aXvorcea rro„ ,00. sense.^^
.e 3a» in
t.e seoon.

Capter

t.-.t

Maistre ™eans so»ethi„s
very .i„ere„t
-the aevelo.ea .an"
than Burke does. It I3
not surprising that
M.^stre turns ,vlthThls Is because his writings
are In .any „ays
"a political
Philosophical, and religious
Justification of the restoration
.ove.ent...

As is therefore to be
expected. Malstre had a
great antipathy toward any
theory that could be seen
to Justify
a belief in revolution.
The very theory used by
his ene.les
to Justify revolution was
surely no exception.

Malstre singles out Rousseau
as the arch-exponent of
the
State Of Nature concept, and
prepares to try to

refute hln.
He begins this task by declaring
that the existence of such
a Et.,te would have to be proven
historically, which of course
cannot be done.??
.^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^
^^^^ ^^^^

Rousseau, though he sometimes gets
carried away, uses the State
of Ifature as a logical construct,
and therefore Malstre seeks
to refute it as such. The State
of Society must be natural

Malstre, Stud^ On Sovereignty . In
Lively, Works Of Joseph
De Malstre, pp. 95-97,
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Hans Barth, The Idea Of Order: Contributions
To a Phi.lo50t)hy

Of Politic s, trans* by Ernest Hankamer and
William Newell,
York: Dordrecht, Reidel,
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(IJew

I960), p. ^^^^

Caponigri, Aspects Of the FhilosOT^hy Of
Maistre, p. 103.

for three reasons:

first, because God
wills .an's perfection
(which can take place only
within society), second,
because
society is part of God's
creation, and third,
because one can
tell what is natural fro.
what develops.^^ These
factors plus

man»s natural sociability prove
the naturalness of civil
society,
and conversely the unnaturalness
of
the State of Nature, to

Maistre's satisfaction.
Just after he has demolished
the State of Nature concept
to his own satisfaction,
Kaistre develops a theory partaking
Of the State of Nature in .any
ways.
As has already been pointed
out at several places in this
dissertation, Maistre, though
at odds with the spirit of his
age in many ways far more than
Burke ever was, paradoxically
reflected its temperament and
theories, especially those of his arch-enemy
Rousseau (in a

distorted fashion), more accurately than
Burke ever did. Maistre
uses his belief in the Deluge of Noah to
prove that men before
the Fall were far superior to the men of
his time.

Maistre 's

line of reasoning here gives a good insight
into his theory
of punishment

(of which more will be said later) and into
the

way in which his thought processes operated.

Since (Maistre

believed) punishment is proportionate to one's
knowledge of
guilt, the fact that God handed down the harsh
punishment of
the Deluge shows that man at the beginning
had much greater

^^Ibid.

,

pp.

112-113.

u.derst.„..ns an. .no,I«a.e
(including .cienti^c
.„o„Xea,e)
than He po..,3.es toa^.^^

^^^^
^^^^ ^^^^^^ ^^^^
one debatable proposition
(that
ai there
Laere w=b
= ^oi
was a
deluge)^ to give
suppor
to a debatable conclusion
(that the hu.an race
fell to its present state fro» a high
pinnacle of knowledge).
This is certainl.
extremely poor logic. Laski Is
quite correct in saying
that

Maistre^ would reach his conclusions
before he even made his
inquiries.
This antediluvian State of
Nature was one in ,hich
men were totally subordinate
to God. and individualism
of the
-ort Halstre hated was
unknown. Men never engaged
in atheistic
studies, aad everyone was
happy.
The collapse of this happy
state Of affairs stewed fron.
man's heretical quest for
knowledge
and fr,» his willful pride.
This Maistrean morality

play gives
an indication of Kaistre-s
inconsistent use of the term
"knowledge.
"Knowledge",
the sense of individual inquiry
into all aspects
Of heaven and earth, was one
of Halstre's greatest enemies.
On the other hand. Maistre
used "knowledge" in a second and
unusual fashion. In his preferred
definition, knowledge was
the subordination of the
individual to society and the acceptance
of the status quo. religious and
political, based on faith.

m

:t was the first kind of
knowledge that had landed man in his

predicament, and it was the second that
could extricate him
79
Maistre. The Second Saint Petersbur;^
Dialogue in Lively,
,

*2Eils

Of Joseph De Maistre
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.

pp.

201-202.

Laski, Studies In the Problem Of Sovereignty

,

p.

232.

>o™ n.

Maistre, ,„ other woras.
.rtieulates a dialectical
theory or the State or
.ature. Man was ori^inaU.
i„ a MissruX
State of Nature marked by
hleh ni=t<.
plateau of» knowledge
y a high
and union
with hi. Creator. The
fact that .an was in
harmony with God
-SSest3 that this knowledge wa. of
the second variety,
that
Of submission. This
divine state came to an
end because of
the first kind of knowledge,
and man has been suffering
for
his sins ever since. The
search for knowledge is,
however,
legitimate, as long as it is the
right kind of knowledge
(Here
Maistre seems to xnciude
includp intellectual
i ni-oT i ^^-i-,,
t
endeavor, within limits,
along vdth submission to authority.),
and is, moreover, a sign
Of man's desire to return
to his original «tate and
escape the
degradation into wnich he has fallen. 8l
^ very crucial fact
to understand about Maistre,
one uniting him vdth his
Philosophe
foes and morally Justifying (in
his own mind) the general
authoritarian cast Of his thought, is that
this degradation can be
,

,

overcome and, unlike Burke's view
that this must happen by
centuries of evolution heading in a
direction that man probably
cannot comprehend, it can be done in
the twinkling of an eye.
Here Maistre the fierce polemicist
and Maistre the man who resigned
from the Savoyan Senate (a body with
judicial functions) due
to an inability to hand down death sentences,
become one.

was a personally

I^ind

Maistre

man and did not embrace his authoritarian

Maistre, Second Saint Petercburg Dialogue

Works Of Joseph De Maistre

.

p.

198,

,

in Lively,

theory out of any cruelty
in his nature, .ut
(,uite the contrary)
because the redemption of
.an Tro. eons or tor.ent
was constantly
within reach, and .ust not be
permitted to slip away.

The great
goal to be achieved would
make almost any action
morally permissible. Hobespierre undoubtedly
would have agreed. Maistre
the Philosophe is never
more evident.

Underlying Maistre's belief
u«xj.ei in ^
io.=f and
«^
a lost
regainable State
Of Nature is the concept
that government and society
are
sep-

arable,

.^ether this belief stems from
August inlanism or eighteenth century theories (especially
those of Locke) is uncertain.
It is not, however,
unthinkable that the

man who once said ..contempt

for Locke is the beginning of
knowledge." could have himself
been influenced by Locke. This
is true both because of Maistre's
incongruous division into both Christian
and eighteenth century
thinker and because of his tendency
to use excessively tough
language as a means of getting the
attention of an audience, ^2

In all likelihood, in this as in so
many other things, Maistre
was both Christian and spiritual
contemporary of the Enlightenment.

Several things necessarily follow from this
division of society
and governm.ent.

First, society is (in Maistre

as chronologically prior to government.

's

theory) seen

The State of Nature

was a condition with society, but without government
(except
in the broadest sense of direct rule of men by
God).

As must

emerge from this belief, government is morally inferior to
society,
Lebrun, Throne and Altar, pp. 22-23.

and (though ordained by
God) Is ordained in
order to orovide
for .an in his .tate of
corruption.
A certain stand-of
.ishness
toward political authority
Is the result. It is
a reasonable
assumption that this was a .ajor
source of Halstre-s
Papalis„.
for here was an authority
that (in Kaistre-s belief,
was entirely
(or primarily) .oral, and not
political. .«,en mankind
makes
its return to God and to its
primitive state, the need to
control
Ban's imperfections will pass
away, as the imperfections
pass
away, and so government will
cease. This point ought
to be
carefully considered by those
who would like to see
Maistre
as a true fanatic for authority,
for. without do^gradins
the

authoritarian components of Maistre's
theory, the use of political (as opposed to moral)
authority

was always instrumental.

Maa, as he ought to and could
be. would have no need for
political
authority, because moral authority
would be wholly secure.
It is most unfortunate that even
those who have some kind words
for Maistre (of whom Matthew ,u-nold
is one of a select ?roup) downgrade this aspect of his thought.
Arnold, In fact, declares

Maistre to be "altogether inferior" to
Burke in his imaginative
power, but to have "fewer superfluities."^'^

If by "superfluities"

one means the willingness to make
a radical leap of faith into

uncharted regions (at least In theory), the
reverse may,
some extent, be the case.

Maistre

's

to

views of the State of Nature

Matthew Arnold, "Joseph De Maistre On Russia,"
London
Quarterly Review

,

CXLVIII (October, 1879), 229.

sho» hl„ to Share, i„
an in.iroct fashion,
the opti^is. of his
aso.
There lo a «oal to history,
an. It Is right over
the horizon
and magnificent. One can
somewhat forgive those
who ignore
these Utopian segments of
Halstre-s theory, for he
himself did
not like to .a.e the. too
explicit, due to their
obvious similarities to the philosophy he
was combatting. They
do. nevertheless, pervade his theory
and serve as the moral
Justification
for his authoritarianism.
That this contradicts
fundamentally
Haistre.s stress on the necessity
of preserving the'entire
status
quo (social, religious, and
Eolitlcal) Is certain, because
his
belief in the non-political
quality of the returned State of
Nature was nothing less than a
formula for the ultimate
political
revolution, to be carried forward by
faith.
It is not likely
that Malstre understood fully all
the revolutionary Implications
of what must be called his State
of Nature theory.
To eliminate
government, even by total reliance on
God and faith, would be
about the most revolutionary activity
imaginable, and would he
profoundly disruptive of all aspects of
human life.
It may be said,

therefore, that both Burke and Mals'.ro

embraced their particular theories of nation,
Natural Uw, and
the State of Nature with a view to human
betterment. Burke
felt this could be best achieved by
reconciling order and liberty,

because both were necessary to the pursuit of the
good life,
and both could come simultaneously.

These beliefs led Burke

to support a system of Independent states existing
within a

general fra.ewor. of .o.al
law. a Natural La.
a.rlvea fro. Ood
Which wouia serve to
maintain both liberty and
order,
and a

State of Nature which,
how-ver
ow.ver vas-nol
vaguely, v,
bestowed certain right£
which were to hi enjoy.d
enlovsH «ri
t
n.
nthln
the
social state.
In these
aspect. Of Bur.e.s theory,
it is impossible to
place either
liberty or order before the
other, be It chronologically
or
in degree of Importance.
The situation In Maistre
is rather
different,
with this theorist, order
must come before libertv
point Of ti.e. so that liberty
(which is
,,

.

..

m

signlfica;.tly dif-

ferent in Maistre than in
Burke) might be achieved
at all.
Ih the realm of International
relations, this requires the
subordination of all
a-x czazes
stat(=«? to
t.->
fv^o one
^v,^
^
the
state
which is not a true
state, the Papacy. The Papacy,
as the incarnation of God's
law, is to so order all the
states that they will achieve
their
true liberty despite themselves.
Maistre, as a good theist,
does believe there is a Natural
Law, but he also fuzzes the
issue by identifying God's law
with all laws, so long as they
are in keeping y;ith a country's
God-given traditions. This

follows necessarily from Maistre

's

belief that God is sole

Legislator, and certainly places a high
premium on order. This
order, however, being God-given, must
include all the liberty
man is capable of having, for no one
knows the nature of a

creation better than the Creator.

Finally, Maistre debunks

one theory of the State of Nature that seeks
to set liberty

against order, and upholds another that seeks to achieve
liberty

an M..re. .en„..o„,
e.o™. ea„

^^^^ ^^^^

Us o„

^^^^

^e.ou.. 3......

.... ...
not understood by Maistrp
=,r,^
^
'^a-LST^re, and
does xiut
not altpr
u
alter the chronological
ore.
^^^^^^^^
^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^^^^
^^^^^
liberty as inextricably
interwoven, and Maistre
saw the achievement of liberty through
order.

^

That this is more than
a tritH^i
^""^"^^^ difference
should, hopefully,
^
^
be Obvious,
.^ong other things, it
bespea.s a rather basic
diff.
erence in the two theorists^
views of .an, which is
a subject that
necessarily pervades their
entire theories
uueories, this
thi . dichotomy
. .
having
been seen in the last
chapter.
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Chapter IV: Sources and
Nature Of Sovereignty
A. origin Of Positive
Lav,.

As was seen In chapter
three.

Bur.e believes there Is
a relationship between
natural law and
positive law. The case of
Hastings showed a positive
Uw couM
not be legitimate unless
it was reconciliable
with natural law
but beyond this it is
difficult to really understand
the re-

lationship between the two
types of law.

One would ^hlnk that

the strong ethical and
religious cast of Burke's
mind would
cause hi. to say there were
principles against which one
could
Judge the content of positive
law, but on this point
he is

ambiguous.

This .ay be the only case in
which the French Revolution succeeded in working
a major change in one of
Burke's
basic ideas. At about the
age of thirty. Burke penned
a critIcisn, Of the seventeenth
century chief justice Sir Matthew
Hale,
one of the great proponents
of the case-by-case approach in
com:=on law.
Burke said that one can understand
the historical
development of the law. and that this
development often derives
from principles outside the
common law outside.' It is a safe

assumption that Burke meant such
principles to be ethical and
religious. By the time of the French
Revolution, however, the

concept that common law was derived from
laws outside of itself
had vanished from Burke -s vn-itings. One
of Burke's most Important
J.G.A. Pocock, Politics

.

Language . and Time ; Essays On

Political Thought and History (Hew York: Atheneum,
1971), p.

221^.

statements on the subject follows.

^^-^^^
to inoculate any scion
^^""^
alien fn tt
plant.
°'
All the'^relormaLons we
^^^^inal
^^v/h'^^
proceeded upon the princJ
^e\lren
? ^^,ff
and I hope, nay, I am
persuaded, thaJ ail tLT^^'^l^'
possibly may be made hereafter
iill be cLe^u^v'^?^'^ .
upon analogical precedent,
autnorityf

f

anfexa^pLfr

This statement is followed
by a careful analysis
of the major
reformations of British history,
detailing how the architects
Of these reforms made a point
of showing how any changes
they
instituted derived not from any
abstract principle, but from
previous positive laws. If Burke
is to be believed, therefore,
the legitimacy of a law derives
from its antiquity, and nothing
else.
It is a bad idea to say a
thinker did not really believe
what he claimed to believe (for who
should know better?), but
Burke »s own writings of the same
period and his temperament
permit us to discount what he
says of himself on this point.
It io quite impossible that Burke,
who was morally outraged
by what he perceived to be the atheism
of the Jacobins, would

have said that the basic laws and
institutions of his society
were secular in nature.

fTaturally, if laws only derive from

their antiquity and from no innate
principles, secularism is
perfectly legitimate. Burke had by no
means become a secularist.
In his letter on Protestant rule in
Ireland, written to his
son in 1793, clear evidence of this
is given.

It is said by

^Burke, Reflections On the Revolution In
France

,

pp. 35-36.

hi. that Protestant tyranny
in ireUna I3 an
evil and ought
to be put to an end.
but that the established
Anglican Church
»as Of t„ hundred years
duration in that country
and had therefore beco.e an indissoluble
part of the Irish
landscape.^
No

theory basing positive laws
on their age alone
can possibly
reconcile all parts of this
last statement, for
Protestant
tyranny in Ireland was every
Dxz as
aq Old
olH as
oo was the
^^y bit
establish-nt or the Anglican Church there.
Ti.e, however, did
Justify
the latter, but could not
Justify the for.er. This
was because
the former was manifestly
unjustifiable, violating as it
did
the law Of God and the
ends of proper government.
The establishment Of the Anglican Church,
though a mistake in a
primarily
Catholic country, did not have
this tyrannical
quality.

Time,

therefore, can grant no right to
an immoral law, practice, or
institution. Principles outside of
the common law and knowable
to the human intelligence remain
central to Burke's concept
Of the positive lavu It may
be assumed
that Burke made his

false declaration to the contrary
because he was fighting an

armed ideology that arrogated to itself
the right to Judge all
laws and institutions based on independent
principles. Though
the Reflections On the Revolution In
France is rightly consid-

ered Burke's philosophical magnum opus, it
must be remembered
that it was by no means written as an abstract
articulation

^Burke, Letter On Protestant Ascendancy
In Ireland

Burke *s Works, VI,

/+03.

,

in

or Eu..e.s philosophy,

a. .as true of .ost
of his wor.s (ex-

cepting only his Philosop
hical
Ideas Of the

SuMl^

In^ Into

the

0^

and Beautiful, a very
early .ork)

Crete goal was being pursued.

Of Our
,

a con^

The existing order in
England

was to be preserved, and
this could be done best
by denying
principles had anything to do
with the legitimacy of
laws.
To accomplish this goal,
Burke says time alone
validates laws
and institutions, and laws
and institutions arise to
cope with
specific problems and show their
continued worth by their survival.^ By trying to articulate
a belief he did not hold,
Burke
landed himself in a logical
contradiction. He said a law is
good because it is old, and also old
because it is good. This
would say that age and worth are
parallel factors, but it gives

contradictory answers to the question of
whether goodness is
an independent quality. Burke, naturally,
did believe it to

be so, and moreover felt it to have
no necessary connection
;d.th age

whatsoever.

That which was old commanded Burke's

respect as an example of the accumulated
vdsdora of generations,
but it did so only in the absence of any
other relevant infor-

mation.

Age would give no weight to a law or institution
when

it could be demonstrated convincingly that the
law had become

useless or harmful.

A very powerful demonstration, however,

would have to be made before this conclusion
could be reached.
^Pocock, Politics

,

Lan,quage

«

and Time, p. 229.

In the case of Maistre,
there is not this common
la. notio
that laws, and consequently
institutions, work themselves
out
in a pragmatic fashion
over a long period of
time.
The most
common way for laws to be
established is for either
God Himself
or a di^rinely-inspired
lawgiver to create the state
and its
national character. If this
character is sound and the
state
is at peace, there will not be
any special need for laws,
and
such laws as are needed .vill
arise automatically from the
nation
Character. ;Vhat this shows is
that, unlike' Burke, Maistre
does
not hedge at all about the
relationship of principles to the
laws.
The principles which form the
heart of every nation's
laws must be Catholic principles.
All states m.ust be religious,
and Maistre, unlike Burke,
does not see his faith as being ineluded in the general cause of religion.
Catholicism is the

highest religion.

One state need not be the carbon
copy of

all others, because,

for example, one may be a monarchy
and

another a republic, but the strictures
of Catholicism must rule
in all. This removes for Maistre
several
problem:.- that

very real for Burke.
dated law?
thing.

are

First, what is to be doae about an out-

In Maistre's scheme of belief, there can be
no such

Any true law must rest on immortal principles and
must

therefore be itself immortal.

As Catholicism will have no end,

neither will the laws dependent upon it.

A second question

that somewhat agitated Burke was whether a bad law can
gain

anything from longevity in way of respectability.

As was seen,

Burke answered in the
negative.
have no meaning.

,

i„

„

Fop Kaistre, the
question can

i„3titutio„ that does not
have

C.abholicisn. and ,ntra»ontanis..
(Gallicanis» is unacceptable.)
at

its heart cannot quallly
as even a bad

lav,;

it is no la. at

all.

This reaches the point of
Maistre discounting the
per.an.ence of Protestantism
in England after tv;o and
a half centuries and speaK-ing quite
seriously of England's return
to Catholicism..

It v,as one of Maistre's
great fears that the nations

Of Europe vvould come to
consider Jacobinism a permanent
part
Of the French landscape
after it had remained in po,,er
a number
Of years, but he himself
was never willing to do so,
no matter
how long it might exercise
its sway. This makes
Maistre- s view
Of laws a good deal less
flexible than that of Burke.
Burke,
as was seen, based his notion
of law on the common law
tradition,
modified by the need of these
laws based on a country's slowly
Changing traditions to adhere
to a basic standard of morality.
Burke was no more rilling than
Maistre to consider the French

revolutionary experience as ever being
able
Of that nation's tradition.

to become a part

The Snglishman, however, because

he did not believe In an
established Infallible guardian of

rectitude on earth, provided for gradual
alterations in
try's traditions, and hence In its laws.

a coun-

He was, moreover,

quite aware that these incremental changes
could become radical

over the centuries.

The Savoyard, on the other hand, certainly

did believe in such an earthly guardian of
rectitude, and he

thereroro saw the role or
. .oral „a„ a. resistance
to an. Can^e.
V/hat is is sanctmea
in Catholic countries.
Change is entirely
1-oral, as it can only be change
fro. a .ore just
to a less

dust Situation.

That this contradicts
fundamentally the Hi31enarian element of Malstre's
thought related in chapter
thr„
is obvious.
All this soes to show that
neither Burke nor Maistre
can

actually be considered a
traditionalist.
to grant any

legitimacy to

a

Neither one is .villing

law or institution based
on its

longevity exclusive of adherence
to proper 'principles.
This
is quite clear in the case
of Burke. The Protestant
Ascendancy
in Ireland was two hundred
years old, and could
have been two

hundred ti.es two hundred years
old .vithout gaining a single
day»s legitimacy, because the
principles at its core were fun-

damentally illegitimate.

The age of a practice granted
it no

right unless it was joined to justice.
could cla2.m prescription.

Only the right tradition

Strange as it may seem, this was

exactly the position of Maistre, except
for Maistre 's belief
that no new right traditions were being
developed. The Catholic
Church itself, though Maistre was impressed
with its longevity
and considered this an argument in its
favor^ was not revered
by him because of its antiquity, but
because of its righteousness.

This is shown by the fact that Maistre praises
the Church highly
Maistre, Considerations On France
A:2^2Ilh .Pa

Maistre, pp. 71^-7^,

,

in Lively, y/orks Of
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for it3 abolition or
slaver., an Institution
he adults to have
been of even longer duration
than Chrlstianity.6
slavery
therefore couia not clal«
to t,e a tradition
.
.ortHy of protection
any -ore than the Protestant
Ascendancy could for Bur.e.
.elthe r
.an .as going to hold to the
incorrect doctrine
that ,,hat

Old was necessarily good,
nor was either going to
nake hi.solf
an a.oralist by holding to
what .,as old regardless
of its .o^al
nerit or den.erlt. Despite
this. Burke felt longevity
could
contribute to a la.-s legitLacy,
and Malstre felt it could
not.
Maistre is far from clear
as to the exact source
of sovereignty. As was already seen,
man is not able to create by
himself, and one would therefore
assume with good reason that
sovereignty Is entirely the work of
God. This would be a fair
overall assessment of Haistre's
position, but for the fact that
he himself is not willing to strip
man of all importance In
the formation of sovereignty.

He says that sovereignty and

laws derive from both God and man.^

It was seen that the form

sovereigaty takes is entirely the work of
God, and yet the existence of sovereignty is entirely man's
doing.

Just as human

evil was no part of God's design, so
sovereignty (which exists

only to control human evil) was no part of
this original design.

Wstre,
p.

The Pone, in Lively, Bforks Of Josenh
De Haistre,

Uih.

7Haistre,
De Malstre

.

Study On SoverelCTtv

p. 94.

.

in Lively, gorks Of Joseph

This does 3ho„ the pov,or
of the hunan being
In Malstro's th eorios.
Han ,uite literally forced
God to do oo.ething
He had not in-

tended .hen he required God
to create aovereisnty.
n.Utr.
wao. in other words, not
being deceptive when
he pictured sovereignty as a joint undertaking
of God and »an. The
ultS^ate
responsibility for the existence
of sovereignty
is. in fact,

^an.s.

This is not »uch of a
testimony for ™an. hov,ever.
because Maistre feels sovereignty
to be a necessary
evil and in
no sense anything to be
happy with. His attitude
toward sovereignty is much the same
as that of the dgnkey in
Orwell's
Animal Farm toward his tail:
he appreciates having
a tail to
keep away the flies, but he
would rather have no tail
and no
flies.

Man created the flies and hence
bears full responsibility

for the tail, but had no
say in the design of the latter.

Burke sees the state as originating
to cope with certain
problems inherent in the nature of
human association. The question of whether it was founded by
men or by God is one that

Burke does not care to tackle
expressly, but the temper of his
thought suggests a mixture of the
two. vdth God creating the
initial state to be a help to man and
with man modifying it
to cope vdth new problems that emerge.

The way sovereignty

originates in Burke's theory thereby shows
both man's weakness
and his strength, in that man needs help
and can profit by it,

and that he does not create sovereignty, but
can modify it

rather radically.

For Maistre. the state also exists to solve

cert^n p.oblo.s. but they
are
xn the hu..a„ condition.

not problems necessarily
i.,=rent

T.i^ gives rise to a
basic ambiguity
toward the state in Maistre's
thought.
B.

Moral Justifiability Of
Sovereignty.

As can be seen
fro« the above, both Burke
and Halstre feel sovereignty
to be
morally Justified, but their
reasons for feeling this
are so.eWhat different. Both believe
the ultimate Justification
to lie
in the fact of hunan
imperfection. Burke sees the
state as
necessary to »ore or less complete
v,hat is a reasonably
good
and Just social arrangement.
The state must repress
those who
would endanger their fello,v
citizens and must also carry
out
a number of positive functions.
The thing that more than anything else causes Burke to see
the state as justified is
his
belief that it is an intrinsic
and necessary part of society,
and Of the Justifiability and
merit of society he has no doubt.
There has never and could never be
a society vrithout sovereignty,
and the two are inextricably
intermingled. Like Hobbes. Burke
sees society and sovereignty as
permanently Joined, but unlike
him sees society as the more important
of the tivo. To Burke
it makes no more sense to question
the Justifiability of sov-

ereignty than it does to question the
Justifiability of morality,
whose seldom used guardian sovereignty
is.
The case is rather

different with Malstre.

It is, first of all, impermissible

in his view to question the morality of
sovereignty, for God
has created it, and that must answer all questions.

In a larger

aonso. however. Kalstre
gives the question
^oh n,ore .oanlng
than Bur.o was wlllln,
to.
Thlo is becauce
coverois.t. only
exists duo to man'^. oin.,
c-nnand these sins (chiefly
the sin of
disobedience) are not necessary
cixj ana
and aid
did not always
.1
exist.
Sins

sovereignty is associate,
with hu.an sin in a
.uch clearer way
in Haistre than in Bur.e.
This cannot
help but lower the
Sav-

oyard»s overall opinion of
soverei^ntv
sovereignty.
not necessarily part of
society.

c
Sovereignty
is also

If society were what
it ought

to be

(an assemblage of truly
religious and .obedient .en),
no
sovereignty would be necessary.
It would, in fact, not
e^rist
at all if society had not
voluntarily corrupted itself.
Sov-

ereignty is something imposed
on a partially corrupt
society,
and not an actual part of
that society. Maistre is in
full
agreement with Rousseau that
sovereignty ought not to e^ist,
but differs from him by feeling
that immorality caused sovereignty, rather than the other
way around. Burke and Maistre
part company on this count primarily
because Burke feels sov-

ereignty to be a Justifiable and
permanent part of human existence, whereas Maistre feels it to be

justifiable, but transitory,

In one way, therefore, Maistre is
less authoritarian than Burke,
and in another way more. Maistre,
unlike
Burke, does not feel

political authority to be a permanent fixture
of the human condition, but Maistre 's political authority,
while it exists,

is of a far more authoritarian nature than
that of Burke.
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C. THe

Varlabiiu. Or PolUioal
Po™..

Both Bu.,o
tHou«. personal!,
aevote. to .onarcK..
a. r„XX. .UX.
to accept otHe.
.0™. or
^^^^^^
^^^^^^
tx^es. For neither,
however, doe. this i.pl,
3 right for a
nation to erect a for. of
government of it. o,,„
choosing. Both
traditions and geographical
consideration, .iutate
against
thio. Bur.e and Maistre
held to Montes^uleu-s
view that a ^ar^e
state oust necessarily be
a monarchy, though
Maistre accepted
this in a .ore absolute
sense than did BurI.e.
Burke remarks
on this subject that
anarchy had always been felt
to be the

propcr^governmental form for France,
due to the country-s
expanse.
Monarchy .ould, after the
crushing of the .Jacobins,
have to be reestablished.?
This is not to be taken
as saying
Burke had any general antipathy
to republics
'

as such.
Ke, in
fact, declares that he has
none at all. but that a
governLnt
™.st be suited to the nature
of its nation.
By this, Burke
is not referring only
to the expanse of the country
or to its

climate alone, but to the character
of Its people as well.

Burke showed this by his analysis
of the equalitarianisn of
the American character, which,
he probably suspected, made
tLe
g

in,

Burke, Thou/^hts On French
Affairs

,

in Burke's V^orks,

315.

^Burke, Remarks On the Policy Of
the Allies
To France, in Burke's
Works
tiurke,

,

IVith

Respect

IV, 405.

An Apncal From the

ITew

To the Old limits , p.

/^6.

Americans poor material for
monarchy
idx ;.ny
dest^itp
aespite ^the expanse of
,
their territory. „u„an
factors
v.

are show, to be
.oro'in-.portant

than the factors or eeography
and cli.ate when those
factors
conflict.
Bur..e, ho,ever. ,oes not
consider all governmental
arrangements to he of e,«al merit.
Two forms are singled
out
for his attack. The first
of these is absolute
monarchy. E.on
in the height of his defense
of the Ancien Regime
of Prance.
Burke was prone to refer to
it as a "monarchical
despotism.""
He adds that one of the virtues
of monarchy is that it is
easily
tempered, thereby implying that
it is good only if tempered.
The other bad form of government
is absolute democracy, a form
of government inclined to
nart"
ud. i,j tvrannv
i,yranny and „„i
only acceptable
When naxed vdth other forms
These points show a very strong
dislike on Burke »s part for all
forms of government that involve
unrestrained power. It is possible
that some peoples are at
a stage of historical development
where a form of despotism
is unavoidable, but such are very
much the exception, and this
does not render the fact morally
justified.

Maistre holds to geographical determinism
in a much more
striking way than Burke. Form of
government is strongly joined
to climate, as Maistre accepts
Montesquieu's belief that liberty
is somehow most natural in Northern
regions.
The tendency
^Burke, Speech On the Army Estimates
1

^

2

,

in Burke's

Burke, Refloctions On the Revolution In
France

Maistre, Study On Soveroi^n ty

De Maistre, p.

TOO,

.

,

',7or!:c,

m

p.

in Lively, Wort:s Of Joseph

Of one countr. to Have
a certain

ro™

o. ,o.c.„.ent

ronao.o.

ernmcnt for it hv
/n'-in-v,o. 4.u
by sxvins
the people their
particular national
Character a„a territorial
locale.
r„at 3od has .ecrooa
i.
course, beyond the right
of .an to ,ue.tion.
Though HaistL
has a strong preference
for
r monarchy
monarchv (u,u^^u
(which, among other
things
leacs hi» to a positive
detestation of America),
he is entirely
unwllllns to support its
adaption in countries that
have not

had it traditionally.

Just as certain countries
are unavoidably

monarchical, others are unavoidably
republican or despotic,
such .atters are beyond the
control of .en. Governmental
for.s
are not too important
any.ay. so long as they
adhere to the
proper nor.s of morality. As
Kalstre himself (rather
surpricinsl
says. "It Is just the same
to be subject to one
sovereign as
to another.""'
Despite this, there are certain
forms of government Maistre would rule out,
as was
the ca.e with Burke.

The two polar opposite forms of
government, pure democracy and
absolute despotism, cannot exist,
the first because it is "an

association of men without sovereignty",
and the second because
every power has some limits,
Even the greatest despot is
still a man. and Is, therefore,
unable to establish a true
despotism.

All forms of government are between
these two extremes

Maistre's opinion of republics is quite
ambivalent.
^^Ibld.

,

p.

Ibid., pp.

113.

119-120.

To be a
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republic, a state must
be small, so T^nat
that the n"spirit of
association", which .s
Trn-fol
i
vital 4-^
to a republic, can
be strong, and
it
must also be very .dse
and public-spirited
^}:>j.r±zea.
It IS unnecessary
for the government of
a republic to ao
..ch, for all the peop'.e
recpect the co^unal property
an. the society it.elf
t.*es care
Of .uch that would othervase
be left to covernnent.
The only
serpent in this Eden concerns
the administration of
Justice.
The =ro,,d has too n,uch
po>ver in a republic and
demands harsh
punishments for aristocratic
offenders and lenient
punishments
for non-noble ones.'^
Aristocracy rules in a republic,
Just
3.S it rules everv.vherp
-sj.
ry.mere, hnf
but since it
is not openly affirmed
it has a tendency to be
galling to the people. It
is astonishing
that Maistre, .ho is v^.3wed
as an arch-royalist, has so
much
Sood to say abcuc republics. It
could be that when he arrived
in Lausanne, Switzerland as
a virtually penniless middle-aged
war refugee, the peace and order
he found there softened the
•

,

c;

•

sympathetic heart of this royalist.

Man, of Maistre's passages

on republics could have been
written by Jefferson.
In dealing wxth democracy, Maistre
in many ways stole
a march on Tocque/ille.

Democracy is a form of government with

very few restraints on it, and is
consequently one that can
be very oppressive.

It is also a very unstable form of
govern-

ment, as there is great divisiveness
between the aristocrats
who rule in fact, but not in nar.e, and the
people who rule in

Ibid,, p.

122,

na.=

.ut not in

.

UcU

.o^oc.cies onen

ao ..la
rooXH.,.a.
thin... ana a .a^istrate
of Justice in one is
,,ea.. because
he
has to depona on Ms equals
for carrying out (One
cannot say
o.forcins.) his decisions.
The e.ualitarian
spirit is capable
Of .u^onins up great
exertions in the people.
The people are
willlne to surrender everything
to the state.
These factors
make a democracy brilliant,
but
uui _ts
its internal
intern-,! weaknesses
„
,
cause
it to bo only transitory.'''
,

All other forms of government
are openly aristocratic.

An elective ariatocracy is
a form of government
,uite similar
to a republic, but very
weak for reasons that can
easily be
discerned. The class tensions
in such a society can
easily
build up to an explosive point.
An hereditary aristocracy
is
essentially a monarchy with no
monarch. It is a less vigorous
form Of government than monarchy
and has less splendor than
monarchy, but there is no other
forn of government as wise.'^
Its vigor is less than monarcliy's
because it is a plural executive, but on the subject of
this form of government's wisdom.

Maistre seems to have in mind the Roman
Senate in its prime.
The form of government to which Maistre
pays the most

attention is monarchy.

He feels this to be almost synonymous

with government as such and to be the
form of government proper
for practically every nation. It
is a governm.ent both vigorous
1

Ibid .

.

p.

127.

Ibid .

.

p.

119.

o
I

19?

and splendid, and .ore
importantly, one in .vMch
a'astice is
equally administered.
Monarchy is not to be
confused „ith one»an rule. First. "It is
always the Ung-s council
that rules "'9
In a monarchy, as in
every other state, the
aristocracy is th=

ad^nistrative class.

Th.is

serves as a .ajor check
on the Ung-s
power. Second, the king is
also checked hy all
banner of traditions and corporate privileges.
Formal checks are. however
not permitted. Despite his
overall preference for
monarchy.

Maistre's

vlev, on

different governments is
summed up by the

statement that "Thp
-Pr>-r.«,
.ne hpcf
best form
of government for each
nation
is that Which, in the territory
occupied by this nation, is
capable of producing the greatest
possible sum of happiness
and strength, for the greatest
possible number of men, during
the longest possible time.-^O
^.^^^ ^^^^^^^^ ^ ^^^^^^ ^^^^^^
Of pragmatism exists in Maistre's
judgements of governments.
It is now evident that despite
the very great differences

in theory between Burke and
Maistre on the limits

co

be placed

on the state, there is very little
difference in practice between them. Both men are advocates
of limited government.

Burke feels this limitation can and
should be achieved because
of man's generally decent nature. Man is
not overpoweringly
given to the desire to oppress his brother.

It was already

seen that Maistre does not hold to this
optimistic view of man.

Ibid .

,

p.

115.

Ibid .

«

p.

126.
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U

.00. .o.ona ito
...Ural U™u....
proviaoo for U.Uod
.ovorn.ont
.trescln, n..-. enpaclty for liberty.
M.^.^re proviaoo for
ll„Uo„ ,ov.rn..„t
by strocsm. hlc
bouof t„..t authority Un
t„o .Uapo of Co,,.
commands it.
D. The Separation Of
Powers.

On the .ubjoct of the
formal

separation of powers. Burke
and Malctre could not
bo further
apart. Burhe expro.oly afflr».
a reparation of
eovorn.ental
powers, in hi. theory of
what the Britlch Bovorn.ont
lo and
ouGht to be, executive power
and moot legislative power
are
vested in kinc and cabinet,
both of which
are to bo .oparate

from the irou.c of Co.mono.

The Commons is

orlcinate, legislation, and to
serve as

ti.e

to

vote on, but not

people's voice In

Covernment.

The basic theme of Thou,,hts
On the C^urc Of the
Present Discontents is that the
executive branch has been unconstitutionally cooptinc the House
of Commons and thereby
brlncing disorders to the nation.
It would bo good if it co.ld
be said that Burko was entirely
consistent in his theory of
separated powers, but he was not. Burke
was very attentive
to

infringemonts of executive on loglalature,
but not so attentive when the situation was reversed.
In
fact, when the

second Rockingham administration was about
to cone
pi
"

Ibid .

,

p.

113.

to

power.

Burke

one of the leading
proponents of the view
that it
Should accept nothing less
than an all r„ig
cabinet. This
constituted nothing lo„
than a .ajor seizure
of executive
power by the legislature.
It is
it
IS in a. way comforting
that even
v,as

m

Which can beset all of us
when our prejudices are at
stake.
There is, despite this, no
reason to thinl. Burke did

not really
believe a separation of
powers was right for
Britain. His advocacy Of a separation of
powers goes beyond the
case of Britain
All nations ought to have
separated powers. As Burke
puts it:
"States rnay, and they will
best, e^st with a
partition of civil
powers.
That the French revolutionary
government had no
such separation of powers,
but was instead a government
of
extreme fusion of powers, was
a major count against it in
Burke's
estimation. Burke, therefore,
feels that man's degree of
goodness makes limited government
possible, and his degree of evil

makes separated government necessary.

No man or small assem-

blage Of men can be trusted with
even formally absolute government. This is one variant of
government Burke could not
countenance,

Maistre, though nearly as much an advocate of
separation
of powers in practice as Burke,
would not tolerate it in theory,

and did not believe it to be possible.

Maistre was not blind

to the fact that power is not totally
in the hands of one man
22
Burke, Speech On the Army Estimates in
Burke's Works,
,

III, 224.

or group Of „en.
as a "complex

He. in fact, r.rer.
to Kn.lana
ap.rovln.l,

unity and

itical fo.ce = ...^:3

a ".o.t delicate

e,ulU.riun of pol-

^^^^^ ^

.ust li.e one sovereign
.aking up

™ind; „Hen the individual

parts work together (as
they .ust eventually,
if it i^ to be
aaxd there is a sovern^ent
at all), their decisions
are i.ple.ented^as absolutely as if
they .,ere the ,^11 of
a single .onarch.
It is difficult to
question Maistre-s contention
f.at
all sovereignty i. one and
absolute. This is rendered
even
ot^nger by his very perceptive
observation that in every
government povrer inevitably
cr.n-^^^^^^ toward
"oj.y „ra.,itates
one man or institution
that is. in essence, the
sovereign, and is beyond
appeal.^?
It seems that observation
of the trend of all
governments must
force one to accept the
first part of this state.,ent,
but one
might protest that the second
part (that some part of government is beyond appeal) is not
necessarily true. The case of
the American President, who
is clearly the center of this
government, night be Cited as
counter-evidence, l-mile it is true
that the President of the United
States is probably held to
account for his actions as much
as any central institution in

^^lalstre. Generative Principle Of
Political Constitutions,
in Lively, Works Of Joseph
De_ ^!ai^tr^,
p-

Wstre,
De Malstre . pp.

-f;.

Studj; On Soverelrrntv. in Lively,

Works Of Joseph

112-113.

2'Malstre, The Po^e, in Lively, 7/orks Of
Joseph Do Kaistre, p

195

the .orl.,

this

„ot amount to ,roat
accountabiUty.
a President is reelected
or defeated based
on Ms s.in

n.-t

'

i„
actions, and not because
of t.ose actions
themselves. Tbe President
is ultimately regarded
or punished for
.•-s campaign ability.
Vftetber this can be
considered b»ins
held accountable to the
voters is highly doubtful.
Second.
an American President
does so much
murh th.ithat any campaign can
scrutinize only a tiny
percentage of his actions. The
rest so
entirely without exanination
in the fullest Maistrean
manner.
If there could be any doubt
that Maistre had proven
his case
for the unavoidable unity
and absoluteness of
sovereignty, it
would have to be deemed
eliminated by his canny
observation
that anyone .,,ho could Judge
the sovereign would himself
be the
<.efe„din.

Ms

sovereign.26

^^^^^^^^^ ^..^^

^^^^^^^

^^^^^

^^^^^^^

Presidency, it can be said that
the principal would-be
judge
Of the President is his major
party rival. If the voting

public

accepts this Judgement, or
articulation of Judgement, the challenger replaces the incumbent
as sovereign.

This, however,

derogates not one whit from sovereignty,
which remains as absolute and united as before. The
final proof of Maistre's
theory of the unity and absoluteness
of sovereignty may be
given by pointing out that he did not
intend "absoluteness"
to mean that government pervaded
all of society (for Maistre

was no more a totalitarian than an
Dltramontanist necessarily
Is), but merely that sovereignty is absolute when
"constitutionally
Ibid ., p. 136.

19?

.-'xerci.e...

.xt^.„ t.e ..Xe.iti„ate
circle tracoa
-nentaX la... o. eac.
count... ..^7

the

„

.uMa-

^^^^^^^^^^

at all, someone must
„„_ issue,
decide a, given
and he
•

that issue cannot be
restrained

,,hcn he

>,ho

decides

is acting rightly.

One cannot help feeling
that Maistro is trying
hero to reconcile hi. authoritarian
impulse and his distrust
or hu.an nature
and is not doing a very
good Joh of it.
It does not really
say very much to oay
sav a state
<?t-.fo is
-to
v
^
absolute
within certain constitutionally circumscribed
^
svhere^ and
opne.es
nnd
n .
certain
constitutionally prescribed v/ays.
/ay.,
Maj^-i-rf.
^
haiotre is,
other words, a believer
in limited absolutism,
with all the iiiogic
illo-ic -h.f
ohat phrase involves.
The difficulty he n.ver
n^ver solved,
qoluo^i
^v,^
and
never could

m
-?

-;

•

m
,•

i

solve, was who

could .eep this formally
absolute sovereign vathin his
proper
bounds without, as Maistre himself
observed, then becoming the
sovereign. Halfway absolutism
is an impossible position,
yet
it is one that Maistro tries
to hold.
Despite this, his ana^.ysis
of the necessary unity of
so^-oreignty is excellent.

Neither Burke nor Maistre was at
his best in the treatment of sovereignty, even though
the latter took
the subject

as one of his most important themes.

That is because both seek

to reconcile a defense of
the status quo in practice .vitb lim-

itations on sovereignty (though Maistre
was chary
was doing this).

This gives social critics a handle with
which

to criticize the status quo,

27

i^«>

pp.

to admit he
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despite what Burke and Maistre

wanted.

...1,.,,

3,,,,
^^^^^^^

^^^^

erexent. .Uo.. fo„
fundamental dirrero.ce.
betv,oon the two.
Both wanted t)oTit-'r-ii
c^^-w-ti-x.
-it.cal stability
and limited government
and
sought to Iciplement them
In wav.s
in
th=t were
Bays that
not too different
practice. The theoretical
differences

m

luuou
must not
not, however,
h„
be considered in<^i mi
in.xs„ificant as indicators
of the general
diroctt
-p-;

Of their theories.

-

Chapter V: Ways Of Checking
Authority In Burko and Kaistre.
Burke and Maistre recognize
that authority does net
li..it
itself. Ho. It is to be limited
is a major concern to
both
of them, and is a major difference
between them.
It rtll be

sho-»n that their solutions
to this problem fit into
the generally

libertarian inclination of the one
and the authoritarian inclination of the other*
A. Burke's Theory Of the Party.

Burke's concept of gov-

ermnental limitation sees this limitation
as partly taking place
within government itself, and central
to this view is Burke's
theory of the party. Burke agreed
with Bolingbroke that the

great ideological parties that had disturbed
the state in the
previous century had passed away, but whereas
Bolingbroke saw
this as an opportunity to eliminate parties
entirely, Burke

realized that the resultant social peace made it
so parties
could be domesticated and used both to check
authority and
preserve the harmony that they had once destroyed.

Until Burke,

no theorist had ever seen parties as anything
but avoidable

or unavoidable nuisances.

It was he who showed parties had

a vital role to play in the state.

It was in opposition to

Bolingbroke »s theory that a party under a Patriot King should
put down parties forever that Burke wrote his Thou.^hts On the

£ause Of the Present Discontents .

Burke felt parties were to

200

beco., .n l.tesral

of government, and
he defined ^art,
as: "a body of „en
united for promoting by
their joint endeavors the national interest
upon .o„e particular
principle in
Which they are all agreed."'
By thus institutionalizing
discontent, both tyranny and
rebellion were to be avoided.
Parties were not to be revol n-t-i nr,^>,„
revolutionary armies in Burke's
view, but
they .ere to be centers of
at least possible
discontent. It
was in a party a public-spirited
citizen could work to
frustrate
the abuses and unconstitutional
designs of authority. Being
a party member does not
make one less loyal to
his country,
for it proves one capable
of loyalty to something
beyond himself. The party member,
moreover, does not have to
subordinate
his Judgement to that of the
party, for he -^11 choose
a party
he can agree with nine times
out of ten.^ This last
point shows
Burke was not only advocating
the existence of the V/hig
Party,
but of parties as such.
He recognized that many
people did
not share the ideology of the
Whig Party, and many of these
people, such as Lord North and Doctor
Johnsor, were personal

friends of Burke.

pa.-t

Burke, therefore, realized that
men of good

will can disagree on what is good
for the people, but that such
disagreements can be absorbed within an
ongoing, peaceful, state.

Parties were to be fully law-abiding
institutions, and yet by
^Burke, Thou^;hts On the Cause Of the
Pronont Discontents

in Burke >s

lVor!:s

.

I,

^Ibid., p. 533,

530.

,

20!

reading between the
lines
-Lines It can be
assumed that in time
of
-JO. crisis a part, could be
the spearhead or
revolution,

as

this earlier use of
narty but .tf isc an
.arty,
event he would rather
not see reneatpri
r>^^4.Peated. .artxe.
„„t to check the
government by
boms a^ed bands of desperadoes
(as »any 1„ Burke's
ti
inclined to see the.),
but by organizing the
House of Co^on s
in the „a.e of the
people and of liberty,
and by voting do wn
assaults on the constitution
by either crovm or
cabinet.
If
necessary, this policing
function could take the
for. of subjecting cabinet .enbers to
i.peach.ent "that groat
guardian
or the purity of the
constitution. "3 The Me.ber
of Parliament,
v-orking through his party,
is to have "a strenuous
resistance
to every appearance of
lawless ^uwyjcj.,
T)Ower- a opirit
-t^iri t n-r
^^a
of independence
carried to some degree of
enthusiasm; an inquisitive
character
to discover, and a bold
one to display, every corruption
and
every error of government."^
The M.P. is to be a pest on
the
^-

,

public payroll determined to
make miserable the life of any
member of government performing
in a way contrary to the trust
bestowed on him. A party organizing
the Commons is tc bo a
control for the people on the
government; it was the reversal
of this formula that was the
fundamental -cause of the present
discontents." Burke has the fullest
confidence that if this
^Ibid., p.

z,95.

^Ibid.

L97,

,

p.

day-to-aay inquisition of
,ovorn„ont is carriea
out. .oth revolution and tyranny can
usually .e avoiaed.
T.ere is every
reason to believe him to
be correct.
B. Burke.

s Theory Of Revolution.

revolution may become neoessarv
"cesiary.

Ifespite all this, a

it
It,
however, "will be the
v.

very last resource of the
thinking and the good."?
actions Of eovern.,=„t which
justify revolution. As
Burke sa,s
Of ,688, "The Hevolution
was made to preserve our
ancient, indisputable laws and liberti'^^s
xu«rx,i.s and that
fh^+ ancient
^
constitution
Of .^overn^ent which is our
only security for lav;
and liberty"^
(italics Burke's). The attempt
of Ja..os II to change
Britain's
traditional constitutional order
and establish a royal
absoluti
Justified his Violent overthrow.
Burke probably saw the similarity between this case and
that of America, where Britain
was seeking to alter the
ai^rangemenL which had grown up
between
herself and her colonies over the
years. If the preservation
of the status quo were the only
justification Burke saw for
revolution, this v.ould surely be
a conservative enough theory.
•

He was, however, quite vdlling
to judge the worth of a status
quo according to questions of
content. Burke, at the outset,

did not know how to judge the French
Revolution, for he knew
the status quo it overthrew was
one eminently deserving of
overthrow.

He,

however, refuses to say exactly what acts
permit

Burke, Reflections On the Revolution Tn
Franco, p. 35.
~~"
"

6

Ibid., p. 35.

?o:5

a .evolution .gainct the
statu., ,.o.

Hi. .e.initivo
statement

on thin issue follows.

^^^^.^'Z^^r^^^^^l

otoaience cu.ht
obscure, and not
easily deflneable. It i^ not
^
Which determines It/
'^^^"^^^ ^--^
Go;ernnent'':£' T''
"
indeed, before it can be
deranged,
^^Sugh^o ? an^'iT"'''
future must be as bad as t
e
o' ^'''''^f'
^^'^
things are in that lament-^blo exxlrlinL
^^^^^n
^o^J.f
t
disease is to indicLTtL
^'^^
remerto
^^^^^^^ure has
qualified to administer in
extre^itL^
^^^^^^-^l* ambiguous,
bitter potion to a distempered
s^ate!?
to

Burke was not in the habit
of giving lessons on
revolution
and he did not desire to do
so here.
The gist of the foregoing
quotation is that when revolution
is required, the need
.vill
be recognized. Nevertheless,
the basic configurations
of Burke's
ideas on the principles whoso
violation justifies revolution
can be discerned.
Not surprisingly, they revolve
around the
Natural Law. It stands to reason
that the violation of the

^

principles upon which sovereignty
is founded will entail the
more-or-less violent restructuring of
a particular

sovereignty.
What these principles are has already
been discussed. It will
be remembered that they constitute
an impressive catalogue of

individual rights.

One can now see that the violation of
one

or two of these i-ights is to be vindicated
by appeal

to Par-

liament; the wholesale rending of these
rights, which would

logically include an elimination of the right of
appeal from
the acts of government, could be set right
only by the "bitter

potion" of revolution.
7

Ibid,, p. 3^,

Burke's foregoing statement can be

compared to one bv
by T.nnirc
Locke .eclarins revolution
to be Justified
by "a Ion, train of
abuses, prevarication.,,
and artifice., all
tondins the .a.e ,„ay,
Ovhic§ .ake the do.ign
.i^ible to the people

they are soi„s."

The similarities
between Burke's statement
and that by Locke are too
great to be coincidence.
This is
another case in »Mch Burke-s
early attraction to
Lockeanis™
Shows up very strongly.
, fundamental difference
between the
two concerns who should
decide v,hen revolution
Is Justified.
I.ocke declare.: -If
themselves aggrieved and think
the prince acts contrary to
or beyond that trust,
»ho so proper
to Judge as the body of
the people?"? Burke is
unv.llling to
grant the right of determining
the necessity of revolution
to
the people. His -.ore elitist
opinion is as follows:
'^^^ necessity of revolutioia from
the
tnc farayity
gravItro'^tL'f'™^:'!
Ox tne case; the irritable,
fro-: =onslbnitv
oppression; the higb-n-,lnded, fron,
disdain andlndi'^^^tlon nt
lovt.

of honorable danger

m

a generous cause,

10

A revolution is right when the leading individuals
and classes
of the society determine the concrete
conditions Justifying
it to exist.

in 1688.
8

This is what Burke pictures as having taken
place

Though

I

am no student of seventeenth-century British

John Locke, The Second Treatise Of Governr.ent
(Uev York:

Bobbs-Merrlll, 19=2), p. 126.
Ibid .

.

p.

139.

Burke, Reflections On the Revolution In France

,

p. 35.

history, it .00.. unlikoly to
no that Jamos II had
boon .bandonoa by all the influentialc
of Britain. Thlo
pointo up
tho

fallacy of Bur,... viow a. to

.,bo

1. to thro,,

,o™

tbo gauntlet

Of revolution.

Of people,

It is not to be exopctpd
expected tv,nf
that any large group
such as the leading classes
of society, .ill over

be entirely united about
a concern of trivial
importance. It
is far less to be expected
that they vail unite on
cuch a risky
undertaking as revolution. If one
hundred percent of the great

men of England declare James
II has committed crimes
deserving
revolution, it is a reasonable
expectation
that he has done

GO.
01

If, however,

seventy- five percent of the
natural leaders

a society would convict the king,
and twenty-five percent

would exonerate him,

v;hat

is to be done?

It would seem that

if one-quarter of the great men
of a society are convinced the
ruler has acted both legally and morally,
one cannot embark
on revolution .ith an entirely clear
conscience. The only way
that Burke can justify revolution to
himself is for all the

nation's natural leaders to deem it necessary,
and, despite

Burke's views of 1688, this just will not happen.

A

further

problem with Burke's justification of revolution
is that it

begs one very important question: who are the natural
leaders
of a country that are to determine the existence
of factors

justifying revolution?

It is all too easy, if one wants to

justify a revolution, to say that one's friends who support
the revolution are the natural leaders of the country.

It is

an unfortunate concluoion,
yet one th.t „nst be
.ade, that Burke
probably ai. exactly this
,vith regard to the
,688 revolutlor

Bur.e feels that, when
it is necessary,
resolution should
be carried out for
strictly limited purposes.
The assault on
the constitution is to
be foiled and situations
returned to
the state they .ere in
before revolution beca.e
necessary.
In the case of ,638. for
example, Burke says that
after the
deposition Of Ja.es II. "They
|he .'hig revolutionaries,
left
the crown what, in the eye
and estimation of lav,, it
had ever
been-perfectly Irresponsible.
.^ether or not this is true
as a matter of historic fact
is a secondary consideration;
what
is important is what it ,,hows
about Burke's whole theory
of
revolution. One of the aspects of
the Revolution of ,688
that
^

most recommended it as a model
was that, in Burke's estimation,
far from altering the constitution,
it left it the same, but

strengthened.

A revolution should bo carried
out to remove

the tumor or cluster of tumors
that has required it, while

harming the healthy surrounding tissue
as little as possible.
In sose cases, this may require
radical
surgery.

In the case

of Fra-.ce, vhile denying the right to
meddle in France's purely

internal affairs, Burke recommends sweeping
changes.

As Cone

observes. Burke recommended for France a
constitutional monarchy
vrith a

froely-elected Estates General sharing vdth the king

power over taxation, guarantees for liberty and
security for
,

1,,

.

,

the people of France, and the
establishment of a Catholic
Church
purged of the abuses that had
helped to bring on revolution
J
Cone holds these recommendations
against Burke, feeling that
they were unrealistic and
violated Burke's own strictures
about
the limited nature of reforms.
Burke was indeed recommending

revolution, and what he called for
may have been unrealistic
for France, but he understood
that the Revolution, though
in
his view the work of conspiratorial
brigands, had been brought
to fruition because of the
widespread abuses in the system it
was attacking. Social reconstruction
was not a favorite occupation for Burke, but when he saw it to
be necessary, he was
not averse to recommending it.

If possible, revolution should

constitute nothing more than the throwing
off of a light deposit
which has accumulated on the
surface of the body politic,
but if some change is necessary, it must
be undertaken.

may even require radical reshaping of the
system.

This

Burke did

not think this would usually be necessary,
but his hand did

not tremble to hold the knife if it had to to
save the life
of the patient,

Burke»s notions of checking authority, by various means,
are nothing if not libertarian.

7/hen at

all possible, any check

on authority should be made moderately and non- violently

,

in

response to very concrete, correctable, abuses, and with an
12
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Carl B. Cone, Burke and the Mature Of Politics

tM

;

the

French Revolution (Lexington, Kentucky: University

of Kentucky Frees,

1964), 379.

eye to it. concrete ePfoct
on tho people.

UnliUo .o.e of the
people Of .is tine. Burke
was painfully
of the oufferings
to Which the JacoMns
„ero .u.Joctin, the
people of Prance i„
pursuit Of a theoretical
Ool.en A.e. Ho.erate
reforms are those

TOien

revolution was
ao npcG^R-:,r>v
^r.^ t-u
necG.sary, and
the cause of liberty
might

^ake it so. it was to be
carried out in a fashion
that would
not bo unduly damaging
to the body politic.
As was already
seen, Burke »s concern for
the security of the body
politic is,
while undoubtedly influenced
by a conservative
temperament,
primarily the result of his view
that a staters traditional
laws and institutions are the
best safeguard for its liberty.
Abstract reforms carried out
with a view to theoretical
perfection
are likely to be destructive
of liberty in fact.
In this aspect
Of his thinlcing. libertarianism
definitely talces precedence
over conservatism. Conservatism
is upheld as the best means
to liberty.
There is no reason to doubt Burke
Ts honesty in
declaring that he placed liberty above
conservatism. His whole
life was a testimony to his
probity.
C. Maistre»s Vie^vs On Limiting
Authority,

a very diff-

erent concept of checking authority
is found in Maistre.

It

was seen in the previous chapter that
Maistre declares authority
to be absolute,

and even refers to it as being able to
"co.imit

evil vdth impunity."

A Id.ng, Maistre 's model for a sovereign,

iG so splendid that before him all
subjects, both noble and

?.09

co«o., are as ,ood as e,ual.'J

Thl. „as ,uito a
.tato„e„t

for a convinced aristocrat
like Malstre to .al.o.
Revorthel...
it is implied, ..rf.thout
ever belns actually
stated, that the
^r., v;lll be subject to
institutional checks that
the v^so
^vlll

heed,

r^aistre declares that
the king cannot i.poso
death

or corporal punishment,
as that power is
transmitted by hi.
(Haistre. as a magistrate,
was very sensitive to
the importance
Of an independent judiciary.),
cannot Judge in civil
cases,
maj- order imprisonment
or exile, but should do
so publicly and
have the advice of an
"enlightened council" in doins
so. and
Should not deny the people the
right to denounce abuses
to hlm.'^
There, however, are not and
cannot be any formal
institutional
Checks on a stupid or evil king
who seeks to flaunt his
responsibilities. The aristocracy and
privileged classes would doubtless
try to hinder such activities,
and probably could do so in the
short run, but the l^ng. if he
sought to be a tyrant, could
sain the upper hand over the aristocracy.
The king has the

power to ennoble men and families,
which moans he would have
no difficulty in bringing into
the administrative class people
who would serve him.

There are, therefore,

intra-societal limitations upon the king.
one may depose or even judge the

king.'-^^

'^Maistre, Study On Soverel,-ntY
Do ilaistrc
lit,.

,

p.

.

I PJ-d ..

15

n6.
p.

117.

Ibid,, p. 117.

.

no indestructible
This is because no

The king is God's

in Lively, fforks Of Jo-nnh

annointed, and so to Judge the

Ung

would be to Judge God,
.hich

is ob^^ously unacceptable
to Maictre.

nation becomes quite complicated.

At this point, the
sit-

One would think that
to say

the v^ng could not be judged
or deposed would be to
say he was
entirely independent in whatever
he did.
Such is not the case.
First Of all, Maistre, as an
IIltra..ontanist
declares the Pope^
to be "the natural head.
..of universal civilization",
and says
the Pope has the power to check
and nake bearable temporal
power.
Though no member of a national
society may Judge his king,
the
Pope, as the leader of universal
society, may and must. How
Maistre is able to reconcile this
vdth his earlier statement
that the king may not be Judged
is a good question. He does
not exi^ressly answer this
question, but one can hazard two
,

possible answers.

First, though no man may Judge
a king, in

the same way that all men are the
same before a king, so all
men, both kings and subjects, are
the same before the Pope.

When, therefore, a sinner's case is
before the Pope, the holiness
of the Judge eradicates all claim to
merit by the defendant.

In other words, though this individual who
is before the Pope
for Judgement is a king to all other men,
he is no
Pope.

A king may not be Judged, and when the Pope
Judges this

Kan, a king is not being Judged.
the Pope does not do the Judging.
1

pp.

ld.ng to the

^

Maistre, The Pope

H2-1/1.3.

,

A second possibility is that

The Judging is done by God
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through His earthly intemodiary

,

the Pope.

No one could possibly

deny that Cod, Who is the
Creator or all sovereignty,
.ay Judce
that which He has created.
Maistre is of the opinion
that this
power Of judgement exorcised by
the Pope, either directly
or
as the servant of God, would
eliminate both tyranny and
the
need for revolution. There is no
reason, given Maistre's view
of the Pope, to doubt that such
would be the case, if the Pope
possessed sufficient military power
and a sufficient emotional
hold over a believing population.
In the Middle Ages, it must
be rerr^ombcred,

the disapproval of a Pope
caused an Emperor of

the Holy Ronan Empire to stand in
the snow imploring forgiveness.

Maistre refuses to give any hints as to
how the Pope judges
whether or not to disapprove the actions
of
a king.

He declares,

in fact, that the Pope is "limited only
by the blindness or

bad faith of princes" and that it is foolish
to judge by abstract
rules in place of experience.
The matter is left entirely
up to the conscience of the Pope, and Maistre
has perfect faith
tliis povror

will not be abused.

If mere disapproval by the Pope does not bring an
erring

sovereign into line, there are more potent weapons to bo utilized.
In the ultimate extremity, the Pope could excommunicate the

and give his subjects a dispensation from sovereignty.

Icing

This

would, of course, cost the king his throne, if the Pope could

make his verdict stick.
^'^Ibid.

,

p.

I'/liat

.

is remarkable is that Maistre

1

8

does not seem to understand the
revolutionary nature of such
an act. I-Ie goes so far as to
say this pov.er of the Pope
perr^its

resistance vd.thout revolution and
without denial of sovereignty; the Pope has even
increased the respectability
of
sovereignty by coercing it into
doing rightj^ 3^^^^ ^^^^
^

probably .any, people v/ould continue

to stand v;ith the formally

dethroned king, such an action, far from
avoiding revolution,
would instead touch off ci.-il v;ar.
Further, whatever the abuses
of a particular sovereign, it is
ludicrous in the extreme to
say that sovereignty can be rendered
more respectable by it

being shovm that a sovereign can be
undone by a nod of the Pope'
head.
An employee ;;ho is on minute-to-minute
tenure is noticeably lacking in respectability. Maistre,
who stresses the im-

portance of sovereignty, would destroy all
sovereignty (except
that of the Pope) by rendering it contemptible.
D. Maistre»s Treatment Of Revolution.

Perhaps because

of the unbelievd.ng nature of his epoch, Maistre
realizes many

people will not accept the authority of the Pope
as a sufficient
check on authority.

Rather against his

to discuss the subject of revolution.

olution is rather ambiguous.

v/ill,

Maistre is forced

His attitude toward rev-

One of the greatest faults he

finds with Protestantism is that it permits rebellion in both

religion and politics.
1

^

Ibid .

,

pp.

%bid .

.

p.

^

Maistre is convinced Christianity

l/fO-lZf1.

137.

cannot Justify .evolution.

On the other hand,
ho.ovc. he also
holds to the inconsistent
view that there are two
choices for
an individual .1th regard
to sovereignty,
obedience or rebelUon
furthermore, the sovereign may
be killed,
but not Judsod.-^^

This is a very peculiar
statement.

One would thinl. that
nothing

implies a Judgement of a sovereign
,uite so much as overthrov;ing
and murdering him. People who
are satisfied with their
gov-

eriments seldom undertake the risk
and bloodshed of revolution.
There seem to be three possible
explanations for this anomaly.
First, Maistre may have been
caught nodding in this part of
his theory, and simply did not
realize how absurd it is to
spealc Of revolution without
Judgement.

Maistre was a human

being, and would have been capable
of error.

A second poss-

ibility is that Maistre was quite aware
of the apparent conflict,
and sought to use it to demonstrate
his belief
that revolution

is an act of irrationality.

In this explanation, revolution

would not necessarily imply Judgement,
any more than a lion
implies Judgement when it devours a man.
A government which
had Maistre 's great respect, that of France,
was overthrovm
in what he considered to be the irrational
culinination of an

irrational age.

V^nat

Maistre saw as abuses in the France which

existed prior to the Revolution were the
penetrations of the
Enlightenment philosophy into the court and aristocracy.
20

Maistre, Stud;^ On So vcroi;:ntv

.

in Lively,

'.Vorks

The

Of Josenh

traditional French system was sound,
and there certainly
was
no ground for its overthrow.
The third possibility
is ti
this conflict is but another
example of that conflict
that runs
through so .uch of Kaistre-s
thinking: that between
Maistre
as man of the Bnlightemnent
and Maistre as consorvatiTe.
.'he
second aan wanted earnestly to
place all authority beyond
Judg.ment. but the first knew this
to be impossible and
ultimately
destructive of good government. This
conflict was never resolve,
and never could be, because it
reflected a duality within the
thinker himself.
Yet another cause of Maistre
's strange ambivalenc.^ to

revolution stemmed from his theory of
human uncreativeness.
Man could not really create anything,
least of all a revolution
against divinely-instituted authority.
The reason the French
Revolution broke out in the first place, and
later proved so
powerful, was that God, not the Revolution's
nominal leaders,
was actually controlling its course, in order
"to regenerate
g^ranci by punishment", because "terrible means
to set her on her true course again. "^^

n:ust be

used

Maiscre took second

place to no man in his desire for the end of Jacobin
tyranny,
and probably had more faith than many that Jacobinism could
not succeed (for God v;ould destroy it when He was ready)

,

bub

unlike his fellow exiles in Lausanne, he was in no
special hurry.
PI

Maistre, Considerations On Franco

Of JosGDh De Maistre , pp. 48-50.

,

in Lively, Works

>va. •o.cau.e

tho Revolution .as a
cign of .o.e divine
.Ian
that .an could not ultimately
foil, the attempt to
foil it being
as .uch heresy as the attempt
to .al.e
a revolution.

Haistre
»ust have infuriated his
compatriots hy saying that
God had
prevented an early counter-revolution
so that all guilty
parties
France might be punished.
Here were the eddies
chafing
at the bit to get back to
France, or so.e other place
(like
Savoy) ,vhore the revolutionary
amies had penetrated, rebuild
their estates, settle scores,
and talce up

m

where they had left

off, and one of their most
prominent leaders was playing
the
part of a MenshevUi of the
ji-nc rieht
.
Thi
ij.^nc.
ihis= is an
indication of
'.vhat happens when it is
believed hiunan beings are impotent
before some all-encompassing force,
be it God or historical
materialism: paralysis of v/ill results.
Kaistre felt he could
speed the end of Jacobinism in just
the same v;ay as he could
seek to prevent the collapse of his
house in an earthquake and
keep his body from being ravaged by smallpox:
he could pray
to God,

It is paradoxical to say that revolution
is, at the

manimum, morally suspect, but human opposition to
revolution,

unless one be unmistakably a tool of the Lord, is
also morally
suspect.

Such, nonetheless, was Maistre»s position.

Maistre gives no instructions as to how the
necessity
for revolution is to be determined.

Even though he may permit

revolution against a sovereign (but without judging
him!), the
22
pp. 53-5^.

idea Of ..iting a pri.erfor
revolutionaries would not be
especially congenial to Maistre.
It was seen earlier
that on
this problem, and .any others,
Maistre stresses the
superiority
Of experience over abstract
rules, but experience of
what?
Apparently religious persecution
does not Justify revolution,
for Maistre never suggested
the revocation of the
Edict of
^rantes to permit such extreme
action, and even expressly
upheld
the legitimacy of the
Inquisition as a way for the
embattled
Church to defend itself against
heretics and unbelievers.
Even
When the Jesuit Order (for which
Maistre always had a passionate
regard) was expelled from France
under the monarchy, he was
not prepared to call down the
fire and sword of revolution
upon
the evildoers. Deprivation of
property rights would also not
justify revolution. Under no state
did regressive taxation
deny property rights to the mass of
the population more than
vms the case in pre-revolutionary
France.
It was already seen
that Maistre was highly aware of the
necessity for an independent
system of justice, but even this lack did
not merit resort to

political violence.

The Lettre de Cachet was a funda^mental

institution of the French monarchy and could in
no way have
been reconciled to Maistre
Justice.

's

ideas of the adininist ration of

It was also seen that Maistre felt it was
important

for people to have the right to denounce abuses to
the king

through a somehow elected body.

It need hardly be belabored

that the French Icings had succeeded in destroying the Estates

General as a viable institution
of cocioty.

T.e French .nonarchy

Whatever its potential for refor.,
in its .ain outlines
stood
as an insult to Maistre^s
theories of what a state
should be
and do, and yet he .as
un.illinc to sanction its
replacement.
If even the ultimate atrocity
(in Maistre»s view) of
expelling
the Jesuit Order can pass
without sanctioning resolution
or
at least a Papal suspension
of sovereignty,
how can it be said

that the state must observe
any rights, be they individual
or
corporate? It is incredible that
Maistre, who possibly more
than any political theorist who
ever lived, looked at the specter
Of human evil full in the face,
could merely say to the sovereign
"Bo good!'., and remove in
practice any rights about which he

must be good.

Maistro

v/as

not willing to say about a tradi-

tional sovereignty: 'M^re it committed
a punishable offense."
Just xvhat can be beyond the rights of
an originally legally-

constituted state ip a complete mystery.

As impossible as it

seems to reconcile this to much of the
rest of the body of

MaisLre's thinking, it seems unmistakable, since
no concrete
cases of legitimate opposition to authority
are given in practice, that any resistance to authority, oven
resistance by the

Popo, is a more act of will, which cannot be understood
or de-

fended logically.

This opens up two likely possibilities with

regard to the subjects of a state: either unrestricted obedience
or unrestricted opposition.

In view of the nature of man, about

which Maistre had no illusions, unrestricted opposition is the
far more likely eventuality, though not the one Maistre favored.

As could be expected from
the fact that Maistre
gave no
hints about the reasons .hy
revolution could be undertaken,
he also gives no instructions
as to .ho is to announce
and carry
out a revolution. One would
anticipate,

given Maistre's elitist

bias, that a revolution would be
the

minority.

;vork

of an upper-class

The case is, however, not
certain.

One idea that

Maistre considers and rejects is
that the call for revolution
can be given by a permanent tribunal
of government.
He rejects
this idea because revolution is the
destruction
of sovereignty,

v/hich would be the destruction of
the authority of the insti-

tution that declared revolution. ^3

There is a large measure

of truth to this statement, but it may
not be as compelling
as Maistre believed.

It is true that the declaration of
rev-

olution would have to be this tribunal's last
official act,
at least for the duration of the interregnum,
but this would

not eliminate its authority for this last
act of suicide, nor

would it dissuade a sufficiently public-spirited
institution.
Three problems, rjowover, emerge.

First, membership on this

body would carry eome prestige and salary, and its members

might not want to lose these, especially since the revolution
might fail,

vvith

its champions losing thereby not only their

offices, but their heads.

Second, an agency such as this would

become one of the most vital institutions of government, and
^Maistre, The Po^e
p.

133.

,

in Lively, Works Of Joseph Do Maistre
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its ,r,or consent to acts
of govennnent would
proWy ,e socunoa
exther by elving it a .etc
over legislation or by
bribing its
r.er„bcrs with money or
po.er. Once tfds
institution became
formally or informally involved
in the day-by-day
business of
sovernins. which would probably
be inevltablo, the
specific
function for .hich it had been
organized would tend to atrophy.
Finally, as was a problem with
Burke, a less than unanimous
verdict for revolution, v,Mch
would be the likely event,
would
be of a dubious binding
xiuxng quality.
nuaT-ifv
t« ^-h
In
other words, an institution
like this would be possible in
practice, but uncommon nonetheless.
Maistre did not, however, abandon
the concept
of niinority-led

revolution.

He was very definitely of
the opinion that the

people do not decide revolutions,
but are at

a passive

..iost

instrument; as Maistre puts it very
succinctly, "Perhaps four
or five people will give France a IcLng.-'^^
This statement,
however, raises more questions than it
resolves.

may not refer

First, it

the carrying~out of a revolution.

to

instead, suggest a mode of choosing a king
after

a

It could,

revolution.

If this does refer to the carrying-out
of revolution, the prob-

lems are still extreme.
to carry out revolution?

First, what four or five people are

Maistre had no high regard for either

the morality or intelligence of those who opposed
him (He said

of Locke that "Contempt for Locke is the beginning
of knowledge.",

and of Voltaire that "Paris crowned

"Slaistro, Cgnsid^rntl ^nn

Joseph Do Maistre

,

p.

36.

him— Sodom

Franco

,

would have banished him."),

in Lively, Work,^

QS,

but .any ether people considered
the. among the groat
.on of
the tine,
my should not these people be the
ones to lead a
revolution, as in Kalstre-s
eyes they had7 Allied
to this first
question is the one of ho„ these
men are to he selected.
If
rules for the selection of
revolutionaries were .ade, a
long
step «ould have been taken
toward the setting up of
rules of
revolution, a task Maistre wanted
absolutely to avoid. Just
as Kaistre gave no useful
instructions on the rightful
causes
Of revolution, so he is not
helpful on how a revolution
is to
be led.

Finally, there is the question of
after the revolution,

,.hat

should be done

'^at should be its goals?

It

is susgested

with regard to France that the
counter-revolution is to reinstitute all Of pre-1789 French society,
minus those Enlightennient

accretions that helped lead to revolution.

certain, however, that this is typical
of Maistre

revolutionary goals as such.
olution may be permitted.

It is not
's vic-v; of

Some change as a result of rev-

At one point, Maiscrc says that a

few wise men can make political improvements.^^

mo

these few

wise men are, what these improvements are,
and when and under

What conditions they can be m.ade, are nowhere
Qxpllcatsd.

Maistre

is v/llling to entertain the idea of reforms, but
then drops
the subject,
25,,

.

.

^^aistre. Study On Sovereignty

De Maistre, d.

104.

,

in Lively, Works Of Joso-h

It .u.t be ob..Lous that
taio Is probably tho
.o.t frun-

tratins and perplexing part of
all Maistre's thinking,
no
other place does the basic
tension between Maistre
as Enlighten.ent thinker and Kaistre
as Conservative (or
reactionary)
she, up noro strongly. The
issue of resistance to
authority
»-as. after all. the
issue which »ost disturbed
Kaistre about
the Enlightenment.
Maistre wanted to do everything
he could
to eliminate resistance
entirely, or to tie it to
a conservative
and respected authority (the
Papacy) which would not abuse
it.
Maistre hir,self. however,
recognized that the need for
revolution could not be as easily
eliminated as he would like,
and
he was therefore forced to
legitimize in principle ..hat he
despised
fact.
This caused a basic tension in
his thinking
on the subject, which resulted
in his inability to create
rules
to limit the genie he had
unleashed.
He could not boar to stay
on the subject long enough.
Maistre -s position on restricting
authority may therefore be referred to
as authoritarianism vdth

m

m

a guilty conscience.

As was seen, Burke's position on resist-.

ance to authority, as opposed to
institutional checks on authorlt;
has serious problems (as an attempt to
produce a logical pos-

ition on such a subject almost certainly
must), but it is at
least understandable.
standable-

Maistre 's position is not really under-

Chapter
A.

VI: Helationship
Of Church and State

Church and State In
iiurke
Burke'

- Ph-ii. . ^
o
Philosophy.

The religious
vic». o. Bur.e ...
ext.e.eX. important to
an unae.stanai.,
or
his overaXX pMlosop.,.
^^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^
the nature of these
views.
Stanlis.» for exa/npie,
exair,t,le
declares that
"Burke.
own religious convictions
s
„ight well ,e described
as
Catholicism qualified hy
British nationalise...'
of his British
nationalise there can be no
doubt, but. despite an
appreciation
Of the historic Importance
of Catholicism and a
willingness
to unite With the
Catholic countries in a
co^on alliance against
the enemies of religion,
it must be said that
Burke's views
Of religion and of
religlon-s relationship to the
state were
fundamentally Protestant.
«T>atever his admiration for
the crown
and (sometimes) for the king.
Burke certainly never looked
u^on
the monarch of Great Britain
as the de facto head of
religion
England, much less as an
infallible source of spiritual
pronouncements. In addition to its
lack of an Infallible head.
Burke has other views about the
nat.ire of the English Church
that set it off from even a
Galilean Catholic Church. In opposition to the petition of dissenting
ministers to be permitted

m

to be paid by the Church of
England, while not subscribing to

its beliefs. Burke goes out of his
way to declare that he agrees
Stanlls, EdBund Burke and the tfatural Law, o.
201.

2,?3

Loce

v^ith

that the Church is a
voluntary association
.hie.,
as such, has a right to
set ter.s of .e.bership.^
Tl^s st.t.-nt is positively shattering to
any notion or infallihle
church
authority, in that it has a
.ar.ed tendency to reduce
the status
Of the Church to that of
a long-established and
.enerablo cri^.^t
Club. The Church is run in
a certain way by
priests selected
in a certain .ay si.ply
because this is ho. the
people through

their representatives in
Parliaraent have desired tl^ngs
should
be.God did not organize the
Church in any particular
v;ay,
ap.d

so Parli,ar.ent is free to
reform Church structure and
org<

anization in any way it chooses,
though, as vath any other
major
reform, this po-.yer ought to be
handled temperately. The very
status Of the Church as an
established church is subject to
the control of Parlia^nent,
though Burke strongly supports
this
status out of a respect for its
longevity and from his oppos-

ition to secularism.

The Church is not an ordinary
voluntary

organization, in that, as a result of
history, it is intermingled
with the state, there bly gaining grandeur
and losing independence.
The exalted status of the Church of
England is in no

v;ay

interpreted by Burke as giving it a monopoly
of religion within
the territorial limits of Britain.

Burke's activities on behalf

of religious toleration have already been
related, and these
were by no means motivated by the sort of
attitude that shows
Buriie,

VII,

.Speech On the Acts Of Uniformity , in Burke '
s

17.
•^

Ibj d .

,

p.

16.

-//ork-s,

s

rorebearance to that ..ich
it despises, .ut ste.ned
instead
fro. a genuine regard
for the legitimacy
and sanctity of other
relicicns. This was rather
natura"ciouxa- Ifrom
rum a. m.n
man
-

wno was a comm-

unicant of the Church
nurch of
Of v^a-i^^^^
England, was raised in a
half Catholic
hone, and was educated by
Quakers. This leads to
Burke's state.ont that "Toleration is
good for all, or it is good

for none..-'^

This Shows that the Church
of England is exalted
above all other
religions in relationship to
the British state, but not
in relationship to sanctity as such.

The power of the state over

religion in general and the
Church of England in parfcicul,^
is real, but nonetheless limited.
It does not extend to
matters
Of religious conscience,
as that sort of control,
far from being
part Of Christianity, is actually
an attack upon it.5 Limits
upon religious freedom are
permissible only when one dissents
not out of conscience, but out of
a desire to raise factions

and destroy the peace of the state.^

The foregoing is, naturally,

a major qualifier upon religious
liberty.

is and must be entirely free.

Religious conscience

The only power a magistrate

.lay

have over roli,.ion is in its external
ceremonies, for true rel-

igious observance cannot be compelled.

The foregoing few state-

ments show a moderately libertarian side of
Burke in regard
to religion, but there is another
side.

Burke

Dissenters
5

,

,

It was seen that Burke

Speech On a Bill For the Relief Of Protestant

in 3url:e

Ihid .

,

p. 25.

^ Ibid .

,

p. 30.

*

IVorks,

1^.1,

29.

h.. no

u:a„s

ror pollticl.,d
rollslo...

,,,,

^„ CO Lin-

to.cd .uch a reunion in
the Torn of t.e
Unitarian Society.
BurUe sa. t.e tenet, or
thio sociot,- (a.on,
.Hich v.-ere a de.and
for tue cU30sta-oli3hnont
of the Cl.urch of
England) a. being
/ and .a.Ifully subversive of the state,
and he
wa. therefore unv^lU., to
cLLsavo. the staters
ri.ht to exa.ine
the opinions of nominally
rolicious bodies.^ At the
point .hen
a religion demands not only
the right to abstain
fro. what it
considers evil, but also the
right to reshape society
forcibly
adhoronco to its standard of
rectitude C.l^ch is the way
Burko, correctly or incorrectly,
pictured the case at hand),
arsunents based on the right of
religious toleration cease to
have relevance. Traitors and
persecutors, or .ould-be perseouters, cannot claim religious
inmmity. Here again v;e see
Burke as the hard-headed realist
unwilling to endanger the
community in the nar.e of even his
most valued principles.

m

There is one group in society that
by its very existence
is a nionaco to all order and virtue
ceive

sjid whJ.ch

Che slightest shred of toleration.

atheists.

mistakable •

is never to re-

This group is the

The loathing and hatred of Burke for
atheism is unTn his ST^cech For the Pelief Of Protostont
Diss-

ejitors, which is in large measure a paean
to the virtues of

religious liberty, atheists are referred to as "outlaws.
. .of

——

'Burke, Spooch On... a Petition Of the Unitarian
—
—

————— —

in Burko »s IVorkc, ^711,

r.'ocLotv,>
I

II

Che nu.an racC..

..g.eat

^inl.tc. or .arknose in

the

..,oria

„ho

ondoavorlns to s.a.e off all
the .or.= of God
ostabliched
in oMcr and beaut,",
and „en v,ho "are never,
never
a:-e

to be aupp.

orted. never to be tolerated. "3
^^^^

1'73. almost twenty years before
Eurke

v,as

^^^^^^^^

to vdtness the full

effects Of revolutionary
atheism, but not before
he had visited
Paris, conversed with so.e
of her leading intellectuals,
and
come to a shocked realization
of the meaning of
revolutionary
atheism. The reason, for Burkes violent hatred toward
atheism
were f.vo in nu.ber.
First, religion v,as such
an integral part
Of Burke's whole life that
the disavowal of
the existence of

God could not but fill hi.

„.ath

horror and the belief that the

holder Of such a doctrine
was alr.ost irremediably
evil. It
v.-ould be impossible
to over-estimate the
depth or sincerity
Of this gut reaction.
Second, Burke saw the state as
religious
to its foundations, which
vrould make one denying the
existence
of God a political revolutionary,
whether he desired to be one
or not. The atheist was an enemy
of morality by the very nature
of his creed, and was an enemy of
civil peace because of the

unavoidable tendency of atheism to attack
the very basis of
the social order.

Burke's hatred of atheism was, therefore,

both ideological and practical.
It can be seen from what has been said that
Burke saw

church and state as separable concepts, though
the two would
g

Burke, Relief Of FrotcGtant Dissenters , in
Burke's Tories,

VII, 36-37.

oru-n

-oe

inte^inelea. as in

,

^^^^^^^^

Church an. .tate are
,oinoa. which .a. he
henericial a^
an e^roosion or the
religious character of
the state, historical tradition ,,in
dictate .^^ch or the
tv.-o i. to he
predominant. In the case of
.ngland, Burke saw the
^V^on

.articu^ a.

ootamshed

Church as subordinate to
the state, possihly
hocauhe relt rolisious liherty
to he „ore secure in
this situation
than in the opposite arrangement.
Though church and state
are
distinguishable, religion and the
state are not.
Burke feels
that a true alliance of
equals hef.een church and
state is
impossible, as one must
predominate, but v,hen the state
has
predominance over the church, it
is not a case of a secular
state controllins a church;
in Christianity, religion
and the
state are one, and the laity
(including the nagistrates)
as
an equal part of the church,
have a share in its government
and must care most of all for
the needs of religion.' The
Protestant aspects of the foregoing
statement are unmistakable.
This unification of religion
and ohe state nay «oll derive from
Burke's early studies of Aquinas,
for the latter declares that
"Every human law has just so much
of the nature of las as it
is derived from the lav, of nature",
which is. of course, a religious concept to Aquinas. '° The
similarity of thought is
,

9

Burke, Petition Of

Works, VII,
^^The^

tlio

Unitarian Socioby

.

in Burke g
'

2|3,

Political Ideas Of Saint Thomas Aquinas

Dlno Bigongiari (Hew York: Hafner,
1965), p. 53.

,

ed. by

rather striding. ,3 both
Burke and Aqulnac clearly
bollovc In
sanctified states.
Burke tended to think of
the unity of religion
and the
state in a v:ay favorable to
liberty. Fi^st, the fact
that the
state .as a sanctified
institution did not .alee it
above criticis.. In a larger sense, the
very religious significance
of
the state deepened its
responsibilities to liberty, as
it .as
to be conducted as an
institution worthy of God.

sideration was that the state

v;as

A second con-

to act against persecutors,

and certainly never er.brace
persecution itself, persecution
being Viewed by Burke as an
anti-religious act. Despite the
vraj in which religion is
used by Burke, the very idea
of a
sanctified state has certain results
chilling to liberty. At
the very outset, a sanctified
state will, as Burke realized,

probably necessitate a state church.

Even if all other religior

are treated with toleration
("toleration" being in itself a

term wonderfully expressive of the
anomalous position occupied
by a non-conformist religion in
a land witr. a state church),

they are still the "dissenting"
religions.

The social, pressure

to conform to the dominant
church can be very considerable,

even in the absence of any overt discrimination
or persecution.

Moreover, discrimination or persecution may
be unavoidable in
a state with a douiinant or established church,
for he who does
no t adhere to it is by that very act out of
step with the nation

and very possibly looked on, therefore, as unpatriotic.

The

extent to .Hich
Burke, .ho, it

ua.

.u^-t

1« so is .ado evident

. ,.otation
fro.

bo remembered, put

political career
on the lino for religious
toleration for Catholics
and Je>,s.

the Bastille for thos;
"'""'^
nho da^e ?o lSe?1,
France. In tliis spiritual
°^
reS^eat ^ct
lord George Gordor.; a convert to
kd^s--l ?'na°n * r'""''"
there meaitate on his Talnud
nnt-ii hfT^
^
beconlng his birth and part- ^nd n^^
diagraceiul
the ancient r-l-' .^i
to
°^
.--"-l^^^
or until'sLe JeisSns
frryourVthf FrJnc^l^ ^
water, to Please your
nev/Hrbre„^S;e
h":"^ snail
'^--^'^^xen,
TAlLn""
ransom
hin. He rnav thf^r. ho ono-xT^^
vdth
the old boards
of the syrSorue^and Tloll ^^f-^^^^^e
compound int°rp!t o? ?J f^-^^f^^^ poundage on the long

f

=

4.

a^-r;iir-^d .fr^.rp-tL^-rL^^^^^^
Even with the testimony of
his fight for religious
toleration
and his state,.ont that Gordon
should act in a way v;orthy of
his religion, it nust be said
that this quotation by Burke
sho.s
a clear strain of xenophobia
and of at least some anti-semitism
as v;ell.

Furtherrnoro

,

statements of a similar anti-semitic

nature appe,ar in other places in the
Reflections

,

though Uioy

are, fortunately, entirely absent
from his other v/ritings.
If, hov/ever, such a good and noble
spirit as Burke can give
v/ay to

these ideas (v;hich may bo, to no small
extent, connected

v/ith the

atmosphere created by an established church) under

the pressure of events, v;hat could one
expect from a less ;vorthy

individual?

The penchant for discrimination exists in all men

at all times, but an established church,
v/hatever its favorable

Burke, Reflections On the Revolution In Franco,
pp. 95-96,

results. p„-oa-oly does
..oh to bring out this
trait,
."s
therefore. austifiaWe to
as. whether BurKCs
goal or a J,,,
religious state «lth an
established church, but
,^thout di=cri„.
ination, j.s even possible.
I>3spite its results in
practice, there is little
reason

to doubt that Burke intended
the association of
religion with
the state to be one favorable
to liberty.
Religion is, first,
to be a Check upon the
actions of the state and its
governors!

Burke^s state .as a Christian
state, and was to act as
such,
in the best sense of the word
"Christian." Due to the Western
religious idea of the moral
equality of
all .en, no subject

of the state is to be outside
the sphere of its concern
and
solicitude. Religion is favorable
to liberty in .ore ways
than
this. Liberty requires an advanced
and cultured civilization,
and Burke believes such a civilization
is necessarily religious.
There is one basic reason v/hy religion
and civilization are

associated: only religion is truly capable
of disciplining and
controlling the base instincts of marJcind,
as was the case after
the fall of the Roman Rnpire

,

v/hen the

Catholic Church succeeded

in turning tribes of marauding barbarians
on horseback into
Cin Burke »s view) gentle and chivalrous knights.

This is one

reason why Burke never supports toleration for atheists:
he
cannot think of them as other than irremediably uncivD.lized

people, and hence dangers to the community.
1

2

There is no doubt

MacCunn, The Political Philosophy Of Burke

.

pp.

122-124.

?31

that the actions of the
French atheiots

cemented hi. ,n thi. .elief.
for several reasons.

Fxrst,
Fire.-!-

,789 and afterward,

Libert, i. connected
1tv^>,+.
liberty

>.^th

can exist only

religion

m

a civilized
state, .hich Cas was seen)
to Burke .eans a
religious state.
A strong, possibly despotic,
hand would be necessary
to control
a depraved and wild populace,
but by ennobling the
entire pepulation, religion makes it
fit for liberty.
Religion, Turther-re, instills in the great of
the society a sense of
the heavy
responsibility under which they
labor, and helps to curb
"the
3tench Of their arrogance and
presumption."13
^^^^
ment may serve as a further
refutation of any belief that
Burke
was a blind ad.ircr of the
aristocracy. Religion, and
especially
an established church, also
raise the sense of dignity of
even
the poorest man in the community,
by allo^.rlng him to identify
with the ponp of a r.agnificent
institution of which he is a

valued member.

Burke recognized that an entire society
could

be

cne extent that all of its members
were seen

free only to

as having personal worth, and Burke
felt an established church
to be conducive to this attitude.

This is an example of the

pitfall into which Burke sometimes falls
when he treats the

British experience as universal.

Though the British established

church may have had this happy tendency to treat all
men as

morally equal, there is no reason why an established
church
woul.d have to have this benign effect,

as Burke, being acquainted

^-^Burko, Reflections On the Pcvolution Tn France

,

p.

1

iG.

With the affairs of India,
should have realised.
One of th.
sroatost ways in „hich
religion servos li.ert.
is
promoting
order. ..^oh Bur.e sees
as a pri.e necessity
for liberty.
Only
a religious consciousness
can appreciate the
significance and
continuity of national life,
and thereby hold the
nation together.
It ha. already been seen
that Burke prefers to
deal ..,1th liberty
.Ithln a concrete social
context, which necessarily

i.pUes

the existence of the nation.

He who sees the Hand
of God in

the history and traditions
of the state will be
hesitant about

promoting changes and innovations
destructive of civil peace,
'
and henco of liberty. Hero
again the British experience
is
treated as universal, vath
unacceptable results. The traditions
or Britain since Magna Cl.arta

v.ere

favorable to limited governnent

and liberty; religious consecration
of these traditions could
only be to the credit of
liberty, but in many or m.ost
countries
the national traditions
were (and are) distinctly hostile
to
liberty. Religious consecration
of such traditions could only
be destructive of both liberty
and religion.
Burke did not
seem to be aware that this was
one of the causes of the French
revolutionary attack or. religion in France,
Religion in the
form Of a financially-independent
established church is also
seen by Burke as serving the function
of Aristotle's middle
class, that of an intermediary between
upper and lower classes
(Burke Is ambivalent toward the middle class
itself, seeing
it as a source of much wisdom, and yet
recognizing its predominant

role in the French Revolution.).

The church is to be independent

Of both arxs.ocra=,

people.

at tyrann. fro. either
quarter.

to .0 able to re,u,o

attests

It is true that
this role Burke

asolsn. to the church, that of
the guardian of civil
.eace ani
Of the liberty of all the
people of the state, is
possible,
as it has bee. performed
at „any ti.es in
history, fro. the

ti.e Of the Bible to the
present.

There are certain conditions

inseparable from a state church,
however, that nilltate
against
a Ions continuation of this
buffering
function.

As 3urk<

him-

self realized, a state church
must be ,ealthy in order t<
'0 have
the respect of the aristocracy,
this respect being necessary
for the church to be able to
perform its sacramental functions
toward the aristocrats, and, if
need be, to command thorn. A

poor church vdll not have the
respect of the v;ealthy.
necessity of the church to be

This

..ealthy vdll, often enough,
give

Churchmen the temptation to act In
ways conducive to wealth.
This would, of course, fatally
compromise the church in the
eyes of all. Including the wealthy.

The status of the church

as an Institution vdth great power in
the state would also cause

many members of the aristocracy to enter
the priesthood, especially
since the requirements of primogeniture
would bar the role of

landed gentry to all but the eldest sons of the
aristocrats,
thereby requiring all younger aristocrats to
search out some
respectable alternative means of livelihood.

It need hardly

be stressed that the average higher clergyman
would not be

likely to be too strict toward that class

vjith

which he was

associated by ties of kinship.

The church itself could
not,

in 30.0 cases, function
as an integrated body,
for Just as its
upper echelons .ould be composed
of the offspring of
aristocrat,
so its lo.er echelons
would be .ade up of somewhat
lo.er elc.enl
Of society, which would tend
to favor their social
equals.
This div-isiveness within the
church could seriously,
perhaps
fatally, weaken it as a device
for upholding the liberty
of
all, for different parts of
the church would strike
harshly
at the tyrannical designs of
some classes (or at their
struggles
for liberty), while ignoring
the depredations of other
classes.
This pulling in opposite directions
by parts of the church could
result in its paralysis as a
socially- significant institution,
unless the top hierarchy succeeded
in coi^anding its lower
echelons, in which case the church
would usually be an agency
for the preservation of the tyranny
of the aristocracy and not
for the preservation of the liberty
of all. It is likely that
Burke »s ideal of a strong and
socially-independent established

church acting to uphold both liberty and
order would
be honored in the breach than in the
reality.

.-nore

often

Whatever the

practical effects of a state church upon liberty,
however, there
is no reason to doubt that Burke intended
it
to be a chief

guarantor of liberty and moral equality.
B.

Church and State In Maistre»s Pliilosophy.

It has already

been seen that the relationship between Maistre»s
church and

his state is that of total subordination of the latter to the

fcr^er.

Tn. st.te .ay ao
whatevo. it „ls.es. 30
,o„g .3 t.e
Church .oe. „ot disapprove.
TMs. or course, robs U,e
state
Of all true independence,
all the nore so because
the local
church is SUbiGC-!-y-y
jcc, fir.t
f i r-^f of
rsf^
all.
to a supranational
eartiily
authority. The Catholic
Church is "the best and
.ost .errect
or sovern,nents"'^; nn^er
such conditions all other
governments
must yield to it, and by
"the Catholic Church",
Kaistre never
±.

»eans a national Catholic
Church, which could be
subject to
effective state control.
Beyond this subordination of
state
to Church,

the relationship or the

t>vo

is one or alliance.

State and church are to work
together to maintain an orderly
and Christian civilization.
Maistre does not call ror a
complete absorption of state by
church, because under the
dictate
or the doctrine of the two
swords, the church may not use
mill
force or carry out the death
penalty. Such actions are barred
to a wholly spiritual
authority like the church. The
relation
of religion and the church
to liberty is ambiguous in
Maistr..
The church does basically stand
ror the preservation of che

existing order, but not ror just any existing
order, irresp>>ct:

of its attributes.

Protestant or atheistic countries can cer-

tainly never have the blessings or the church.

Gallioanism

is also anathema to Maistre, though he himseir rilrtod
it in

Ms
'

P»

13?..

younger days.

ivlth

Even a suitably Ultramontane Catholic

Vaistre, The Po^e, in Lively, Works Of Joseph

De Kaistre

.t.te ..St „eet certain
requirements Ir it is to
got the sanct^'on
Of the ohurch. It .ust
adhere to its customary
tradition, and
corporate privileges, must be
based
oasea on the
tbP rule
t^mt
oi law (especially
.dth resard to matters of
crinanal Justice), and must
per.it
the people to denounce
abuses through a popular
assembly vdth
a narrov, franchise (if such
Is part of its traditions) . '5
This
Shows ^faistre.s church not to
he entirely indifferent
or hostile
to the cause of liberty.
Such liberties as are
traditional
and corporate in nature have
the church as a zealous
guardian.
This, however, leaves much to
bo desired on the subject
of liberty,
for Maistre sees -.bcrty
a^. r^o^.-;
^ 'Tbnrtv ao
derivmg
essence from inheritence
stretching back to the divine
creation of the state.
Several
considerations derive from this.
First, since pedigree is the
primary consideration in the value of
a liberty (being synonymous
;vith its Godliness), no one
has the right to judge the social
usefulness of such a liberty. This is,
in a way, absolutely

m

libertarian, as it malces such rights
perfectly inalienable.
Tliat, however,

aligns the church firmly vath the liberties
of

both ki.ng and aristocracy (both collectively
and in opposition
to each other and the people), but by
making these rights so

absolute, it creates a situation in which these may
well become

oppressive to the liberty of the bulk of the population,
for
one man's perfect freedom can only be bought by the
perfect

Maistre, Study On Sovereignty
De

Kaislre

.

pp.

and 117-119.

,

in Lively, Works Of Joseph

237

unrreedo. of others.

The Philosophe-U.e
tendencies or Maistro
are again evident in his
willingness to treat certain
rights
Of certain people as
absolutes, irrespective of
consequences.
The Church will support
for the average .an
(at best) a benevolont despotism, for. v.lth
the exception of the right
to rep-

resentation in a purely advisory
council, the b.ak of the
population has no rights which the
church vd.ll enforce, due to
the fact that the average man
was absent when rights were
being
handed out. Maistre is, moreover,
absolutely adamant on the
point that written laws can create
no rights not existing in
a nation's natural constitution,
which, considering the changelessness of customs (in Maistre's view),
freezes legally-protected
liberty into the position of a
prerogative of the favored classes. 16
It need not even be stressed
that vdthin the church itself
the
average layman's position was that
of absolute submission to

authority.

The church also does not function
as a protector

of the lihorty

liberty

iri

o.f

individuals, for Maistre does not think of

terms of individuals.

Such rights and responsibilities

as one has derive from his family, his
class, or some corpor-

ation to wnich he may belong, but not from
himself.

Man as

man has no liberties which the church will
protect or the state
must respect.

Maistre positively denies that there are rights

of men, quite in contrast to Burke, who quarreled

\n.th

Jacobinism

about their content.
^^Maistro, Considerations On France

Of Joscrjh De Maistre

,

p. 73.

,

in Lively, Work s

A

?

A derivative of the
fact that Malatre.
i„ contrast to
Burke. 3003 church a3
superior to state. i=
that freodo. of
relxgion is not counted by
f.aistre as a ri^ht
te be defended.
This follows necessarily
fro. the facts that
a state cannot
be subordinate to several
churches and that the
Catholic Caurch
is (in Halstre.s estimation)
clearly the superior of
all other
relieions. Just .hat the
position of other relleions
is to
be in Haistre.s Catholic
state is never made clear,
but conversion by the s™rd is eschewed.
This is because '^here is
not and even cannot be an ont-i r.«-»
t
17
GnLirea.y false
religion,"'^
That
is based on c.e belief in
man^s uncreativenoss, .hich
in this
case neans all religions are
God-created, and hence deserving
Of some respect.
It aould be acting
against God to seek to
eradicate all religionc but the
crue" one by force, though
-,r

^-

-.

.

.

.=

discussion and argu..ent are to be
used to bring all back to
the Church. Force n-ay be
used by the Catholic Ciaurch only
to
defend itself against the assaults
of other religions, but what
constitutes an assault can be difficult
to define, as Kaistre
himself learned v;horr ho got in trouble
in Russia for the charge
of causing the conversion to Catholicism
of subjects of the
czar* A proselytizing religion is likely
to see the conversion
of one of its members as an attack upon
it.
The relationship
airtong

religions is no neat coherent package in Maistrc»s
theory.
17

^^^^^^"» Anli.^htonmont On Sacrifices

Of Josorh Do M gist re . p. 297.

,

in Lively,

\yor!-s

one religion is cloarl,
superior to all ot.er=
an. Has t.e state
at Its oor^and, but
.ust forebear the
tenptatlon to conv»>-t

people at t.e point of the
sv.ord; raiding the
ne.bershlp of
the less true religions
by rational argument
is. ho,,over. ,er..issiblo.

it is right to seek to
undo God's ,vork (v.ach
all religions are)
,,on-violently. but not violently,
is a real
puzzle. A me.ber of a dissenting
religion in Kelstre-s state
is in a highly uncertain
position. He has no Irrefutable
right
to practice his faith, for
to countenance such a
right v,ould
bo to sanction error, but
neither muct he fear for his
life
(nor. presumably, fear unequal
trea.^ent) if he wishes to adhere
to his faith.
At the sa<ne tine, all the
forces of church and

society

..my

.,111 be

to Catholis.,,.

brought to bear to secure "voluntary"
conversion
It goes v.-ithout saying that
this social pressure,

and the social stig-aa attached to
dissenting

froia ivhat

is more

a church state than a state church,
ivould, despite Maistre's

sincere assurances to the contrary,
constitute repression and
make persecution essentially inevitable.
This is despite the
fact that the state ought to have
a moral responsibility to

safeguard all peoples from religious persecution,
since, to
repeat, all religions are the work of Sod.
The tension in Maistr
thought between libertarianlsm and authoritarianism
is again
evident.

De facto religious toleration is taken
as the proper

relationsidp bctiveen the religions in a state, and
then condition
are. vattlngly or unwittingly, established that
make religious

toleration i.po.si.le.

I„ the final .naly.l.,
authcitarianl sm
out.
A. a loyal .on or
Mo c.urch. Maistre
unvdlu.-ng
to accept a religious
settlement that ,ri.lX give
per.anonco to
the enemion of h*"
s f^^lth
n-s
laitn f(.or he perceives
tho=.. to be such).
It can be seen from this
chapter that Buri.e and
Malatre
arc poles apart on the
arrangements they fa.or betv.-een
church
and state and ar.
are very
vprv slgnifxcantly
o-n-i -r- ^
^a-i
-.-r.^
different in their attitude
toward freedom of religion.
As ought to be expected
from the
fs-\

basic configurations of their
thought. Malstre Is inclined to
be hostile toward religious
pluralism and Burke is inclined
to be favorable toward
it.

As has been shovm, hov,ever,
the

fact that both men uphold
a state church renders
religious

liberty rather tenuous in both
of their theories, though
so ivith Maistre than v;ith
Burke.

.„ore

Chapter VII: The Theory Of
War and Empire
A.

Burke's Beliefs About War.

It must be said at
the

outset that Burke.
s theory is not the best of places
to look if
one Wishes a full-dress
exposition of the concept of
war.
This
is true because it was not in
the style of the mature

Burke to
sit down and write an organized
philosophical treatise. Consequently, it becomes necessary
to search throughout
Burke's writings for those moments when he
touches on this subject, and one

must Often resort to interpretation.
not a friend of standing armies.

It is a fact that Burke
was

As was good Tnig doctrine,
he

saw them as inevitably fatal
to a country's liberty,
and for that
reason rejoiced in the defeat of
the British in the American
Pevolution, because he felt that
British success would have required
the establishment of a large
standing army to hold down the disgruntled Americans, with all of the
many unpleasant consequences
this would have had for England.^
Such should not, however,
be interpreted as saying Burke
was any sort of pacifist.

He,

first of all, openly declared the
right of one nation to intervene in the affairs of another, under
certain conditions. Since

there can be no such thing as an entirely
domestic enactment,

because what happens in one state necessarily affects
others,
a new practice in a state, if it is deemed by that
state's

^Burke, Appeal From the New To the Old mir.s

,

p.

ifO.

noishbors to bo harmful to
the., .ay be put dov^
by force of
arms.
It can be seen that
war is a per_nlsslblo
2
response to
a nation that thro.s off
the yoke of morality and
plots evil
asainst her neighbors, or permits
the continuation of
practices
laarmful to the... ,,hich has
the sa..e result.
Burke articulated
this la.t concept under great
stress, soeklne to n,ake the
.oral
case for v,ar v,dth revolutionary
France as strong as possible.
This is ,vhy he -.vent really
further than he would have
vrtshed
and er.braced a point of view
that would tend to justify
war
under any and all conditions.
Eurke-s nore basic attitude
tovard what constituted a proper
justification for war was
somewhat more li.ated.
duty) to undertake

wai-

A state had a right (and
probably a

not for the sake of plunder,
but "for

the sake of our fsiiily, for our
friends, for our God. for our
country, for our :dnd."-^ A truly
offensive war ..as, therefore,

unacceptable.

Tkis is surely a broad enough definition
of what

constitutes a just

wai-,

but 3urke probably realized that with

good faith ajnong nations payer restrictions
on the right of
war mould bo unnecessary, and without
good faith such restrictions would be unavailing.

Burke was one of the first in England

to realize that peace with Jacobin France
was impossible, since

it ecbraccd as an article of faith its duty
to subvert all other
2

Burke

,

First Letter On the nagicidj Peace

Works, 7, 320-323.

Ibid.

,

p. 305.

,

in Burke's

3

statos. and therefore had
to totally triumph or
be totally destroyed.
A war to the death
between .ystemo could,
therefore,
bo just.

Fortunately, such Armageddon-like
wars are the exception
rather than the rule.
reference to the war with
revolutionary
France, Burke says that peace
is not possible, since the
v.ar
is over systems of government,
not objects.
This clearly
implies a normal offensive war to
be limited in its goal, concorning, in all likelihood, some
one disputed city or province,
and thereby subject to mediation,
or at least

^

not unlim.ited

in its consequences.

There is still another kind of

v;ar,

one

fought for the defense of the existence
of a family of nation
states. In hAs Speech On the Arn^ ^^stimatos
(given on February
9, 1790, before the Jacobin armies began the
forcible export
of their creed). Burke argued against
a larger military budget,

saying chat such
of pov/er.^

v;as

not needed for the defense of the
balance

There is no doubt that Burke recognized the
advan-

tages for Britain of a European power balance,
since Britain
was the balancer, but the fact that Burke
supported national

autonomy as a laudable goal (even to the extent of
having once

supported Corsican independence), shows that his support
of
'Burke
Worths,

V,

,

Second Letter On

tlie

Pegicide Peace

,

in Burlie

'

3/1,3.

^Burke, STPcech On the
III, 21i+-2-!5.

Amy

I^stimates , in Burlap s
'

'.'/orks,

»

a balance of po-.vor was
not

meanly motivated.

The pov,er bala
-ance
vas to b= maintained because
the national pluralism
it supported
was good and worthy of support
It is now worthwhile to
ponder the philosophical
content

Of Eurke.s cheory of war,
and its relationship to the
rest of
his theory. It was seen that
Eurke is hostile to the
idea of
war, due to the ^litarization
of society, and consequent
loss

Of liberty, that it can engender.

There are, however, no en-

thusiastic schemes for the abolition
of war to be found in Burke.
Seeing .an to be what he is. Burke
knows the less pleasant parts
of the huraan personality will
lead to war, but this is a fact
to be accepted, not applauded.

There would be no wars if

t'
;ne

world were what it ought to be, but
Burke is v/riting for th€
ae
real world, and that is a world that
contains wars. Wars can
even be legitirna-ce

,

as was the war against Jacobinism,
which

Burke urged on his countr.ymon vath great
zeal, but such wars
are to be fought only to preserve the
rights and independence

of one»s nation

an;^

its friends and the religious bases of

European civilization.
not be fought for

just.

ir.oro

'.Vithin

the European context, a war may

aggrandizement and be considered to be

It vrill bo seen later in this chapter that
rules varied

somewhat outside of Europe.

As is the case in the rest of his

theory, Eurke in his treatment of war takes man as he is, and

seeks to place him vathin an environment that will limit his
base instincts as much as possible.

In this regard, that means

,

xn^tiUin,
that wars

ia,„ or a co^on .uropc,^
olvlUzation .0
be United in nu.bor
an.,
t.oy occur,

.lU

a„V
m

r-ocit,.
^^^^

Of nations

v,ill .0

^^^^^^^

^^^^^^^^^^

a. littlo threatono*

.-ar ao i= nocccsary.
B. BurUc... Viov; Of
the Proper Domestic
CUn.ato In '.Var.

Burko.s ideas ac to ho» the
citizenry should act during
a

were, one »ust ad.it,
influonced by .Aether he
believed
the particular .ar -.vas
Juot or unjust.
In regard to Ar.erica,
v,.ar

Bur:.o

declared that the war's
supporters called for unanimity
in its prosecution, but
that a nation ought not to
be unanimous
in irrationality.^ L^st it
be thought that Bur!«
embraced the
concept that business as usual
should continue during a v.ar,
his «ords and actions vAth
regard to the war against the
French
in the ,790>s must nov, be
examined. In this latter case,
Burke
declares that ,ar cannot be "long
carried out against the will
of the people" and that the
present uar requires the
zeal of

the majority; he bitterly denounces
the British govermr.ent for
not awakening the zeal and perseyerorxo
of the nation for what
would be a long ,var.^ Burke was rilling
to use all the instruments of criminal justice, including
a partial suspension of
habeas corpus, against those who wore
aiding the cause of Jacob-

Burko , A Letter

^

^^"-^^^^
Burke *s

li2£

'.VorkG

,

1

To^

John Fnrr and John

£itv Of BriGUOl
,

2

,

Ilarrir.

On tho Affaire Of

.

F.cqr:;

Ai::eri.ca

. ,

in

.

]

n

'Burke, First Letter On
VforkG

,

V,

233 and 2;2.

t^ie

Regicide Peace, in Purke

'

s

xn.s., and engaged in
a type of bitter, and
often hysterical
Vituperation that allowed his
opponents to picture hi. as
a
dyed in the .ool reactionary.
One should not thinl.
that there
.as any essential conflict
between Burke^s behavior in
theso
t.o .arc. The defining
characteristic in each was his
devotion
to liberty, and to the
requirements necessary for liberty.
In the .^.erican case, Burke
was convinced Britain .as
pursuing
an insane policy v;hich, if
victorious, ,vould doom the
freedom
Of both Britain and A:.erica.
An upholder of liberty,
therefore,
was .orally bound to do everything
in his po.er, including adhere to his governr.ent s enemies
(a possibility Burke briefly
considered), to crush the designs of
King George III and Lord
Korth. There v;as surely no requirement
to unite behind tlie
^

^

•

cause Of tyranny,

in the case of the

v;ar

against France, how-

ever, the conflict concerned a drive
to strike

do^^vn

the enemies

of ci'/ilization and religion, both
of which are necessary, as
has been seen, for liberty. One who did
not give his full efforts
to the cause in Uils latter war,
or who allied 'vith the other

side, could not but be deemed an enemy
of licerty, and be pun-

ishable as such,

irnity was, therefore, morally obligatory
in

a just vrar, and morally reprehensible in
an unjust one.
C. The Imperialism Of Edmund Burke.

It would have been

rather strange for a leading British politician of
the eighteenth
century to assume an anti-imperialist stance, and this
Burke
did not do.

Burke was indeed an imperialist, but, as will be

seen, an imperialist of
a so.ewhat enli.htoned
variety. The
very fact of his imperialism,
however, .eant that Burke
did
net grant to non-European
nations that
fro. total conquest which he granted to
European ones. Burke believed,
first
Of all, that the British
Enpire v;as not a case of
.ere conquest,
as it woald have been if
Britain conquered France;
Providence
(vdth a capital "P") had
granted the Enpire to Britain.^
Thi.s

i^ity

God-given right of Britain to rule
the Empire carried with
it
the responsibility to do so
for the sake of the people
ruled^
and in a way conforr.able to
the traditions

of the colony; this

latter point is shovm by the fact
that Burke declares an Indian
native ruler should have "a good
education, conformable to the
ir^axims

of his religion and the manners
of his people. "^^

The

rimt

of the British Parliament to
exercise direct day-to-day
rule in the colo.ni3s is denied.
It is said by Burke that uany
of the problems oi India stemmed from
the fact that Parliament
thought it could issue decrees against
corruption from a dis-

tance of nine thousand miles, rather than
leaving the matter
to a native government which, though
subordinate to Britain

in both law and fact, would have the pc.ver
to carry out Britain's

general directives and provide for the prosperity
and well-being
Surke, Spooch On Conciliation

^IMd.,

'71 th

the Colonies

,

-n.

p. S7.

BurKo, ElevenLh Porort Of the Select Co -riittne 0^ the

House Of Commons On the Affairs Of India , in Burke's

^Vorks

,

VIII, 26 1.

^

2/+8

India. p..,,e.n

Bur.e decUr.d .is idea
of the ..pire
to be that or a
federation of states having
local privileges
under a co..on headJ^
The true independence
of the states
in the Empire is not,
however, permissible.
Bur.e did not even
Offer ^.erica full de
Jure internal self-govern.ent
until her
war for independence was
already under way, and that
offer «ust
be seen as a departure
from his ideas of proper
colonial administration designed to save
America for Britain at the
eleventh
hour.
All colonies, from the most
advanced to the most primitive, may have a local
government designed to implement
Parliament's dictates in the most
moderate fashion and to promote
the economic development of
the country, but they may
not have
independence, '^at Britain may get
from her colonies is economic
wealth, to the extent it can be
gained from improving, and not
degrading, the economic conditions
of the local countries, and
allies in war, which will come from
uniting the Empire through
bonds of common interest and sympathy.
It must be said that Burke's
imperialism is a mixture
of libertarianism and authoritarianism.

There is, as was seen

in chapter three, a Natural Law which
is as valid in Benares as
it is in Bristol.

Men everywhere have a right to a government

that looks out for their interests and
seeks to promote their
^

^Burke, N[inth Peport Of the Select Committee Of
the House

Of Commons
82,

Oja

the Affairs Of India, in Burke's Works

.

VIII

165, and
1

2-

Burke,, Speech On Conciliation With the Colonies

,

pp. 8^-83^

happiness.

The existence of universal
principles of good government does not, however,
stand as a justification
for the
existence of one unitary
government for the Empire.
Unlike
some other imperialists.
Burke realizes the Empire
is not one
nation. Charleston cannot be
governed as one would govern
Canterbury, and Calcutta cannot be
governed as one would govern
Charleston. This leads to a recognition
by Burke of the legitimacy of local customs and
sensitivities, which he (often
incorrectly) believes must be
reconciliable with the Natural
Law. anyway.
At a certain point, however,
the reins of empire
become pulled tight. Though Parliament
is to exercise only
a general supervisory authority
over the individual states of

the Empire, this authority is never
renounced (save, as noted
above, in the pragmatic attempt to douse
the already out of

control fires of the ^erican devolution).

That this renun-

ciation was contrary to the general temper of
Burke's philos-

ophy of empire is shown by his reaction to the
passage by the

Parliament of Ireland of a tax on the estates of absentee
landowners (who resided chiefly in Britain).

Burke declares that

a "superintending authority" is needed for the Empire,
and that

by "the very nature of things, and the joint consent of
the

whole body", it was proper that imperial legislation should

originate in England.

When

thj.s

"joint consent" was given

is, of course, a good question, but it is clear that Burke
may
^•^Burke, Letter On the Irish Absentee Tax , in Burke's

Works , VI, 12Zf-125.
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-t, except 1„
oi-

a .ost attenuated
sense, .e seen a. a
.u.porto.
the iaeas later to
cause the creation or
the British Co^on-

wealth or Nations.

The .„pire is or.ainea
or Ooa an. inseparaUe.
but ie not to be an
exploitative relationship.
It is a case
Of diversity within unity,
but unity nonetheless.
The colonies
»ay have all rights, except
that of independence.
D. Maistre.s Beliefs About

.,Var.

Maistre-s treatment of

the subject Of war begins
with a question Burke more
or less
neglected. Burke felt war to
be a disagreeable, but
natural,
part or hu^an existence. Maistre
is not so sure about the
naturalness of war. He is a
benevolent man (to the extent an
ideologue can be), and asks himseir
why man. who le blessed
with compassion, goes to rar -with
"a certain gladness" to kill
his brother."* Unlike Burke.
Maistre confesses openly that
the fact of war torments him.
He asks the basic questions or
.hy people (most certainly including
Maistre, as will be seen)

ascribe glory to the military, why
no nation seeks to break
out of the state of nature manirested
by war, and why. most

importantly, God has never allowed man
to attempt a "society
of nations."'^ T>,o,jgi it would seem
highly unlikely after this
introduction, Maistre answers these questions
in a way that

amounts to a nearly complete defense of war
under existing

%aistre, Seventh
''orks

Saint Petersburg Dialogue

Of Joseph De Maistre
15

.

Ibid ., pp. 248-249.

p.

245.

.

in Lively,

U

8

conditions.

Men admire soldiers because
they are unquestionably
worthy Of admiration,
possessing such qualities as
virtue, piety.
religion, pleasantness, courage,
and inability to be
hardened
even by "the terrifying sight
of carnase...'^ „en look up
to
soldiers because they are a
superior breed of men. It
appears
that Maletre has taken all of the
favorable legends of the noble
knights of the past and applied
them without diminution
to the

soldiers of his time.

As to

three distinct answers.

ivhy

there is war, Maistre gives

First, a "truly national

•,,ar".

one

for the establishment or preservation
of a nation, is completely
understandable.
Such wars are, however, few in
nu^^ber, and
certainly would never include, one nay
assume, a war to throw
off the authority of the Bishop of Rome.
Second, man often
goes to war because there is a "great
law of the spiritual

world" which dictates that all animals,
including men, should
kill one another.

It is safe to assume that man is in this

lamentable condition because of his Original Sin.

disobeyed the
lust.

ivill

Had man not

of God» he would not be stained by a blood

The final cause of war is when man acts as an
instrument

of God's justice; in such a situation "God comes
forward to

exact vengeance for the iniquity committed by the
inhabitants

Ibid ., pp. 250-25
^^Ibid., p. 246.
1

Ibid .

.

pp. 251-252.

Of this

«rld

against >^„..,19

^^^^ ^^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^

course, to cases such
as the war against the
Jacobins.
Not only does Halstre see
war as something r.an
deserves
for his evil, but he also
sees It as having beneficial
results
for manldnd.
He feels that a nation
reaches its height only
after a "long and bloody"
„ar. ,,hlch constitutes
"an invisible
hand. ..continually pruning"
the tree of the nation to
ensure
Virtue and genius. 2° It may be
assu!.ed that Maistre felt
God
used ,ar as a way of eliminating
the evil and the stupid.
How
he could have believed this
except as an act of blind faith
is, indeed, a real puzzle.
It may not necessarily be
the best

of the nation that die in war,
but it is not necessarily the
worst either*
E. Imperialism In Maistre 's Theory.

One does net find

in Maistre a treatment of imperialism
such as one finds in
Burke. So far as strictly political
authority

is concerned,

the principle of national sovereignty
is taken as inviolate.

This reaches the point of Maistre hailing the
victories of revolutionary France, seeing them as determined by
God to preserve

the territorial integrity of France against
the coalition of

allies which would have partitioned that country.

It has

Ibid., p. 25^.
20

Maistre, Considerations On France, in Uvely,
Works

Of Joseph De Maistre, pp. 62-63.

2U,

.

,

.

been seen, however,
that Maistre, in eiiect,
.mh.
" effect
embraces an imperlali.. far „ore .weeping
than that of Burke.
The „oral sway
Of the Papacy is. or
ought to be. entirely
universal in its
.cope. The political
leadership and the very
customs of all
societies are subject to the
authority of the Pape. To
Maistre
therefore, the world ought
to be one monolithic
Catholic e.pire.
despite the national sovereignty
he officially upholds.
It ,ould no, be well to
compare the contents of
these
two theorists- philosophies
of war and the relationship
they
have to the overall theories
of libertarlanism and
authoritarianism.
Burke, one may assume, does
not like war. but sees
It as an omnipresent and
unavoidable part of human existence,
and. therefore, does not make
his disapproval manifest. It
is simply
the nature of the human creature
to seek to get
'

m

his way through war. though
this trait can be somewhat moderated
by the belief that one shares
a common humanity with those
against
whom he is nghtlng. This comes down
to the belief that man
Is, as was seen in chapter two,
a most mixed creature to Burke,

but one that can, within certain limits,
act rationally and

fairly decently.

The question of war or peace is, moreover,

in the hands of man.

Burke does not seek to revolutionize the

environment man lives in, both because he takes It as
a given
•nd because he believes it to be one permitting a
reasonable

approximation of liberty.

Very few wars are inordinately de-

structive of order and national life, and man Is, in
the final

a human scale, and in
dealing with it Burke does
not see any
need to bring in philosophical

themes directly.

Maistre, however, expressly
brings in his central themes
Of evil and redemption when
dealing with war. Had man
not
sinned by disobeying hie Creator,
the corruption of man's
very
soul and the resulting v^ath
of God, which are the causes
of
war, would never have occurred.
Man is, however, responsible
for wars only in a secondary
fashion. Man's criminality led
to the establishment by God of
the institution of war (note
the ex^dence of man's simultaneous
power over God and. nonetheless, his uncroativeness), but
individual wars are by no

means any outcome of man's deliberation,
but are instead either
the results of the uncontrollable
animal-like qualities of fallen
man or are the results of God's

;vill

to destroy evil men.

For

Maistre, however, war need not exj.st,
and will surely pass away
when man ropents of his sins and subordinates
himself to God

and to God's authorities on earth.

The cure for the evil of

war, and all other evils, is acceptance of
a rigidly authoritarian

society.

Chapter VIIT: Theories
o^.
iheori.s o-p
Of r^
Class Structure
and Attitudes Toward
Social Mobility
The «ays in which BurRe
and Maistre treat clas«
structure
and social .oMllty are
indicative of their attitudes
toward
society and change in general.
These tv,o theorists lived
In
an age not only of
political revolution, but of
a sodal revolution that fueled the
political revolution.
Throughout Western
Europe, the middle class was
beg1.nnine to feel its strength
and demand at least equality
v;ith the historically
Privileged
classes, and incidents like the
Chartist Movement also bespoke
a stirring in the lower
classes.

No political theorist
could

afford to ignore these facts,
especially after the French Hevolution and the resulting world
war blasted them into unmistakable view.

To see how Burke and Maistre
vl.ewed these problems

and sought to cope with then is
the next order of business.
A.

Burke's Perceptions Of Class Structure.

As one might

expect from the general temper of
Burke's views on politics,
he felt the class structure of
a society to be rather complex.

At the top of the social structure was
the aristocracy, but
the aristocracy itself was divided into
two components: the

men of apparent merit and those of actual
merit.
it, contrasting himself »jith the

Dulte

As Burke put

of Bedford, a titled ad-

vocate of Jacobinism who opposed the
granting of a pension to

Bur'ce,

..I,

.erita, .hatever they are,
are original and personal:

his arc derivative...^

It .ust be stressed
that those of der-

ivative nerit, who are primarily
the titled aristocracy,
have
their rights to social and
political importance secured
by preccription and the right of property^,
even when they are ignorant
and obnoxious pipsqueaks like
Bedford.
Burke's actions showed
that he felt the top political
posts in the nation, certainly
including all cabinet positions, should
go
to

this class.

The

second echelon of the aristocracy,
which certainly also included
a number of titled aristocrats
(such as Lord Roc]d.ngharn, Burke's

patron and a man of great political ability),
is the one into
which Burke places himself and people
like him, commoners of
great political ability.

ITnat

the relationship is between the

commoners in this class and the class of
aristocrats of derivative
merit above them is never rendered perfectly
explicit in Burke's
theory.

It is clear that these gifted commoners
are to be ad-

visors, but are also to be more than advisors.

They are not

to issue recommendations that may be heeded
or not heeded, but

are to possess real power.

Though barred from the highest posts

in the land by the lack of titles, they are to have their
pos-

itions in government, and may (like Burke) even become important

officials of party and government.
is, however, required of them.
^

Submission to their betters

Burke always knew his place

Burke, A Letter To a rioble Lord, in Burke

^Ibid.

,

p.

209.

'

s

Works

,

V,

199-200.

in British society, and If
he ever aspired to a
cabinet post,
he never made this aspiration
manifest or attempted to achi
eve

it.

Below the untitled aristocrats
lie the middle class, amon
S
whom are the merchants. It would
appear from Burke's v^itings
that these men are not to be
members of
the government, oven

in subordinate posts.

Burke says of the French
Estates General

that the merchants vdthin it "had
never known anything beyond
their counting house, "3 thereby
implying this to be poor trainin
for the business of government.
Merchants are not, however,
entirely insignificant when it comes
to politics.
They may
have good ideas to give to the members
of government, and it

may even be

^;ri.8e

to solicit their opinions.^

Despite the con-

siderable wealth merchants nay have, the
liquidity of which

makes them "the most effectively rich and
great in society, "^

merchants as a class are to be both socially
and politically
subordinate to the classes above them.

A merchant

naturally

has a vested right to all that he possesses, as do
all men.

and may be a very intelligent fello;v, but the style of life
he leads denies him the time for reflection needed to
govern
a state.

As shall be seen later in this chapter, however, this

barring of merchants from membership in government does not
^B-jpi^e^

Reflections On

the_

Revolution In France

,

p.

Zf9.

^Burke, A Short Account Of a Late Short Adminir.tratlon
In Burke s Works
'
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.

I,

.

266.

Burke, Second Letter On the Regicide Peoco , in Burke's

Works , V, 330.
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neceBsarily extend to the sons of merchants.

Burke is ambiv-

alent about the position in society of
the lower classes.

At

one point he declares that "no class or
description of menis to bo excluded from county meetings
discussing the subject

of Parliamentary reform^, and yet at another
he quotes appro-

vingly Chapter Thirty-Eight, Verse Thirty-Three
of the book
of Ecclesiastes as follows.

They

(the common peopl^ shall not be sought for
in public
counsel, nor sit high in the congregation: they shall
not
sit on the judge's seat, nor understand the sentence
of
judgement; they cannot declare justice and judgement,
and
they shall not be found where parables are spoken.

The harshness of this latter quotation may be explained
by the

pressure Burke was under in attempting to eliminate the French

revolutionary philosophy, root and branch.

He probably did

not intend to shut out the lower classes from government quite
as totally as one would think from the foregoing.

The lower

classes are, nonetheless, subordinate members of society, due
to their intellectual and cultural inferiority.

Their role

in society is not to govern the state (which is the prerogative
of the two classes of aristocrats)

,

opinions on matters of government

(v/hich right belongs to the

nor even to express their

middle class), but to declare their unformed grievances.

This,

of course, means that the lower classes do have a real, though

strictly limited, role in the governing of the state; they are
^Burke

,

Letter On Parliamentary Reform

,

in Burke s Works ,
'

VI, 296.
7
'Burke, Quoted in Reflections On the Revolution In France

,

p.

%,

not merely hewers of v.ood and
drawers of water.

As will be

seen later, this, nonetheless, rather
lowly status is not unshal!:eably

passed down from generation to generation.

It has now been seen that what Burke
viewed as the proper

society is pyramidal in nature.

It has classes with varying

rights and responsibilities, and, by the nature
of things, these
classes become more populous as one descends the
pyramid.

All

individuals are, however, valued members of society
and have
a role in the governing of the state, for even
the limited right

of the lower classes to express their discontents is
important

for the functioning of government.

Moreover, the dividing lines

bet\veen the classes are not totally distinct, nor are
they impermeable
B. Social Mobility In Burke's Theory.

Burke is aware

of the fact that people are able to rise from one social class
to another.

This awareness stems from the fact that what Burke

advocates is essentially an aristocracy of talent, though a
noble title is taken to be presumptive evidence of talent.

Even the highest echelons of society are not barred to one of
common birth, for the power to ennoble a family alv/ays lay in
the hands of the king.

Without it ever being specifically stated,

it is a fair assumption that Burke believed there was a right

for a talented man to advance socially.

Burke himself purchased

a landed estate at Beaconsfield (going heavily into debt to
do so) and did not feel it presumptuous to hope that he and

his line would be ennobled for his services to the state.

This

s
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right of advancement does not, hov/ever,

co.r.e

automatically.

Those who are already in the top aristocracy
have a right to
set the rules for entry.
It is right that mobility

into the

pinnacle of society should he rendered very
difficult; Burke
says vdthout self-pity that he was forced to
present his cred-

entials at many places along the road and that
he was not "swaddled and rocked and dandled into a legislator."^
It was right

and proper that it should have been so, but once
a man has passed
all the tests, his right to a title ought not to
be questioned.
One of the few criticisms Burke has of the French
aristocracy follows.

Those of the commons who approached to or exceeded the
nobility
in point of wealth were not fully admitted to the ranlc
and estimation which wealth, in reason and good policy,
ought to bestow in every country, though I think not equally
^.-ith that of other nobility.
The two kinds of aristocracy
\that of title ?.nd that of talent) were too punctiliously
kept asunder.?
^

This

v/as

objectionable both for the injustice of it and because

it turned the most important potential allies of the tiled aris-

tocrats into their bitterest enemies.

This is not the proper

situation.

Everything ought to be open, but not indifferently, to every
man.
do not hesitate to say that the road to eminence
and power, from obscure condition, ought not to be made
too easy, nor a thing too much of course. If rare merit
be the rarest of all rare things, it ought to pass through
some sort of probation. The temple of honor ought to be
seated on an eminence. If it be opened through virtue,
Q

Burke, Letter To a Moble Lord
9

,

in Burke

'

7/orks,

V,

Burke, Reflections On the Revolution In France, p„

193.

159.

let it be rejTiembered, too, that ^n.rtue
is never tried but
by some difficulty and some struggle. 10
It was necessary to give this fairly long
quotation so that

the full flavor of Burke »s ideas might be
transmitted.

One

may assume that passage from the lower classes
into the middle
class is simpler than passage into the aristocracies,
both because

less talent is required, being primarily financial
in nature,
and because the gate-keepers do not compose such
a formidable

guild.
One problem of social mobility Burke does not consider
is that of downward mobility.

It has already been seen that,

in regard to Bedford, he declares the position of the titled

aristocrats to be inviolate.

This is despite the fact that

he realizes Bedford hardly has the intelligence or character

which would properly place him in the nation's governing elite,
if, indeed, his ennobled ancestor did, having received his title

for being a syncophant of King Henry VIII.

The fact that Burke

always supported the custom of primogeniture^^

^neans that those

fandlies which have once ascended into the ruling class probably
will not fall out again.

A certain amount of social stagnation

is, therefore, provided for in what Burke considered to be an

eminently good social structure.

Not only does this have a

tendency to derogate from the liberty, which Burke wished to
^^Ibid., p. 57.

Burke, Appeal From the New To the Old Whigs

,

p. 85.

promote, of people to rise in the social
structure, for one
can honestly ask the right of a piece of
deadwood like Bedford
to judge the qualities of a man like
Burke, but it also damages
conservatism, because it saddles the government
v/ith incompetents
in its highest echelons.
If Burke ever realized this problem,
he did not make his realization manifest,
for to do so would

have been to question the vdsdom of hereditary
aristocracy,

which was a central element of the British constitution.

Never-

theless, this lack of provision for dovmward mobility
must be

regarded as a major flaw in his theory of society.
C. Kaistre's View Of Social Structure.

Maistre sees society

in a monarchy divided into king, aristocracy, and commons,
mon-

archy being the most natural form of government and society.
At first glance this appears to be essentially Burke's view,

and surely there are great similarities, but there are striking
differences.

First, to be part of the aristocracy in Maistre 's

estimation means to have a noble title.
tocracy.

There is only one aris-

An untitled aristocracy, which Burke forthrightly

declares to be a key element of society, is a contraaiction
in terras to Maistre.

He who does not have a noble or clerical

title is, in law if not in fact, a member of a socially undiff-

erentiated mass.

In Maistre

's

estimation, a lawyer is, in the

eyes of the constitution, no more socially elevated than a peasant.
Burke, as was seen, was quite aware of the legitimate social

grievances of the top men in the Third Estate that helped fuel

?X->3

the French Revolution; Maistre,
qatte obviously, was not.
He
declares that a nation has all it needs
to be happy in its ancient lav;s and customs J ^ ^his cramps
the complex social reality

of a nation into three somewhat artificial
divisions corresponding
to those of the Estates General.

The rights one possesses are,

moreover, strictly determined by which of these
artificial div-

isions one belongs to.

As has been seen in chapter three, the

rights of king and aristocracy are much more
central to the
society than are those of commoners'"^, even though
many nominal
commoners may well be richer, and conceivably more
influential,
than many aristocrats.

All commoners, regardless of actual

rank, have only the right to express their grievances, if
such
is a traditional right in their society, v.lth their "betters"

determining what, if anything, is to be done about the grievances^
Maistre, as is usually the case

v/ith

ideologues, has become

so fascinated with formulas, in this instance that of a tri-

partite division of society, that he has been unwilling to examine the actual social reality the formula purports to describe.

Because of this, Maistre, in effect, ignores the existence of
the middle class, one of the major social realities of his time.
He, in other words, gives a reasonably accurate description

^Maistre, Study On Sovoreif^nty , in Lively, Works Of Joseph
De Maistre

,

p.

128»

''Maistre,

Considerations On France, in Lively,

Of Joseph De naistre, p. 77.

V/orks

of the social structure of the early
Middle Ages and sees it
as a reliable picture of eighteenth
century
Western Europe.

D, Social

Mobility In Maistre's Theory.

Though he may

not have been entirely happy with the
fact of social mobility,

Maistre could not deny the existence of
social mobility.

It

became necessary, therefore, to explain this
phenomenon in a
way that would not be too disturbing to the
primarily ascriptive
society Maistre favored.

At the outset, it is necessary to

limit the araount of social mobility by reserving
certain offices
for certain descriptions of people, so that there
might be

"mobility vathout chaos. "^^

Maistre feels, with good reason,

that the type of society he favors could not survive
if men

had a right to aspire to all of its offices based
on talent
alone.

If nothing else, that v/ould eliminate the feeling of

awe for offices and office-holders that most men have and that

is so essential for holding the society together.

Consequently,

it is important that social mobility not be looked upon as some-

thing that a man can claim as a matter of right.

The first

way in which social mobility takes place is for a king to lift
a family into the aristocracy. ^

Unquestionably, this is done

as a reward for great personal merit or for service to the nation

but the key consideration is that only the king knows the criteri
^^
^

Ibid ., p. 91.

^Maistre, Study On Sovereignty

De Maistre

,

p.

]16.

,

in Lively, Works Of Joseph

he uses, and he is answerable to
nobody (except God, of course)
for the selections he makes.
No man is really able to act
in
a fashion that will unerringly improve
his chances for ennoble-

ment, nor can he complain if he is passed
over.
social mobility

v/ill

In this way,

take place without needless disruptions

or jealousies, as long as the people accept
the legitimacy of
learlnff the decision for mobility entirely in
the hands of the

king.

There is another way in v/hich social mobility
takes place.

Maistre, after all, had to be aware of the fact that
some individuals and families rise in the social hierarchy
(though

only unofficially, as was seen in Part "C") with little
or no
assistance from the king, as through success in business, for
example.

If Maistre admits this really takes place through

individual effort, the ground\vork has been laid for a competitive society, something Maistre ^vishes to avoid.
to this dilemma follows.

His solution

It is asserted that a talented man

will somehow reach his predetermined place in society, and that

society
it.^^

;vill,

furthermore, reject a man who is dangerous to

This shows again Maistre 's mystical conception of society.

Society is a living organism, a mind, that recognizes those
individuals who ought to be advanced, and casts off those individuals who are as poison to it.

It is permissible to believe

that the controlling intelligence in this process is that of
God.

This method of explaining social mobility is even preferable
^^Ibid., pp. 12Zf-125.

to the first

from Kaistre's point of view, in
that it leaves

nothing to any man, not even the king.

The two methods are

not, ho^,ever, contradictory, in that in
the first the king also

acts for God,

The second method, nevertheless, puts
every person

on notice that no ambition of his can possibly
affect ids standing

in the social structure.

If one is destined for advancement,

no endeavor need be taken to bring it about, and
if failure

is one's lot, no amount of striving vail alter the fact.

A

better formula for social rigidity and stagnation could hardly
be imagined.

Man's fate is in no way in his own hands, and

so he had best accept the best of all possible worlds.

The problem of dov/nv/ard social mobility, which was not

considered in Burke, was, after a fashion, considered and solved
in Maistre's theory.

It has already been seen that society

repels those who would endanger it, and there is no reason to
believe this refers only to those who are attempting to ascend
to the top of the social ladder, and not to those who, through

inheritance, are already there.

It is both unjust and foolish,

therefore, for lower social classes to envy and hate those in-

dividuals above them, for if they remain on their elevated perch,
they do so because of the blessings of God, and if it is right
that they be pulled

lov;,

man has not the power to do this, but

God unquestionably does, and shall.

It would be well at this

point to remember Maistre's quiet opposition to the attempts
of his fellow exiles to force the coming of an anti-Jacobin

counter-revolution in France.

,

In summing up this chapter, it would
have to be said that

in it the two theorists have shown well their
penchants toward
the philosophies

I

have called conservative libertarianism and

conservative authoritarianism.

Burke is perfectly willing to

see the class structure of his society as largely
fluid, with

no sharp lines of division marking the border between
the top

of one class and the bottom of that just above it.

Nevertheless,

there are classes, and the class to which one belongs has a

great deal to do with the rights one may claim in the governing
of the state, though not v/ith one's rights as a human being.
The class to v;hich one belongs is, moreover, largely, but not

entirely, determined by one's ability.

It is proper that one

seeking to rise into the governing elite be subjected to a rigorous, and often harsh, cross-examination, and that one whose

family has already so ascended be permitted to keep his position,

regardless of his own personal attributes.

A central consider-

ation, hov/ever, is that in Burke's theory the attributes equipping

one to rise in the social structure are generally marked out,

and should one possess these attributes and pass the initiation
he is required to take, he may then claim upward social mobility
as a matter of irrefutable right.

With ability and perseverence

the humblest man in the state may make his way to the top

owing his success to the undeserved favor of any man.

i.vithout

In the

case of Maistre, however, social classes are divided by very

sharp lines of separation.

If one has not the title of aristocrat

or priest, he is assigned to the vast pool of
the commonality,

whatever his objective social standing may be.

Furthermore,

not only are one's political rights strongly
affected by one's

social class, but one's rights as a human being are as
well.

Malstre has a strong tendency to let the common people
escape
his purview completely.

Finally, the class to which one belongs

is ultimately determined by God.

One cannot, therefore, see

his lot in life as social injustice, since men have little or

nothing to do with it, and one must accept his place in society
with humble resignation.

Divine authority, which determines

social strata and their membership, is not to be questioned.

Chapter IX: The Nature Of a Constitution
and Its Significance
For Liberty
A. Burke's Ideas About the Nature
Of Constitutions.

In

order to understand what Burke meant by a
"constitution", it
is first necessary to recapitulate briefly
some of the points
of Chapter Three on how the state is
initially
established.

The

foundation of government, and hence of the
constitution, was

originally in the hands of the people, for "At
some time or
other, to be sure, all the beginners of dynasties
were chosen
by those who called them to govern,"^

By "those who called

them to govern", Burke clearly means the body of the nation.
As was seen in Chapter Three, Lockean ideas about a formation

of government by popular consent are very alive in Burke's mind.

This launciiing provides only the most primitive constitution
for a nation, and is joined to two other constitutional elements,

one prior to the primitive act of constitution and one follovdng

upon it.

In reference to the latter, it must be said that the

laws of a state, especially the most fundamental laws, become

added to the original constitution.

In the case of Britain,

this would mean that such documents as Magna Charta, Petition
of Right, Bill of Rights, and the Act of Settlement of 1689

had become parts of the British constitution.

It v/ould have

been surprising if Burke, who, albeit somewhat unwillingly,
^

Burke, Reflections On the Revolution In France

,

pp.

16-17.

s

had been trained as a la;vyer, had not
seen written lawc as very
important elements of a constitution.
The profession of a lawyer
is, of course, that of the explanation
(or distortion) of written
laws. Had this been all Burke meant by
"constitution",
his

would have been a mundane enough view.

There are, however,

two somewhat more abstract meanings of
"constitution" in Burke's

theory.

The constitution of a nation derives from the
char-acter,

morals, and traditions of the people, and has a
reciprocal effect

upon the people's character, as in the case of the
Anti-Popery

Laws which, by denying Catholics the right to own land,
were
felt by Burke to have encouraged dissipation and immorality

among the Irish Catholics,^

The fact that a constitution is

immanent in the character, morals, and traditions of a people

means that the constitution is somehow uniquely suited for the
nation, and therefore cannot be established based only on what
are felt to be universal principles of good government.

Univ-

ersal principles do, nevertheless, have a place in this abstract

meaning of "constitution,"

As was seen in Chapter Four, a law

(or a constitution) depends on general principles of justice

and good government for its legitimacy.

quality to constitutions.

This gives a cosmic

They are, whatever their somewhat

mundane origins and legislatively-conceived components, part
of God's design for the well-being of all manlcind and of individual
2

Burke, Fragment Against the Anti - Popery Laws, in Burke

Works . VI, 351-353.

'

s
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nations.

As Burke feels is true of the state
as a whole, so

for him is the constitution in part
sanctified.

It is not entirely

clear just how the sacred and non-sacred
elements of a consti-

tution are to be reconciled.

All constitutions, since they

come somewhat from the hand of God, Who is
the Creator of man's

character and looks after him, must be deemed
somewhat worthy
of respect.

Nevertheless, a people can somehow lack freedom

in its natural constitution and traditions, as Burke,
who never

much liked the French, felt to be true of France.

It would

appear^ therefore, that the glorious and the debased and the
divine and the human coexist in uneasy combination in every

constitution.

For those countries that lack freedom in their

natural constitutions, Burke offers no easy or quick solutions.

This is because a constitution is the result of a slow process
of development, and cannot be made for a country overnight.^
Though, as was seen, the written constitution of a country
Is very important (for Burke would be the last man to underrate
the importance of Magna Chart a)

,

the constitution represented

in the character of the people in general and of the office-

holders in particular is the more decisive for the well-being
of a nation.^

It was seen that Burke decried the corruption

England brought upon Irish character, and at a later point in
^Burke, Fourth Letter On the Regicide Peace , in Burke

Works , VI, 61.
^Ibid.

,

p. 62.

'

his career he viewed Jacobinism as seeking
to maintain itself
in power in France by abolishing all morals
and seeking to corrupt
the youth of that country through all manner
of "corporal gratcpj^^^.^

ification."5

therefore, a strong linkage between

a corrupt political constitution (such as that
of Jacobin France)

and a corrupt populace, and presumably also between
a healthy

political constitution and a morally upright populace.

Though

this is not a novel concept, being the central concept
of Mach-

iavelli«s Prince and Discourses (There is no evidence that
Burke

borrowed the idea from these sources.), it is nonetheless important for an understanding of Burke's theory of the nature
of constitutions.
B. Maistre On the Nature Of Constitutions.

Maistre's

ideas about the nature of constitutions are simultaneously simpler
and more abstract than those of Burke.

l(Vhereas

Burke saw con-

stitutions emerging from written laws, national character, and
the will of God, Maistre admits the existence of only the final
two.

A constitution cannot, or ought not to be, 'ATitten, be-

cause it is a diTine work, and because

ijvritten lav/s

dished, but fundamental laws cannot be.

may be ab-

This contempt for

the written word is one of the chief characteristics of Maistre.
He declares that Plato, "who is always the first on the path
^Ibid.

,

pp. lO/f-105.

^Maistre, Generative Principle Of Political Constitutions ,

in Lively, V/orka Of Joseph De Maistre, p.

1i+7.

to all the great truths", was
correct in saying that one can
get only the appearance of wisdom
from written discourses, and
that, furthermore, one of the chief
errors of Protestantism

is its reliance on the written word of God,
the problem being
that even in this case writing is not
animate and can neither

defend itself nor hide itself from those who
should not see
it.

The overpoweringly authoritarian aspects of the
last part

of this statement need hardly be belabored.

A constitution

is a governing device which springs full-grown from
the brain
of God at the moment of a nation^s birth.

in two ways.

This takes place

First, much of the constitution of a society is

the direct work of God, without any intermediary.

It may be

assumed that these constitutional elements stem from the period
when, Maistre believes, all men were under the direct rule of

Sod in some sort of State of Wature (see Chapter Three).

Any

law must derive from a superior will if it is to be obligatory^,
and so, naturally, the law of laws (the constitution) must derive
from the most superior of wills.
an indirect manner also.

The constitution does so in

"The fundamentals of political con-

stitutions exist before all written laws", because, as Maistre
says in regard to England, "The real English constitution is

the public spirit" (a declaration with which Burke would agree)»^

^Ibid .. pp.
^Ibid., p.

156 and 158.

h8.

^Ibid., pp. 149-150 and 151.

Since God is the Creator of a society's public
spirit and nat-

ional character,

tliis

contribution to the constitution repre-

sents God working at one remove.

A ^vritten constitution is not

only objectionable because of its failure to convey
vdsdom,
but also because ±z is weak, and by being we ale it
endangers

the existence of the state.

''^

This is probably because the

very act of writing laws, especially fundamental laws, gives

men the mistaken belief that they are truly masters of their
fate, thereby causing people to doubt the sanctification of

the constitution.

Attempts to reform the constitution are not acceptable.
This is both because such is questioning the work of God, which
is obviously unacceptable, and because every constitution has

faults basic to its nature and inseparable from it.^"

trinsic faults can

e:d.st

a very good question.

How in-

in an entirely divine institution is

It is probable that Maistre is trying

to doubly protect the constitution from tampering.

First of

all, one ought not to touch the constitution with profane hands

because it is an ark of the covenant.

Secondly, if unquestion-

able defects in the constitution *s design are perceived, these

still exist for the good of man (a case in point being the sale
of judicial offices in pre-revolutionary France, v/hich resulted
^°Ibid., p. 151.

^^Ibid., p.

167.

in the establishment of an independent
judiciary) ^ 2, and one

should never attempt repair of them, even if the
divine plan

incorporated in them is not apparent.
C. The

Relationship Of Burke's Views Of Constitutions

To Liberty.

Burke's ideas about constitutions are that con-

stitutions are a mixture of flexibility and rigidity.

The or-

iginal constitution of every state is, as was seen, the result
of the free choice of the populace, who set a direction for the

society by choosing a king.

Though this power to create a gov-

ernment is one that Burke feels ought to be handled very gingerly and applied only as a remedy for intolerable provocation,
the fact that the original constitution arose as a result of

popular

gives the people, at least in theory, a substantial

\'n.ll

say over their constitution.

thing like a total say.

Naturally, however, this is no-

Burke was no populist, and never claimed

The power of any man or group over the constitution

to be one.

is, in two ways, severely limited.

First, no constitution worthy

of the name may depart from the universal principles of the

This may certainly be viewed as a strong defense

Natural Law*

for the liberty and morality of a society, but it definitely

derogates from the freedom of a society to shape its constitution as it chooses.

There is a God-given element to every con-

stitution that it is beyond human power (or at least right)
to alter*

Another fact giving a degree of rigidity to consti-

^^Ibid.

,

p.

169.

tutions is the connection between a nation's
national character
and its constitution. This is ambiguous
as far as freedom itself is concerned, as opposed to the freedom
to change one's

constitution.

If a country is blessed vn.th a national
character

conducive to liberty, it would be almost inevitable
that its

constitution would reflect it, and if some conspiracy
should
be hatched to rob the land of its liberty, it vrauld
face over-

whelmingly hostile odds.

liberty is concerned.
coin.

All this is to the good so far as

There Is, however, another side to the

If a country, due to immorality or slavishness in its

national character, lacks a free constitution, it will be ex-

tremely difficult to give one to it.

There is, therefore, a

strong resistance against change in national character, and

this will, for good or ill, be reflected in the constitution
of the particular country.

The fact that every constitution has a large component
of written laws is of major significance for the relationship

of Burke's theory of constitutions to liberty.

A flexibility

ie injected into the whole notion of a constitution.

Bui'ke

had too good a feel for the history of his land to think England
was under the sane constitution as it was in 1066, 1215» or

even 1689»

The constitution of a nation is, in part, an evolving

reality, because written laws affect the constitution, because

national character (which does change, though slowly) affects
the constitution, and because written laws and national character

reciprocally affect each other.

This results in giving the

people, through their representatives, at
least some measure
of continuing control over the content of the
constitution.

The constitution is not set in concrete for all
time, nor is

its content entirely beyond human control.

This dictates eternal

vigilance on the part of people in a country blessed
with a
free constitution, for subversion is always possible,
as almost

happened to England in the 1760«s and 1770 's, and yet hope is
held out to unfree countries, for passage of laws can improve
the character of the people and permit a slow transformation

from slavery to freedom.

The constitution is a framework through

which the best of a nation's laws and traditions (certainly
not all

lav/s

and traditions) are to be conserved in the name

of liberty, and in which such new laws and traditions as are

amenable to liberty and the best of the original constitutional

design are to be incorporated.
D« The Effect Of Maistre's Constitutional Ideas On Lib-

erty.

The reason why Maistre's constitutional ideas are less

amenable to liberty than are those of Burke is that what Burke
sees as the foundation of the constitution is to Maistre the

entire constitution.

Both believe all constitutions must rest

upon the rock of God's law, v/hich necessarily makes them that

much less amenable to human will.

God's law has, however, al-

ready been seen to be a freer concept in Burke than in Maistre,
the latter seeing it as dictating obedience to almost all acts

of almost all governments.

In contrast to Burke, Haistre sees

all of a constitution as being God's law.

This makes it all

well beyond the control, or even conceivably the
understanding,
of man.

A further point in Maistre that derogates froa
liberty

is the very scope he gives to the constitution.

Not only is

a constitution unquestionable in its entirety, it is also
limit-

less in the ground it covers.

Since written laws are very lowly

regarded by Maistre, the only exception being the Ten Commandments, v/hich

v/ere

written by God^-^, quite literally every law

in a society is part of the unwritten code of the constitution.
To Mai.stre, a constitution is an ethereal de^/ice living with
its Creator up in heaven and comprising the society's entire
laws, traditions, and life.
lav/s

Also deriving from the belief that

should not be written is the fact that, unlike Burke, Maistre

does not see the constitution as an evolving mechanism.

If a

country is free by tradition, "free", to Maistre, being a synonym for Ultramontane Catholic, this freedom is secure forever,

barring temporary abberations like the Protestant Reformation
or the French Revolution.

If, hov/ever,

a nation is not blessed

with liberty, not only can it not be given liberty overnight
(which Burke conceded), but it probably cannot be given liberty
at all.

Nor can liberty, in all likelihood, evolve.

This is

because national character, which both Burke and Maistre feel
has an unavoidable connection

\irith

the content of a nation's

constitution, is either not amenable to
change in Maistre^s
theory, or does not change as a result
of human actions expressed
in laws or anything else. It is. therefore,
an article of faith
with Maistre that a nation represents an
unalterable phenomenon

with a changeless national character, changeless
laws, a changeless constitution, and a changeless government.
the nation dies.

It is so until

It was probably this belief that led
Maistre

into absurdities such as believing England could
not "really"
be Protestant, and would ultimately reconvert to
Catholicism.

It may be seen, in summation, that the two theorists*

views of constitutions fit closely into the philosophical
constructs of conservative libertarianism and conservative author-

itarianism.

For neither is a constitution something to be

created, destroyed, or amended capriciously.
a document including within it

It is for Burke

(among other things) much of

the best of the vdsdom of both God and the nation.

For Maistre,

it is a phenomenon that, ideally speaking, exists only in the

mind of God, and yet is very real and reflects the perfect wisdom
of God,

Burke, the practical politician, sees a constitution

ae something that, though doubtless deserving of decent respect,

exists primarily in order to be used to arrange social and pol-

itical relationships in the most acceptable possible manner.
Maistre, on the other hand, sees the constitution as something
before which one should burn incense and feels its very existence justifies it.

Man has some control over the constitution

in Burke and none in Maistre.
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Chapter
A.

X: The Meaning, Value, and Goal Of
History
Burke's Definition Of History.

As should be eminently

clear by now. Burke sees two participants
in the affairs of men:
God and man. This is also true of his view
of history. It shall
be seen somewhat later in this chapter that
God exercises a final

say over the history of a state, but it is also true
that the human

mind is still "the proximate efficient cause" of a state's
history.^
The human mind acts upon history in two ways, by creating
a nation's

traditions (for Burke believes historical traditions to be manmade and the result of constant incremental activity by men) and
by acting within the normal political world (These two
naturally

overlap.).

This second point shows that practically anything can

change the course of history.^

It is likely that Burke, in his

less modest moments, felt that he did just this during the French

revolutionary crisis, and he was probably correct.

History is,

therefore, a cooperative endeavor betv/een all generations of men
and God.

All men can make their contributions to the building

of history,

v.-ibh

out right.

History is, consequently, a developmental process to

God overseeing the project to make sure it turns

which man makes major contributions, and one whose final results
are necessarily good.
^

2

Burke, First Letter On the Regicide Peace, in Burke

Ibid .

,

p.

235.

*

s

V/orks ,

The Relationship Between the
Individual and Hictory In
Burke »s Theory. One can «ee from the
foregoing that Burke sees
the indiTidual (at least potentially)
as having a somewhat limited, yet real, role in the judging «f
history. A nation* c traditions are to be respected, as they are the
creation of many generations and of God. Respect is, however, not
idolatry. Since
history is in large measure the product of the
reason of Bore or
less ordinary human beings, human beings
are somewhat free to de-

teraine whether a nation's traditions do serve,
or ever did serve,,
the ends of just government.

Reform is, therefore, an expected

part of the life of a state.

One should, however, be very cautious about undertaking refarm of a nation's historical traditions, since they are such
a

great coiipendiuin of political knowledge.

History is properly a

subject of very intense study, because such study can give to
one
the accessary understanding to (possibly) carry out reforms.

Con-

sequently, it is entirely illegitimate for an individual to crit-

icize his country's historical traditions from a theoretical perspective, as the Jacobins did, but a criticism based en a keen

historical understanding may be proper, since the reason in history
1b, at least largely, human reason.
C. Maistre's Definition Of History.

ef history is found in Maistre.

A very different view

He adheres to the belief that

"God is the universal moving force"^ in history, as in all else.

^Maistre, Fifth Saint Petersburg Dialogue

Of Joseph De Maistre

,

p. 231»

,

in Lively, Works

The independent role

man in history is essentially zero,
since,

thougk God may u«e man as a tool and
man may even be able to flaunt
the ifili of God in the short run,
God provided to each state at
its inception all it needed in the line
of traditions and customs.
MaiBtre nay, therefore, in striking contrast to
Burke, be considered anti-hifitorical, for a state would neither
have had nor have

needed a history if its people had not sinned by
departing from
God^s perfect pattern.

History is completely under God's control,

with men operating within it only by His
sufferance, and is, moreover, entirely a record of man's corruption and
divorce from Gcd,

History is that which happened after man's fall from grace.
D. Maistre's View Of the Role Of the Individual In
Regard

To History,

Maistre feels that it is permissible in one way for

the individual to judge the content of history, but it is impersiiss-

ible in another way^

It stands t© reason that ae person may judge

the original historical traditions ©f his country, since they are
a creation cf God.

Reform is this regard is campletely unaccept-

able^ and the atheistic desire for such reform is ©ne of the cardinal sins *f the eighteenth century.

of judgement ©f history is proper.

NTevertheless, a certain form

History is no source ©f know-

ledge, contrary to what Burke felt, and S9 history as a whole may,

and should

be,,

judged and condemned.

The only learning that one

can gain from the study of history Is the evil consequences of

departing from the path of God, this departure being the starting
point of human history.

History has the one value that is said

t©

«^d)3ftr«

to a thoroushly depraved individual,
that of serving

as a bad example.

Only in the sense of the abolition of
depar-

tures from God«8 original pattern can reform be
permitted,

thj.s

abolition naturally culminating in the abolition of
history itself.

Such is, of course, a sweeping refora, but it is
also the

final one.
E. A Controvsrsy Over Interpretation Of Burke.

Those who

haye written on Burke disagree on the important question of whether » in Burke »e philosophy, the goal of history has been realized
er whether it is yet t» be realized.

Iti

order to deal with this

question, it is necessary to ascertain first if history has a goal
t* Burke.

Host writers on Burke have answered this question in

the af firisative; Mansfield is an exception and declares that Burke
felt there to be no fixed goal or nature for Ean.^

Burke 'a own

writings give support to the view that there is a goal for maa.
First, there is a Divine Providence that works within hicztory.^

This does not directly state that history has a goal, but it does
render such at least plausible by showing history t© be something

other than a record of the activities of mere men.

A stronger sugg-

estion that there is a goal to history was given during the French

Harvey

C. Mansfield, Statesmanship and Party Government

:

A Study Of Burke and Bolingbroke (Chicago: University of Chicago

Press, 1965), p. 257.
^Burke, Sr^eech On Reconciliation With the Colonies , p»

lifO,

Revolution,

^vhen

Burke referred to prudence, the proper
guide of

statesmen, as being "formed upon the known
march of the ordinary
providence of God."^ To say that God's
providence is on the march
iirplies it is on the march to somewhere,
especially since Eurke

did not tend to be sloppy in his logic,

A more concrete indicator

of Burke»s belief in a goal of history is,
unfortunately, not avail
able, since Burke only rarely made his philosophy
explicit. One

must instead lock to Burke's life and actions, where
the feeling
is gained that Burke saw himself as striving to
bring history to

its proper goal.

Ke saw himself as God»s servant resisting such

abuses, be they slavery, tyranny, or anarchy, as ran contrary to

God's desig-n for man.
Ifow

that e-t/idence has been presented in favor of the view

that Burke sees history as having a goal, one must ascertain if
he sees this goal as lying in a return to the past, as having been
achr'.eved,

or as lying in the future.

the world's
ibility
He had

raa^r

"cAs

1 o ss

Despite Burke's laments over

of grace in his last years, the first poss-

be disposed of easily.

Burke was no reactionary.

eyes open to both the good and the bad of the past.

The second possibility has its devotees and is not so easily nor

entirely disposed of.

Sabine says that Burke had a strong influenc

on Hegel, an idea which, due to Burke's great popularity in nine-

teenth century Germany, cannot be entirely dismissed, and that
Hegel expanded Burke's ideas of history by pointing out theoret^Burke, Second Letter On the Regicide Peace, in Burke ' s Works

ically history»s evolutionary
quality.^

Fro. Vnls it follows that

Sabine saw Burke's theory of history
as non-evolutionary.
takes Sabine's view a step further.

Cobban

He says that Burke had a "thor-

oughly conservative political philosophy",
and that "Burke's version
of Locke turns out to be merely a
justification in theory of the

methods of the

Vfnig

oligarchy."^

There could be no room for hist-

orical evolution in the theory of a man who
was just a theoretical
Jiistifier of Whiggery (and of not even the most
up-to-date Whiggery).

For such a man, existing conditions would provide
all for which

man could ever hope.
as will be seen,

was a

V7hJ.g

This was not the position of Burke, save,

for his views of social structure.

Though he

and did not doubt the value of traditional

'/.Tiig

prin-

ciples. Burke felt one of the most important of these principles

was that of rational reform.^

It has already been seen in this

chapter that Burke saw God's providence as being on the march.
As Parkin says, Burke feels that "The higher reason is disclosed

in the historical process. "^'^
goal is yet to be achieved.

The word process hints that history's

Though one may be reasonably cer-

tain that this controversy over the nature of Burke's histor-

ical theory will not soon cease, the correct view appears to
7
g

Sabine, A History Of Political Theory

,

p. 619.

Cobban, Burke and the Revolt Against the Eighteenth Century

pp. 3k and 59.
q

Burke, Appeal From the New To the Old Whigs

^^Parkin, Moral Basis Of Burke

'

s

,

pp. 47-^+3.

Political Thought, p.

11

8.

,

be that, despite some tendencies
t© the contrary, Burke was

progrecsivist with regard to the relationship
of change to
the improvement of man. Though change
is not necessarily ima

provement, improvement is both possible and
necessary..
F. The Meaning Of "Progress" In Burke's
Theory.
I hope,

It has,

been reasonably well established that Burke was
a be-

liever in progress, which thereby refutes the view of
Cobban
who caw Burke as divorced from the major thinkers of
his age

by the fact of not believing in progress.

It is, nonetheless,

true that "progress" aeans something different to Burke than
it does to, say, Bolingbroke,
throT-Tlng off of

Progress is definitely not the

enslaving traditions, both because Burke did

net believe traditions t© be iiecessarily enslaving, and because

even if they were, they wculd be so much a part of national

character that it would net be possible to remove them without
great effort over a long jjeriod ©f time, probably ages.

Prog-

rees does not sean the establishment of new moral codes to replace the ones of the present time.

Burke felt oorality t©

be founded upoa religion, and for that reason was very ill-

inclined to tamper with the bases of morality.

The moral teach

ings of his tine were felt by Burke to be fully adequate to
any genuine progress.

T© the extent that progress was impeded

by the actions ©f men, it case through not adhering to the dictates of religion.

Progress required not the destruction ot

religion, but its enhancement.

Burke agreed with social critic

such as Rousseau that progress required
the moral liberation
of man, but such liberation required
man to be religious to
the fullest possible extent.

Burke also saw progress in a more down-to-Earth
sense.

Science has a great deal to contribute to
progress, as long
as it does not attempt to infringe on the
moral sphere.

'Wien

science, or what shallow thinl-.ers deem to be
science, is placed

above morality and religion, disasters like the
French Revol-

ution must occur.

This is because "Speculators ought to be

neutral" toward questions of morality.

^

A

^

established between science and morals.

separation is thus

Progress is available

in both, but in science it can come only through alteration
of principles, which is not acceptable in morality.

It is,

in fact, necessary for the principles of science to change,

though this generally occurs in a gradual manner, building
the scientific discoveries of the past.

It must,

UT)on

furthermore,

be added that, unlike the cases of moral and (as will be seen)

social progress, Burke does not seem to believe that scientific

progress has any final goal, either in his
distant future.

o^-n

time or in the

Burke never gave his readers reason to doubt

that he understood the potential of science for improving the

life and well-being of man, and in this he may

be.

said to have

shared the optimism and enthusiasm of his age to the fullest.
11

Burko, Thoughts On French Affairs
IV, 359.

,

in Burke s 7/orks
'

,

s
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It is necessary at this point
to consider Burke's ideas

on the social aspects of progress.

It would, of course, not

be correct to say that Burke
is a thinker opposed to social

progress, for his sincere opposition
to slavery needs little
reiteration. Nevertheless, the abolition
of slavery (which
is to be an ultimate, and not an
immediate,

goal)^'-is as far

as Burke is willing to go in social
changes involving an entire

class of people.

Though social mobility for individuals is

definitely to be permitted (see Chapter Till),
Burke appears
to feel that social progress would reach its
limits with the
abolition of slavery.

The best example of this view cor.es in

Burke's only work devoted solely to economics, in which he
says
"The laboring people are poor because they are numerous. "^^

Since the government could never have the right to tamper
with
the laws of economics by decreeing a minimum wage, and since

employers would be ill-inclined to pay their workers more than
they had to (keeping in mind their religious responsibilities
to their fellovraen)

,

it stands to reason that the great numbers

of the laboring class would, through competition for jobs, keep

their salaries dovm.

Burke did not, however, see poverty as

entailing misery, for he felt that even in time of real privation,
the moral duty of charity would prevent great suffering.
1

Burke,

^

"ftirke,

Sketch Of a liegro Code, in Burke

'

^Burke, Thoughts and Details On Scarcity

Works , V, 134.

s

Works

,

in Burke

,

VI,

'

258-259.

therefore, sees the social classes of
eighteenth-century England
as being permanent realities. Large-scale
social change has
come to aa end,
G. Burke»s Ideas Of the Goal Of History
In Relation T«

Liberty.

These aspects of Burke's theory are simultaneously

supportive of and detrimental to liberty.

One who wished to

establish a new theory of morality, especially ©ne not based

upon religioa, would not be free to do so.

However, Burke was

aware that not all was right with society morally, and strongly

urged increased moral uprightness on people, both for its own
sake and as a necessity for liberty.
time, encouraged and restricted.

Science is, at the

saaie

Scientific inquiry has an

honored place in Burke's theory, in that it is seen as cantributisig ta the progress and well-being of man.

Burke, further-

more, sees no time limit upon what science can accomplish.

Scientists must, nevertheless, have a properly humble understanding of their place in society.

en

Ne more than any other

may they seek to subvert the ethical foundations of society

•r act as self-appointed saviors of their fellowmen.

Also,

Burke's view of the future of class structure has tkls same

double-edged effect on liberty.

Any man is free to rise as

high in the social structure as his abilities will carry him,
but he is not free to question the legitimacy of his social

structure, if it conforms to that of England.

Finally, it nay

be said legitimately that Burke's belief that history's goal

lies in the future does, whatever
restrictions are placed upon
progress, aake a desire for prosrees
permissible. One may believe, therefore, that Burka's ideas
about history's goal have
a rather mixed effect on human liberty.
H. Maistre's Ideas About History.

In Kaistre's theory,

ene finds little thought of history as
a sphere ia which sec-

ular progress is possible.

Unlike Burke, Maistre is not some-

what skeptical about science, but is downright
hostile to it.

Science can be useful to society mainly by giving arguments
to support the conclusions of authority, but must be "put every-

where in second place"^^ to the Church.

Very little indepen-

dence was, therefore, granted to science, and it was to be under
Continual close inspection to nake sure it did not get out of
hand.

Under such circumstances, it would have been strange

if science in a Maistrean society had contributed much to progress, for science needs a substantially free hand t© pursue

its inquiries if it is to reach profitable conclusions.

To

Maistre, however, science does not exist in order to reach conclusions and aid temporal progress, but to serve as a prop for
tbe existing (Catholic) order.

Science, therefore, d®es not

exist for the sake of scientific progress, and has nothing t©
contribute to any advances of the historical process.

^Wst re,

Generative Principle Of Political Constitutions

In Lively, Works Of Joseph De Maistre

,

p. 166.

,

?91

Social progress is also in an uncertain
position in Maistre.
His opposition to slavery is as great
as Burke's, in that he
praises the Papacy greatly for aiding the
abolition of that

Institution J5

This abolition takes place through the
upgrading

of man's morality, which leads one to believe
that by "slavery"

Maistre does not mean only the ovmership of one man by
another.
No doubt the abolition of slavery in its usual
sense was felt

by Maistre to be great social progress, but the "slavery"
that

Maistre is most interested in is that which is spiritual in
nature and stems from the moral degradation of man.

Th?.s

"slavery"

can be ended only by bringing all Protestants (and conceivably

other non-believers as well) back within the Papal fold.

The

abolition of property in human beings is the only social progress Maistre is really willing to accept, and one may assume
that the very phrase "social progress" would have been hateful
to hi»a.

It cannot be said that Maistre advocated a freezing

of the social status quo, for, as was seen in Chapter VIII,
the social structure of his time, v/hich included a wealthy and

influential bourgeoisie, was not congenial to him.

This is

one part of Maistre 's theory in which he may be properly termed
a reactionary.

The social structure is, if possible, to be

taken back several centuries by forced march, to the days when
the entire society could (Maistre believed) be explained ade-

quately on the basis of three estates, with the clergy being supreme.
15

Maistre, The Pope , in Lively, Works Of Josevh De Maistre

,

p.

1i+5.

I. The Meaning Of "Progress"
In Kaistre's Theory.

A«
is

has already been seen, "progress", to
Maistre, does not mean
what it means to many of his contemporaries.
Maistre ^s "progress" does not involve a move to a new
style of living, in either
a eecular or (most certainly) a spiritual
sense. Very paradoxically, Maistre, who despised individualism
and made ceaseless
war upon it, sees progress as involving
a fundamental spiritual

revolution in every individual, which will then
be manifested
by the seciety as a whole. Progress is, in

other words, pri-

marily a philosophical concept to Maistre.

It comes not through

scientific advances or through social reforms, but through
the

purificatioa af one's soul.

The soul is purified by having

all individuality and all doubts about authority (especially

the authority of the Church) removed from it.

Maistre

's

This part «f

theory aust stand as further proof of the fact that

ke was in much of kis thought a Pfeilcsophe of the extreme right.

The rarified atmosphere and abstract nature of this theory of

progress can hardly be over-emphasized.

It could only be the

idea of & mystic who had systematically cut himself off from
the world in which he lived and had then decided that he would

reshape the world he had deserted in keeping with the philos-

ophy he had created or embraced.
J\ The Goal Of History and Its Relationship To Liberty

In Maistre*

8

Theory*

The idea of thero being a goal to history

bulks rather larger in Maistre 's theory than in Burke's,, and

the goal is nore explicitly described.

As w«s related in Chap-

ter III, political society is a very
mixed blessing in Maistre's
eyes. If man had not disobeyed his Creator
and poisoned his
soul, political society, which exists only to
repress man's

penchant for evil, would not have been required.

The end of

Kan's rebellious nature, which will take place as soon
as man
abases himself before God and God's Cliurch, will have far
reachin

effects oa the very nature of huBan existence*

All diseases

and "natural" catastrophieo (which, to Maistrs, are not rooted

in nature at all) will certainly cease to assail man, since
thee© are

sGiae

©f the forms Qod»e punishments of sin take.

War will pass away and there will bo no need for society's in-

stitutions to operate in a coercive nanner, since men will no

longer have to be coerced to do that which is right.
• f course,

It is,

not to be thought that this Utopia is what the average

person would deem a "free" society.

man's life miserable

wi.ll

T!!ose things which render

vanish because all men have agreed

!• abandon their individuality and te subordinate themselves
to a corporate society ruled by a benevolent (in Maistre's est-

imation) but authoritarian Church.

History will, therefore,

reach its goal when all individual liberty has been effaced
from the earth, and union of man with God's will is realized.
It can be said in summation that, with Burke's restric-

tions on what might be deemed historical progress (such as his

unwillingness to allow science t© move to front-rank importance

in the state and to permit massive
alterations of the social

structure over time), Burke's theory still
allows for a large

measure of liberty in the historical process.

The day of reck-

oning is, first of all, pushed into the distant
future, which
makes it no hindrance to the day-to-day actions
of men, and
it is,

furthermore, viewed as aiding the increase of liberty.

Maistre's theory Is certainly not like that.

Salvation may

come at any hour, thus preventing a business-as-usual approach,

and consists of the extinction of human liberty (which is not
seen by Maistre as being true liberty).

^

Chapter XI: Attitudes Toward Utilitarianism
The responses Burke and Maistre have to
Utilitarianiera are

important indicators of the direction of their thoughts.

It is

necessary, first of all, to give a brief treatment of what Util-

itarianiem is.

Utilitarianism^ in its Benthamite articulation, ie

the view that virtue consists in the fulfillment of human wants,

and that the goal of the state or society should be to promot© "the

greatest happiness of the greatest number."

Utilitarianism is, furth

...that principle which approves or disapproves of every action
whatsoever according to the tendency which it appears to have
to augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest
is in question: or, what is the same thing in other words,
to promote or to oppose that happiness.
I say of every action
whatsoever; and therefore not only of every action of a private individual, but of every measure of government.
It can be seen immediately that there are two points in Utilitar-

ianism that are antithetical to any sort of Conservatism: first,
the stress on the needs and desires of the human being as the focus

of morality, and second, the majoritarianism of the phrase "the

greatest happiness of the greatest- number."

It was seen in Chapter

One that Conservatism is inclined to view morality as stemming
from some source other than human beings,

scud

furthermore believes

the majority to have no special claim to rights or consideration.

Veremy Bentham, An Introduction To

the Principles Of Morals

and Legislation, in Edwin A. Burtt, ed., The English Philosophers

From Bacon To

Mni

(New York: Random House, 1939), p. 792.

Government is to serve the needs of all the
people.

In the cases

of Burke and Maistre, therefore, it is
not a matter of asking whether one or both of them embraced Utilitarianism,
for had either

of them done so his adherence to Conservatism would
have been ren-

dered highly questionable, but instead the extent to
which Util-

itarian ideas were accepted and rejected, either
consciously or
unconsciously, by them,
A. Burke On Utilitarianism.

As is the general case in his

writings. Burke dees not write specifically on the philosophy of

Utilitarianism.

It is,

therefore, necessary to glean from his

writings such references as seem to apply to the subject, and from
them to deduce what Burke's organized attitude toward Utilitariani

would have been, if he had articulated one.

During the nineteenth

century, it was a common misconception that Burke was some sort
of Conservative Utilitarian, and MacCunn continues this error and

expressly praises Burke for his lack of abstract

thinking.'''

It

is probable that this mistake stems from a misunderstanding of

BurkG*s concept of "prudence", and
nature of Utilitarianism.

froir.

a misunderstanding of the

If "Utilitarianism" meant only that

government was to serve the needs of the people (a not astonishing
declaration). Burke would indeed be a Utilitarian of sorts, but
the notions of "prudence" and "utility" are not to be confused.

Counting of heads and solicitation of opinions have nothing whatever to do vn.th the determination of prudence.

To some extent,

John MacCunn, The Political Philosophy Of Burke, p. 46,

.
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Burke himself is responsible for this
confusion, as in his Speech
On C onciliation With the Colonies, where
he declares that Merica's
pceitiori in the struggle ^^th England must be
taken as a fact of

life, whether that position be factually
correct or not. because
the A.^ericans see it as correct.^

One may assume that Burke took

this approach because he did not want to burden
himself with un-

necessary philosophical questions.

This was, after all, a political

speech, not a philosophical disputation.

Nevertheless, Burke did

believe the arguments embraced by the Americans to be
valid, and
it was their validity, not the fact that the Americans
had embraced
them, that led to Burke »s willingness to embrace them as part
of
the empirical v/orld.

Surely such tolerance was never shown to

the theories of the French revolutionaries, and would not have

been even if the theories had been backed by the entire French

population (As has been seen, however. Burke saw this latter revolution as a conspiratorial coup, not a genuine popular revolution^)
This lack of tolerance of the French theories is because, in Burke »s
estimation, a given action must adhere to certain

bsisic

orinciples

(in essence those of the Natural Law) if it is to be deemed "prudent".

Usefulness, or (if one will) utility, is a derivative quality

in Burke, and it is derivative not from popular election, but from

its relationship to the law of God.

Burke reverses the Utilitarian

formula which says that what is good for the people (by decision
of either individual or majority) is therefore moral; Burke, on
^Burke, Speech On Conciliation V/ith the Colonies

,

pp. 70-71.

the contrary, believes that that which
is moral must be good for

the people.

As in so many other things, Burke descends
fron heaven

to earth, whereas the Utilitarians ascend
from earth to heaven.

In a somewhat misunderstood phrase,
prudence is "the god
of this lower world.
am.ong

This quotation has gained wide circulation

students of Burke and has been seen as attesting to
his high

regard for prudence, and yet what is less often commented
upon
is the implied derivative status of prudence.

If prudence is the

god of "this lower world" [emphasis min^, it, like all else,
must
take its cue from the higher world, that of faith and religion.

Prudence is ultimately a religious doctrine to Burke, and, therefore, whether or not a given activity of men can be deemed prudent

can be deduced unerringly by examining it against the moral law.

That which is spiritually good is necessarily empirically good,
net the reverse (as in Utilitarianism).

This points up an additional difference between Burke and
the Utilitarians, namely Burke's unwillingness to set up a mech-

anical calculus of good and evil.

contemporaries, the good is that

To Burke, unlike many of his

wMch

thing stemming from an earthly basis.

is the law of God, not any-

That which is good does

promote the well-being of men, but its justification lies in itself, and not in any of its consequences.
It should now be eminently clear that Burke was no Utilitarian

of any sort, and in fact by the logic of his theory was required
^Burke, Letter To John Farr and John Harris
VI,

226.

,

in Burke s Works,
'
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to reject Utilitarianism.

There are, ho^vever, degrees of rejec-

tion, and one can still be somewhat
influenced by a philosophy
he rejects.

To get a clearer understanding of
Burke »s feelings

toward Utilitarianism, as opposed to mere
acceptance or rejection
of it, shall be the next order of business.
Without specifically mentioning Utilitarianism
(and probably
without even thinlcing about that philosophy),
Burke unambiguously

repudiates its majoritarian bias.

Burke believes all men to have

certain God-given rights and believes that there is
a mutuality
of rights and duties between citizen and society.

l£2^ the New To the Old Whigs

.

In An Avpesl

Burke declares that, contrary to

the views of the new Whigs, the majority may not alter the contract

of society and government as it sees fit, since this contract is

binding upon all; furthermore, the majority can have no say over

moral concerns, and power ought not to be vested in the multitude,
since this v/ould prevent the limitation of power. ^

It is obvious

that the populist aspects of Utilitarianism are completely rejected
by Burke.

What the majority, or even the multitude, feels ought

to be done or is in its interests, is of no special consequence

whatever.

The moral laws of the universe are not subject to a

show of hands.

Quite apart from the immorality of the majority

claiming authority over the contract, is the fact that the majority

itself is a creation of the contract.

The concept of "majority"

is simply a legal fiction, because people in a State of Nature
^Burke,. An Appeal From the New To the Old Whigs , pp. 93-9Zf.

can have no corporate existence.^

For the majority to be granted

the right to question the contract
(which, in Burke's view, sets
the basic goals and moral structure of
the society) would be to

permit the majority to destroy itself.

It is, therefore, not only

immoral for the majority to be granted control
over the contract,
but also logically impossible.

Burke certainly agrees vd.th the Utilitarians that
the needs
of the people are the goals of any just society, and
yet he differs
from them as to what these needs are and how they are
to be deter-

mined.

It has already been seen that the majority is not able

to determine its needs or those of the society.

The average person

just lacks the intelligence to determine what his needs are, except

in the most mundane cases.

The people are to be ruled for their

own good by those who are more intelligent and talented than they,

though the people are to have some measure of control over their
rulers.

The people, however, have only limited control over the

determination of their needs.

It is, of course, also true that

the rulers have no free hand in determining the people's needs,
as they are also bound by the moral lav/ and can declare no needs

in contravention of it, nor violate those embodied in it.
The needs of people are two-fold in nature.

purely physical needs: food, shelter, clothing.

First are the
These obviously

require no choosing, as they derive (with the possible exception
of clothing)

from man's nature as an animal.

^Ibid., p. TOO.

These needs arc not,

'

however, to be provided for by the
government (as the Utilitarian
"greatest happiness of the greatest number"
doctrine might imply).
They are to be provided for by negDtiaticns
between buyer and selle
wha, cognizant of their interrelated interests,
vdll strike a mut-

ually acceptable bargain.*^

The higher needs of the human being,

those dealing with something other than mere
physical survival,

may have some relationship to government.

This relationship, how-

ever, is only a tenuous one, in that the government*

s

role is only

to provide the minimum climate necessary for other
institutions

(such as a Church, the family, etcetera) to establish the
nobler,

more civilized, needs of man.

Government has only the negative

function of providing the conditions under which the positive func
tiorus can be

implemented by others*

It can be seen, in contrast to the Utilitarian view, that
no strongly individualistic approach is evident in Burke,

Though

the needs that are to be fulfilled naturally serve the needs of
the individual, they are neither chosen by the individual nor im-

plemented through him.

The impulse is toward meeting corporate

needs and working through corporate organizations to meet needs
that the individual is not really free to accept or reject.

Yet another reason why Burke rejects the individualism of

Utilitarianism is his tendency to reject the egoism that often
goes with it.
7
V,

151.

The individualism of Bentham must be as obvious

Burke, Thoughts and Details On Scarcity

,

in Burke

s

//orks

,

as the non-individualism (but not
anti-individualism) of Burke.

Burke sees the interests of every individual
being served best

through serving the interests of the community.

Though Burke rec-

ognizes that egoism may be a socially useful force,
and for that
reason should not be scorned, he is never really
comfortable
it.

8

v/ith

Selfishness, whatever its practical justification, is
still

selfishness, and is thus both a vice and less than rational.
on the other hand, declares:

is— what?

Bentham,

"The interest of the community then

The sum of the interests of the several members who

compose it." 9

Burke lauds the morality and rationality of the

community interest, and Bentham, in effect, denies that there is
such a thing.
What all this means for the nature of Burke's theory is that
he is simultaneously more libertarian and less libertarian than

the Utilitarians.
to

He expressly denies the right of the individual

determine his own needs and act upon that determination, and

yet he does feel the individual does have needs v;hich should be

met.

These needs, however, cannot be treated as exclusive of or

contradictory to the needs of society.

In fact, the needs of one

cannot be treated apart from the needs of all.

If libertarianism

has something to do v/ith individual freedom of choice, Burke's viev/

must be considered less libertarian than the Utilitarian alterna0

^Ibid .

,

pp.

Iif0-1/4l.

Q

Bentham, Princi-nles Of Morals and Le -^islation
The English Philosophers From Bacon To Mill

,

p. 792.

,

in Burtt,

0
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tive.

There is, nevertheless, another side of
the issue that re-

quires examination.

As was seen, Utilitarianism lays .-reat
stress

on the needs of the "greatest number", thereby
making conceivable
the total forfeiture of the needs of the minority.

This is a pos-

ition that could easily justify slavery, and is one
that is totally
abhorrent to Burke.

Based on his belief in the moral equality of

all men, it is as unacceptable to sacrifice the needs of
the min-

ority to those of the majority as it is to do the reverse.

In the

society Burke favors, all must bo free, and so a democratic tj^ranny
is but little better (if at all) than an autocratic tyranny.

The

needs of all are to be valued equally, as all the most important

needs are ultimately granted by a benevolent God.

nothing if not a libertarian belief.

This is surely

Further, Burke does not accept

the Utilitarian belief that the government can be used to pror.ote

the needs and freedom of the people, or the majority.

He holds

instead to the Conservative Libertarian belief that doubts the
efficacy and safety of government action.

In Burke

own words,

"It \the governmen'^ can do very little positive 'Tood.'''^

Far from

being used to improve the lot of the people, pjovernment should
be restricted so that it shall not make unwarranted invasions on

liberty, as it has an omnipresent tendency to do.

The state is

to be limited in the name of freedom.

It can be seen that Burke's theory is a direct mirror image

of that of Utilitarianism.
1

""Burke,

Where he is corporate, It is individual-

Thoughts and Details On Scarcity

,

in Burke'

s

'.Vorks

,

ietic, and -/here he is at least somewhat
individualistic, it is

corporate.

Utilitarianism sees needs as individually determined

and implemGnted through and by the state,
whereas Burke sees needs
as determined either by nature or by one's corporate
associations,

and Implemented both by one's non-political associations
and by
the individual.

There can be little doubt that Burke's theory

is irreconciliably opposed to that of Utilitarianism.
B. Maistre On Utilitarianism.

is found in Maistre.

A somewhat different situation

Naturally Maistre is at least as little enam-

ored of Utilitarianism's atomistic theory of needs as is Burke,
To Maistre, it is entirely impossible, absurd, and even heretical
for people to seek to determine their own needs, both because they

necessarily lack the ability to do so and because all of a nation's
true needs are embodied in its God-given unwritten constitution.'^

Man has no right to even think about what his needs might be, for
this is tantamount to questioning the wisdom of God.

A further

reason why this is so is that the greatest need of any nation is
1
order, 2

Maistre is, with some justice, convinced that order canno

be reconciled with a continual questioning and debate about

needs*

tnari^s

One of man's chief needs, therefore, is not to be troubled

They are permanently provided for, at least as

about his needs.

long as the divine equilibrium is not disturbed by man.

Faith and

patriotism are also very great social needs, neither being an obMaistre, Considerations On France

Joseph Do Maistre
^

-Ibid.

,

,

p. 80»

pp. 89-90.

,

in Lively, V/orks Of

s
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ject of human choice, but instead aspects
intrinsic to any func-

tioning system.

Still another great need for every man
is the

external coercion that can cone from the state.

There is no poss-

ibility of a person rising to his proper moral
level unless the
state (and other institutions) coerce him.

After all this is said, Maistre comes out with
a statement
that it is difficult to reconcile

v/ith the

foregoing.

He declares

"The best form of government for each nation is that
which, in
the territory occupied by this nation, is capable of
producing

the greatest possible sum of happiness and strength, for the
greatest

possible number of men, during the longest possible time,"^'

Maistre become

a

Utilitarian?

Has

If so, that revelation ivould come

at a rather late date in this work, and since it has been seen

that Conf^ervatism and Utilitarianism are mutually exclusive, would

badly damage the thesis expressed.

Of course Maistre is no Util-

itarian, but it is still necessary to come to grips with the above
quotation.

Just what did he mean?

It would seem that the best

answer, that which v/ould do the least violence

to

tho tody of Maistre'

thought (It is best not to impute contradiction to a theorist unless definitely required to do so.), is that Maistre feels the state
that meets the requirements he set is that which adheres to its

natural constitution, and hence subordinates itself to the laws
of God.
'

The suggestion of a right to experiment in government

Maistre, Study On So verei gnty

De Maistre . p» 12G»

,

in Lively, vyorks Of Joseph

forms thereby entirely vanishes, and this
Haistrean "Utilitarianism
is shown just to bo a matter of terminology
that Maistre picked
up during

liis

pre-Pevolution "radical" period.

This is not to

say that Kaistre vns being ;d.llfully deceptive,
and it is therefore necessary to try to understand why Kaistre
was apparently

.

vidlling to accept a state which served the needs
of less than all

of its citizens, which (as was seen in Chapter One) is an
apparent

contradiction of Conservatism.

The answer would probably be that

Maistre, vrith very great reluctance, was willing to read out of
the human race such compulsive violators of the moral law as
the

French revolutionaries.

They are so divorced from the laws of

God that their needs cannot be met in any organized and civilized

society.

It has been seen that Maistre»s solution to the problem

of these people is that they should die.

The society is, however,

to serve all others* needs.

Tho last great need of man is his need to understand his

place in the world.

This place is one of extreme subordination

to both political and (especially) moral authorities.

If a man

does not accept this subordination, he will give way to the

pAyl

of pride (which is, in Maistre's estimation, the mother of all
sins) and thereby bring upon himself all manner of horrible (tut

deserved) sufferings, both spiritual and physical.

Rather significantly, Maistre (unlike Burke) is not even
Vvdlling to consider the economic requirements of life as being

among man's needs.

Burke felt these were needs and were to be
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settled by asreement in the marketplace.

Maistre could not be

obli^^icu8 to the physical needs of life,
but he

ivas

unwilling to

even raise the question in his discussion of
needs, possibly in
fear that an opening would be given for economic
protest.

It can

be ass-^ed, however, that Maistre would favor
the relieving of

genuine distress through individual charity, for he was
not a

heartless

nian.

How are these needs to be achieved?
somewhat nearer to the Utilitarian point of

Here Maistre approaches
^rLew

than does Burke.

Man's needs are to be impleraented by a complete mobilization of
all of the institutions of society, spiritual, political, and social.

Man is so naturally rebellious that any less of an activity will
cause him to embrace his false needs in place of his true ones.

For the sake of humanity, this cannot be permitted.
govermnent to bring about the realization of
proper.

Working through

raan»s needs is q-aite

Naturally, in keeping v;ath the essence of Maistre'

s

thought,

the key institution for forcing man to accept his needs, that in-

stitution which orders all the others, is the Catholic Church.
In thiis small part of his theory, therefore, Maistre may be looked

upon as an Ultramontane Catholic Utilitarian.
an.

If this sounds like

incongruous arrangement, it is only because it is.
Maistre takes Burke's non-individualistic theory of

needs one huge step further.

whatever to do
mass.

vidth the

hiunan

That which is rational has nothing

choices of men, either singly or in their

To Burke, the desires of the individual are not the total
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Judge of rationality; to Maistre, they
arc no judee at all.

In

another departure from Utilitarianism, Maistre
's claim that he,
like Burke, judges the rationality of a strategy
or practice based
on the results which occur from it, is shown
to be false.

The

best example of this is Maistre 's attitude toward
Protestantism,
to which,

at a time when he saw Europe at war ^^dth
"a real prac-

tical atheism", he was unwilling to grant the slightest
shred of

legitimacy in the common cause.

At a time when England was the

bulwark of the anti-Jacobin crusade, Maistre was confidently predicting that country »s conversion to Catholicism.

This had to

be offensive to British sensibilities and dajnaging to the alliance.

Kaietre determined a priori that only that which furthered the
cause cf Catholicism could be productive of good results (and thereby

rational), and

v/as

save Christianity.

unvdlling to depart from this belief to help
Maistre was as good a Philosophe as one could

have hoped to have found in the Jacobin camp.

Once he had fastened

upon a first principle, he v/ould pursue it to the end, come what
may.

ks must be evident by now, Maistre 's response to Utilitar-

ianism had a fundamental inflexibility that was not present in Burke.
Thin was true notwithstanding Maistre *s contention that the
best state is that which promotes the greatest happiness and strength

of the greatest number.

Maistre, as

a

strong Ultramontanist

,

de-

termined in advance what constituted "true happiness", and like
so many other ideologues

v;as,

despite (or perhaps because of} great

personal benevolence on his part, willing to spread fire, sword.
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misery throughout the v/orld so that true
reason and true happiness might be achieved. One may safely
assume that Spain was
._nd

a happier country before the coming of
the Inquisition, but sin(ice

true reason and true happiness were possible
only through the

ti
;rue

religion, any loss of false happiness could not
count for much.

Maistre's reason, or unreason, is essentially the same
as that
of the Jacobins.

Both of them feel that what ought to be, which

is the only reason and happiness, must be realized regardless
of
cost, and anything less than this can be permitted only a very

transitory existence.

Maistre's relationship to Utilitarianism is an ambiguous
one.

He believes that the important needs have nothing to do with

aiding the individual as individual.

If the true needs of the

entire society are met, the actual needs of the individual
also be met.

vn.ll

Individualism itself is very far from a real need,

and is actually the death of all real needs.

There is obviously

none of the arithmetic approach of Utilitarianism in this.

On

the subject of implementing man's needs, however, there are some

decided similarities between Maistre and Utilitarianism.

Once

man's needs are determined (though Maistre and Utilitarianism determine, them in very different ways), they are brought to fruition

in similar ways by the two theories.

There are no necessary lim-

itations on the executive pov/er of government in either theory.
The government may fairly be used to bring man's needs to fulfill-

ment.

That this may indeed be a threat to the individual is something

of no consequence to Maistre and something
overlooked by the Util-

itarians*
C, An Analysis.

It is worthwhile to end this chapter vdth

the question of who is the closer to Utilitarianism,
Burke or Maistre,

and what this means for their theories.

It has already been seen

that neither one is a true Utilitarian, and the reasons
for this

need not be reiterated*

Surprisingly, or perhaps not so surpris-

ingly, Maistre, the Authoritarian Conservative, is somewhat closer
to Utilitarianism than is Burke, the Libertarian Conservative.

The idea of an activist state, which is unpleasant to Burke, is
not so to Maistre.

Maistre is willing to use the state extensively

to bring about the establishment of a just and ideal society (though

the components of this utopia differ greatly from those a Qtilitarian

would suggest), which, on the subject of implementation, is not
all that dissimilar to the approach of Utilitarianism.

That this

similarity exists may tell as much about Utilitarianism as it does
about Maistre.
A study of Burke's views on Utilitarianism shows both the

existence and the limits of his libertarian beliefs.

He is unv/illing

to allow man to determine his ovm needs (at least in any v±tal

sphere of life), and yet he is also unwilling to allow the state
to be the prime mover for the needs of the people, out of fear

of what this could do to the liberty of both the individual and

society.

Burke's theory is, therefore, simultaneously more and

less libertarian than that of Utilitarianism.

No such partial

libertarianisrr. is found in Maistre.

He rejoctc the libertariai

aspects of Utilitarianism, like Burke, but unlike Burke
accept;
(consciously or unconsciously) those aspects of Utilitarianism
favorable to an authoritarian theory.

The verdict of this cha-

Eay, therefore, be to underscore the fact of Burke's qualified
libc-rtarianisrc and of Maistre' s qualified authoritarianism.
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Chapter XII: The Legacy Of Burke
and Maist:
It has been seen throughout
this dissertation that Burke

and Maistre represent substantially
different solutions to niany
Of the problems of man, society,
and government. The question
which must now be considered is
what the importance of these
two
thinkers was, for history, for
Conservatism, and for political
theory. Naturally, these three
spheres of inquiry necessarily
overlap each other.
A. The Significance Cf Burke.

were quite striking.

The effects of Burke on history

There is little doubt, for example,
that

his opposition to George Illtg attempts
at royal influence had
a real tendency to rally the Whig Party
against this threat, and

thereby to pave the way for the modern
British constitutional
monarchy.

Just what the political development of England
would

have been without Burke's substantially
successful campaign for

Parliamentary independence and dominance is
difficult to

kno-:.

There is, however, good reason to believe that England's history

would have been far different if she had been ruled by a

kin,^

with wide influence, or even dominance, over Parliament.
Allied to this endeavor of Burke was the intellectual ra-

tionale he gave to political parties (The details of his argument

need not be recapitulated.).

It would, of course, be foolish

to say that political parties would not have developed if Burke

had not written Thoughts On the Cause Of the Present Discontents

,
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for proto-political parties had developed
before he entered Parliament, but Burke's contribution to
this development was to make

party membership an un-self conscious
allegiance.

Burke's friend

Oliver Goldsmith could jokingly say of him,
in a game Burke's
club once played of thinking of humorous
epitaphs for the members,
that he had "given to party that which
belonged to mankind", but
the significant historical contribution Burke
made in this regard

was to show that the needs of party and mankind
could be reconciled.

Had Burke, or someone else, not made and openly
declared

this discovery, it is doubtful that political parties, which
might
have led a guilt-stricken existence, could have arisen to the

position of prominence they hold in the contemporary British political system.

Burke's historic influence stretched across the Atlantic

Ocean during the period of the American Revolution.

There can

be little doubt that Burke (along with Pitt, Rose Fuller, Rockingham,

and others) did much through his political opposition to hinder
the British war effort.

It would be going too far to suggest

Burke was a decisive factor in the British defeat, for in this

war the British were laboring under enormous military and logistical difficulties, but he did, nevertheless, make successful

conclusion of the war for Britain much more unlikely.
The most important historic contribution of Burke certainly

concerned the French Revolution.

In this crisis, he (at the outset

almost single-handedly) rallied a British populace, which was

originally inclined toward temporizing with
the menace, to
ited defense of the British constitution and

a spir-

of Western civiliza-

tion.

Historical post-diction is always an extremely
hazardous

undertaking, but it does seem that Burke was quite
correct that
there was no basis for peace between England and
revolutionary
France.

Had England not embraced an anti-Jacobin crusade, or

had not done so in time, there is good reason to believe
that
France might have won the war.

If the new French principles had

triumphed (even in their Bonapartist manifestation), it is obvious
that the very basis of Western civilization would have been rad-

ically altered.

If a universal Jacobin French empire had emerged

in the late eighteenth century, it is hardly likely that the world
as we know it today could have emerged.

'.'Aether

this would have

been a good or a bad thing is, of course, a matter of interpretation.
As one would expect of a crisis of this magnitude, the French

Revolution worked changes on the partisan political makeup of
England,

v.dth

Burke playing a central role in these changes.

It was seen earlier in this work that Burke abandoned the

'iiHiig

Party because of this catastrophe (after that party abandoned
its principles).

Party

v/ith

He also took a large proportion of the Wliig

him into the Tory Party, thereby leading to a long

period of Tory dominance.

During the forty years after Burke

crossed over to the Tories, the Whig Party was to be in power
in England for but two years.

Consequently, Burke was reviled

ever after by the Whigs as a traitor, and hailed by the Tories

as a savior.

An interestins side-effect of
Burke's (and many

of his fellow

m±ssn

removal to the Tory Party was probably,

somewhat paradoxically, to weaken the
authority of the king over
that party, and thereby over the British
political system as a
whole. This is so because when a person
goes from one party to
another, he does not leave behind all of the
marks of his origins

The party of the "King»s Friends" was, consequently,
somewhat

transformed.

Burke's effects on Conservatism were no less significant
than his effects on history.

It may be permissible to see him

(with Maistre) as being one of the fathers of organized Conservatism.

Before these two men began thinking about the nature

of society and politics. Conservatism existed only as a series
of scattered threads here and there, not as an integrated fabric.
It may be said that it was Burke, who slightly pre-dated Maistre

in his writings, that first made Conservatism conscious of itself

This was definitely his effect in Germany (and fairly generally
on the continent), as

,

v/e

learn from Peinhcld Aris.

A history of political thought in Germany in this period of
transition and ferment (that of the French devolution and
Bonaparte, would be incomplete if vie did not consider the influence which Burke exerted upon German thinkers. This influence can indeed hardly be overestimated. None of the political philosophers, with the sole exception of Rousseau,
forced the German thinkers to re-define their political views
to such an extent, nor opened such fundamentally new aspects
In one respect his influence even surpassed
as did Burke.
that of Rousseau.
Rousseau never formed a political school
in Germany, whereas Burke became the spiritual father not

only of the Romantic and the Historic
schools but also
'^^'^'^^^^
developed after the war ;f
Ubera?ian!t
It was Burke who turned Conservatism
from a nostalgic longing

for the "good old days" or a desire to
maintain the status quo

into a coherent set of principles to which
men of intellect could
rally. That they did rally to this standard

was seen in the above

quotation from Aris.

Burke was the pace-setter not only for Con-

servatism as a whole, but (as was seen in Chapter One)
for a par-

ticular type of Conservatism, Conservative Libertarianism.

As

such, he may be looked upon as the spiritual forebear
of such

modern thinkers as Frank Meyer,

'.Villiam F.

Buckley, Jr.

,

Barry

Goldwater, and others.
As one would expect, the emergence of an articulate Conser-

vatism fostered by Burke worked changes in the nature of political philosophy.

Before Burke, political discourse had for quite

a while tended to be divided between those oriented primarily

to the past or the status quo by impulse, and those "progressives"
who pointed the way to a future based on humanism and individual

reason*

Naturally, the "reactionaries" were usually poor compet-

itors for the "rationalists" in an age rather entranced by "reason"
and so where rationalism was defeated it was usually by force
of arms, not ideas.

This reached the point where Catherine the

Great, autocrat of all the Russias, fancied herself a philosophe

^Reinhold Aris, History Of Political Thought In Gt>rmany

,

From 1789 To l8l5 (London: George Allen and Dnwln, Ltd., 1936), p.

and had a bust of Voltaire in her palace!

Burke introduced a

new element into the equation of political discourse,
and by doing
so altered the nature of this discourse, though,

as was seen in

Chapter One, some opponents of Conservatism insist upon identifying it vath a status quo attitude or reaction.
ever, an honest or dishonest mistake.

Such is, how-

It may not be too much

to say that the advent of developed Conservative philosophy
ra-

ther decisively altered the nature of the universe of political
philosophy.

No longer could the "Enlightenment" claim sole own-

ership of thought.

The fact that the "Enlightenment" and its

contemporary heirs, in their pure form, lost the unchallenged

intellectual mastery they once had and became

v;hat

they often

are today, a hesitant, uncertain, and compromising doctrine, may
be to some degree the result of the effective intellectual chall-

enge Burke and his Conservative successors made to it.

A king

rules less confidently when there is a pretender to the throne

with forces in the field.
B. The Significance Of Maistre.

The same basic format used

for examining Burke's importance shall be used for Maistre: he

shall be scrutinized as to his effects on history, Conservatism,

and political philosophy in general.

It shall be seen that Maistr

importance has unfortunately been deemed to be less than it really
It is true that Maistre, at least in comparison with Burke,

never wrought any direct influence of importance on history.
He never held any political office where he could influence the

events of his time in any meaningful way.

As a propagandist for

the anti-Jacobin cause in Switzerland he
probably did something

to boost the spirits of his fellow refugees,
but there was really

nothing especially decisive about this.

Most of Maistre's mature

political career was spent in Russia as the
representative of
a trivial power, in which position he was quite unable
to influ-

ence the course of events of history.

Though this is rather par-

adoxical in the case of a man who so hated philosophers,
it must
be said that Maistre's significance would have to be
considered

wholly philosophical.

As a political figure, Maistre is almost

completely obscure.
His importance for Conservatism is, hov/ever, striking.

If Burke was the spiritual father of Conservative Libertarianisra,
Maistre had the same relationship to Conservative Authoritarianism.
As should be quite clear by new, the main philosophical themes

of Conservative Authoritarianism (complete subordination of the

individual, infallible implementation of the moral law by an earthl

institution, etcetera) are present in Maistre.

The strange thing

is that Maistre's importance for Conservatism has not been rec-

ognised even by those, such as Bozell, who consciously or unconsciously follow his teachings.

Whether the debt is acknov/iedged

or not, however, Maistre's virtual creation of an entire Conser-

vative philosophical school cannot be denied.

>Vhat

Conservatism

would have been if it had not been a multiple birth is difficult
to say, but the fact is that Burke shared the duties of midwife

with Maistre.
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In political philosophy as a whole,.
Maietre has been a
Y«ry neglected figure. I hope it
has become apparent by now
that Maistre was the architect of several
important concepts
that decerre Bore treatment than they
hav* received. Certain
of

hifi

insights, such as that of the tendency of
power to grav-

itate to one institution, within every society,
are of firstrate iaportance for Kaistre^s time and our

o'jm.

This leads,

then, to the question why Maistre has been such
a neglected thinker,

There has never, whatever its real debt to

liim,

of txhought that proudly bore Maistre ^s name.

been a school

One answer prob-

ably is that Maistre nearer wanted to be viewed as an independent thinker..

His hatred for theory is quito obvious, this

hatred stenming from his belief that to ponder the nature of
society and the universe was tantamount t© a divorce
and

frcta

God»s Church.

independent thinker.

ay

frora

God

Despite this, however, Maistre was as

When a

raan

says he is not a theorist, it

be reasonable to believe

hiis

and ignore his written evidence

t» the contrary.

Some of this happened with Maistre.

Another

factor that aay well contribute to the slighting of Maistre
is that his hoaaeland was an unimportant power in world affairs.

One's ideas are always more likely to receive a hearing if they
are trumpeted from center stage, rather than from the wings.

What would have happened to the reception of his thoughts if

Plato were born a Scythian instead of an Athenian, or Burke a

Savoyard instead ©f

a subject of Great Britain?

It is an un-

fortunate tendency of man to look for the great thoughts in
the
great countries*

Further, Maistre was a Catholic thinker, and

there might have been a tendency, for that reason, to feel he

was speaking only to Catholics.

It is not really a coincidence

that Maistre 's chief popularizer in the United States was Orestes

Brownson, after he embraced the Church of Rome,

I

do, neverthe-

less, believe that Maistre has something to say to all people.
A final consideration that may incline people to disregard Maistre

is the tendency of some writers (such as Laski) to see him as
a forerunner of Fascism, and hence as a trivial thinker.

after all, is a creed

\vhJ.ch

counts the value of thought.
can be, a creed

Vvd-thout

Fascism,

is proudly anti-intellectual and dis-

Fascism is, as far as any movement

a creed.

If Maistre were a precursor

of Fascism, therefore, it would be quite correct for political
philosophy to eschew examination of the political theory of a

man

ift-ithout

a political theory.

It should be evident by now that

Conservative Authoritarianism and Fascism, whatever their superficial similarities may be, are definitely distinct and often
sv/eepingiy different philosophies, and consequently this last

argument is not a good reason for hesitating to consider Maistre
the founder of a major school of political philosophy, and to
give him the degree of intellectual scrutiny which follov/s from

this position.

I

truly hope that one feature of current political

philosophy will be to take a second, or even a first, look at
Count Joseph De Maistre, and not to ignore him as has so often

been the case in the past.

C, Conclusion.

The legacies of Burke and Maistre may be

seen collectively as Conservatism.

Before their time, Conserva-

tism was a fugitive doctrine, existing in bits and shreds
among
thinkers, some of whom possibly would not have thought of them-

selves as Conservatives, and spoken of in whispers, if at all.
Burke and Maistre, as it were, took Conservatisri out of obscurity

and into the bright daylight.

Intellectual respectability could

no longer be confidently denied to Conservatism, though many have

tried to do this.

After this initial point, however, the legacies

of Burke and Maistre diverge.

At the same time that Conservatism

was born to a new and vibrant self-confidence, it was also born
to the

di.

vision that marks it to this day.

As is good Conserva-

tive doctrine, one can only understand the future of an institution, a society, or a philosophy by understanding its originso

To speak of the effective origins of Conservatism is to speak
of Sdaund Burke and Joseph de Maistre, the founding fathers.
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